Opinion
No. 349658
03-03-2020
In re HOOKS/WRIGHT/TOLBERT/WHITE/RIVERS/DOZIER, Minors.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 07-468721-NA Before: REDFORD, P.J., and CAVANAGH and SERVITTO, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother, W. Rockette, appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to seven children: CH, CWH, GW, MT, JW, CD, and MR. The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j). Because we conclude that there are no errors warranting relief, we affirm.
I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Between 2003 and 2018, respondent gave birth to seven children. For more than a decade, the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHHS") and the juvenile court system have been closely involved with monitoring respondent's family. The family's contact with Children's Protective Services ("CPS") began in 2007 when the three oldest children, CH, CWH, and GW, were removed from respondent's care after the police found respondent on the ground, intoxicated, and threatening suicide. During this early proceeding, respondent was offered services to address her substance abuse, mental health issues, housing, and parenting skills. Also, during this early proceeding, respondent gave birth to two more children, MT and JW. The three older children were eventually returned to respondent's care and the court terminated its jurisdiction in February 2011.
Between 2011 and 2015, the family continued to have contact with CPS. Several neglect complaints were investigated. Additional services were offered to the family in an effort to avoid removal of the children. In January 2016, while investigating a neglect complaint, CPS discovered that respondent and her five children were living in utter squalor. Shortly thereafter, the DHHS filed a petition requesting that the court take jurisdiction over the children and remove them from respondent's care. The petition included allegations related to physical and environmental neglect. It further included allegations that, despite being provided with services during prior proceedings, respondent had failed to address her mental health issues.
In March 2016, following a bench trial, the trial court found that statutory grounds for jurisdiction existed pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2), because of physical and environmental neglect, financial insecurity, and abandonment by the respective fathers. The court ordered respondent to participate in services, including a psychological and psychiatric evaluation, parenting classes, individual counseling, family counseling when recommended, parenting time, and a substance abuse assessment. Respondent was also ordered to follow any prescribed medication regime, submit to random drug screens, and obtain and maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income. In the 2½ years that followed, respondent's participation in her treatment plan was, at best, inconsistent, and she gave birth to two more children, CD and MR. For a brief period between November 2017 and February 2018, the three oldest children were returned to respondent's care, only to again be removed because they were at risk of harm if they remained in respondent's care. Respondent was then provided an additional eight months to work toward reunification. When her progress was deemed insufficient, the guardian ad litem ("GAL") for the children filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondent's parental rights. After a February 2019 hearing, the court found statutory grounds to terminate respondent's parental rights and further determined that termination was in the children's best interests. Thereafter, this appeal followed.
II. DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUES
A. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent first challenges the trial court's finding that the statutory grounds for termination were established by clear and convincing evidence. We find no error in this regard.
In order to terminate parental rights, the trial court must first find that at least one of the statutory grounds for termination has been established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Trejo, 462 Mich 341, 355; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). This Court reviews the trial court's findings under the clearly erroneous standard. MCR 3.977(K). A finding is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. In re Miller, 433 Mich 331, 337; 445 NW2d 161 (1989).
The trial court terminated respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j). These statutory provisions permit termination of parental rights under the following circumstances:
(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either of the following:
(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.
(ii) Other conditions exist that cause the child to come within the court's jurisdiction, the parent has received recommendations to rectify those conditions, the conditions have not been rectified by the parent after the parent has received notice and a hearing and has been given a reasonable opportunity to rectify the conditions, and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age.After reviewing the record, we conclude that the trial court did not err when it terminated respondent's parental rights under the foregoing grounds.
* * *
(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of the child's parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the home of the parent.
