Opinion
CIVIL ACTION No. 03-1558 SECTION: 1/2
November 25, 2003
ORDER AND REASONS
This matter is before the court on a motion, filed on behalf of claimant, Warren Eschet, to transfer this limitation action to the federal district court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division, pursuant to Rule F(9) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims and the "first to file" rule. Petitioner-in-limitation, Hot Energy Services, Inc., opposes this motion. For the following reasons, Eschet's motion is GRANTED.
Rec. Doc. No. 7.
Rec. Doc. No. 10.
BACKGROUND
This action arises from an explosion and fire that occurred in the engine room aboard the CAMCO BARGE #3 on or about April 21, 2003. At all relevant times, petitioner, Hot Energy Services, Inc. ("Hot Energy") was the owner and operator of the CAMCO BARGE #3. Claimant, Warren Eschet, alleges that he was employed as a seaman by Hot Energy on April 21, 2003, and that he was in the course and scope of his employment when he was injured as a result of the explosion. On May 2, 2003, Eschet filed a lawsuit in the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division, against Hot Energy and certain other defendants for damages arising from personal injuries he sustained in connection with the April 21, 2003, incident. On June 2, 2003, Hot Energy filed an action in this Court seeking exoneration from or limitation of liability with respect to the April 21, 2003, incident aboard the CAMCO BARGE #3.
See Rec. Doc. No. 1, Pet. complaint for exoneration from or limitation of liability ("Complaint"), ¶ V.
Complamt, ¶ II.
Rec. Doc. No. 6, claimant Eschet's answers and claims, at 6, ¶¶ I-III; see also Complaint, ¶ V (alleging that the explosion aboard the CAMCO BARGE #3 resulted in certain personal injuries).
See Rec. Doc. No. 7, Ex. A, Eschet v. Goodrich Petroleum Corp., et al., PL complaint filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division.
See Complaint, ¶¶ V, XII-XVIII.
Eschet filed the instant motion contending that, pursuant to Rule F(9), Hot Energy's limitation action should be transferred to the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division, because venue in the Eastern District of Louisiana is improper. Additionally, Eschet argues that transfer is appropriate pursuant to the "first to file" rule. Hot Energy opposes the motion, contending that venue is proper in this district and, alternatively, if venue is not proper this Court should nevertheless retain jurisdiction over the limitation action because the Eastern District of Louisiana is the most convenient forum in which to proceed.
Pursuant to the "first to file" rule, "when related cases are pending before two federal courts, the court in which the case was last filed my refuse to hear it if the issues raised by the cases substantially overlap." Cadle Co. v. Whataburger of Alice, Inc., 174 F.3d 599, 603 (5th Cir. 1999).
LA WAND ANALYSIS
Rule F(9) of the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims governs the proper venue for this limitation proceeding. See Fed.R.Civ.P. Supp. A.M.C. Rule A(4) (providing that the supplemental rules apply to the procedure in admiralty with respect to actions for exoneration from or limitation of liability). Rule F(9) provides in pertinent part:
The complaint shall be filed in any district in which the vessel has been attached or arrested to answer for any claim with respect to which the plaintiff seeks to limit liability; or if the vessel has not been attached or arrested, then in any district in which the owner has been sued with respect to any such claim. When the vessel has not been attached or arrested to answer the matters aforesaid, and suit has not been commenced against the owner, the proceedings may be had in the district in which the vessel may be, but if the vessel is not within any district and no suit has been commenced in any district, then the complaint may be filed in any district. (Emphasis supplied).
"The rule makes clear that if the owner has been sued with respect to any claim to which the plaintiff seeks to limit liability, the limitation complaint must be filed in the district in which the owner has been sued." In re Complaint of the Tug of Danielle M. Bouchard Corp., 1998 WL 164849, *2 (E.D.La. April 7, 1998)(Vance, J.); accord In re W. Atlas Int'l Inc., 1998 WL 259965, *1 (E.D.La. May 19, 1998)(Clement, J.)("Western should have filed its complaint in the Middle District of Louisiana owing to Fisher's previously filed Petition for Damages [in that district]."); In re Falcon Drilling Co., Inc., 1996 WL 39410, * 1 (E.D.La. Jan. 31, 1996)(Fallon, J.) (holding that the proper venue for a limitation action is the district in which a claimant previously filed a lawsuit against vessel owner); In re TLC Marine Servs, Inc., 900 F. Supp. 54, 55 (E.D.Tex. 1995)(Cobb, J.) (noting that the district court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in which a limitation proceeding was filed by a vessel owner "had no option but to transfer this case to the Eastern District of Texas under the Admiralty Rules, since [a claimant] had a pending suit here"); In re Am. River Transp. Co., 864 F. Supp. 554, 556 (E.D.La. 1994)(McNamara, J.)("[B]ecause [a claimant] filed a claim against the vessel owners in Texas State court, the appropriate venue is the [district court encompassing the location of the state court]).
It is uncontested that Hot Energy is the owner of CAMCO BARGE #3 and that prior to Hot Energy filing its petition for limitation of liability in this Court, Eschet filed his personal injury lawsuit against Hot Energy in the Southern District of Texas. Further, Hot Energy does not contend that at the time it filed its limitation action in this Court, the CAMCO BARGE #3 had been attached or arrested. Therefore, the proper venue for petitioner's limitation action was the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division, where Eschet's claim against Hot Energy was pending.
Hot Energy also argues that because a claim by another crew member of the CAMCO BARGE #3 was filed in Orleans Parish Civil District Court after the petition for limitation of liability was filed, venue is now proper in this district because Hot Energy has been sued in this district.
"[T]here is authority that where there are several causes of action pending when the limitation petition is filed, there is nothing in the rule which in any way indicates that it must be or should follow the venue of the first suit." In re Bloomfield Steamship Co., 227 F. Supp. 615, 618 (E.D.La. 1964) (interpreting the predecessor of Rule F(9), General Admiralty Rule 54). However, where there is only one lawsuit pending when the limitation petition is filed, the district court in which that lawsuit is pending "is the only one in which the limitation could be filed. . . ." Id. Petitioner's have cited no authority for the proposition that improper venue may be retroactively cured by the filing of another claimant's lawsuit when venue was initially improper.
Hot Energy asserts that venue is not proper in the Southern District of Texas because the Hon. Samuel B. Kent, United States District Judge, Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division, stayed and administratively closed Eschet's claim in response to a stay order issued by this Court. Based on Judge Kent's administrative closure, Hot Energy contends that transfer is inappropriate because Eschet's claim is not currently pending in that court.
See Rec. Doc. No. 7, Ex. 2, Eschet v. Goodrich Petroleum Corp., et al, Civil Action No. G-03-293, Order of Stay and Administrative Closure (S.D.Tex. June 27, 2003).
The Court rejects petitioner's argument. Judge Kent's order merely stayed Eschet's claim, in deference to this Court's limitation stay order, "for a period of thirty (30) days, pending the entry of an Order from the limiting Judge, lifting the limitation stay or final adjudication of the limitation matter on its merits." Judge Kent did not dismiss Eschet's action or otherwise close that case.
Id.
Based upon Judge Kent's order, this Court finds that for purposes of Rule F(9), Eschet's claim, although temporarily stayed and administratively closed for thirty days, remains pending in the Southern District of Texas.
Finally, Hot Energy argues that even if venue was initially improper, this Court should not transfer this case to the Southern District of Texas because the Eastern District of Louisiana is a more convenient forum. With respect to the consequences of improperly laying venue in a limitation proceeding, Rule F(9) provides that "[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, the court may transfer the action to any district; if venue is wrongly laid the court shall dismiss or, if it be in the interest of justice, transfer the action to any district in which it could have been brought" (emphasis supplied). By its terms, Rule F(9) mandates that if venue is improperly laid, the limitation action shall be dismissed or transferred.
Confronting forum non conveniens arguments similar to the argument Hot Energy makes before this Court, district courts in this district have consistently held that even if a petitioner's forum non conveniens arguments may have merit, a limitation petitioner's forum non conveniens arguments are properly considered by a court of proper venue. See In re Tug Danielle M. Bouchard, 1998 WL 16849, at *2 ("This Court cannot comment on the merits of [the forum non conveniens] argument, however, because venue was improperly placed in this Court in the first place."); In re Falcon Drilling, 1996 WL 39410, at * 1 ("The Court agrees that under a forum non conveniens analysis, the Eastern District of Louisiana is the most convenient forum to the parties and the witnesses. However, as this is not the court of proper venue, it is not for this Court to address this issue."); In re Am. River, 836 F. Supp. at 556 n. 1 ("This court orders the transfer of this matter with full awareness that it may be transferred back to the Eastern District of Louisiana for Forum Non Conveniens reasons, as the parties are from Louisiana, the alleged incident occurred in Louisiana, and the witnesses, records, and physicians are allegedly all located in Louisiana."). Therefore, petitioner's forum non conveniens arguments are properly considered, in the first instance, by the district court in the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division.
"It is inevitable that cases will arise in which the very rules designed to ensure the expedient and orderly consideration of matters will serve as impediments to efficient disposition." In re Falcon Drilling, 1996 WL 39419, at *1. Nevertheless, the Court is constrained by the plain language of Rule F(9) despite the Court's awareness that this action may be transferred back to this Court on forum non conveniens grounds. See id.
Because this Court finds that transfer is appropriate under the clear text of Rule F(9), the Court need not address whether the "first to file" rule applies in this case.
Accordingly, in the interest of justice and for the above and foregoing reasons,
IT IS ORDERED that the motion of claimant, Warren Eschet, to transfer this limitation action is GRANTED and this action is HEREBY TRANSFERRED to the Southern District of Texas, Galveston Division.