Because of her mental health issues, domestic violence, unstable and inappropriate housing, and poor parenting skills, respondent has been involved with protective services since 2007. The children were removed from respondent's care for more than three years between 2007 and 2011. During this time, respondent was provided with services in an attempt to preserve the family. In 2011, the children were returned to respondent's care with reunification services in place. However, between 2011 and 2015, CPS received multiple referrals related to abuse and neglect, which necessitated the implementation of preventative services. In 2016, the children were again removed when they were found to be living in deplorable conditions. At that time, the court took temporary custody of the children and once again provided respondent with a treatment plan. The court ordered respondent to participate in services, including a psychological and psychiatric evaluation, parenting classes, individual counseling, family counseling when recommended, parenting time, and a substance abuse assessment. Respondent was also ordered to follow any prescribed medication regime, submit to random drug screens, and obtain and maintain suitable housing and a legal source of income. Despite being offered services for an extraordinary period of time, respondent is still unable to provide a safe and stable home for her children. The evidence presented at the termination hearing established that respondent had not adequately addressed the barriers to reunification, which have existed for more than a decade.
At the February 2019 termination hearing, the evidence clearly and convincingly established that respondent's mental health issues remained a significant obstacle to family reunification. Respondent was diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder and major depressive disorder. She testified that she continued to be treated by a therapist for her mood swings and a psychiatrist for, among other things, medication reviews. She also self-reported that she was taking her prescribed medications, but this assertion was suspect. Despite therapeutic services and prescribed medications, respondent's behavior remained unstable and volatile. Indeed, after the GAL filed the supplemental permanent-custody petition in October 2018, respondent's alarming negative behavior actually escalated. Respondent continued to have aggressive encounters with caseworkers. She frequently was involved in disputes with the children. The court suspended her parenting time in January 2019 after it learned that, in November 2018, respondent threatened to "shoot-up" a residential facility where one of the children resided. Respondent also made unfounded accusations against foster parents that not only jeopardized the placement but required CPS investigations and the removal of the children from their classrooms for interviews. Clearly, at the time of termination, respondent continued to struggle with mental health issues.
There was also clear and convincing evidence that respondent lacked the necessary skills to properly parent her seven children. Respondent challenges this conclusion, arguing that she had completed several services and further asserting that DHHS did not refer her for additional services. Although DHHS "has a responsibility to expend reasonable efforts to provide services to secure reunification, there exists a commensurate responsibility on the part of respondents to participate in the services that are offered." In re Frey, 297 Mich App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). Further, "[n]ot only must respondent cooperate and participate in the services, she must benefit from them." In re TK, 306 Mich App 698, 711; 859 NW2d 208 (2014).
While respondent did participate in services, she clearly did not benefit from the services offered. Indeed, after years of services, respondent continued to act in a manner that was not only inappropriate, but also put the children at risk of harm. In February 2018, while the children were briefly returned to respondent's care, the police were dispatched to respondent's home after receiving a report of a child on the roof. Apparently, after an altercation with respondent, GW left the house and climbed up on the roof. Respondent then refused to let the child back into the house. When the police arrived, they found two children outside the home without appropriate winter clothing and shoes. During this same period, respondent was also involved in a relationship with a man who had been convicted of sexually abusing a young child. Respondent was permitting this individual to have contact with her children, and in addition, he likely fathered her youngest child. When the three oldest children were briefly returned to her care between November 2017 and February 2018, the police were called to respondent's home 11 times in response to complaints of domestic violence, child endangerment, aggravated assault, and disorderly conduct.
Respondent's behavior during parenting time was also inappropriate. There were reports that respondent simply sat in a chair while others, including caseworkers and the older children, retrieved CD when he got into mischief. Respondent also foisted other responsibilities, like diaper changing, onto the older siblings. Respondent refused to sign authorizations necessary for several of the children to receive medical, psychological, and educational assistance. Just a month before the termination hearing, respondent's parenting time was suspended because of threats she made to "shoot up" one of the children's residential facilities. Respondent frequently yelled and cursed at the children and caseworkers. She was also heard accusing the children of being responsible for their removal because they did not clean up after themselves. These accusations were particularly harmful because they were internalized by the children. There was evidence that at least one child was emotionally struggling because he believed he was responsible for the family's circumstances. The behavior of several of the children also deteriorated after parenting time. The children began to mimic respondent's unacceptable negative behaviors, including acting very disrespectful to authority figures. Respondent's words and actions demonstrated that, while she may have participated in a multitude of services, she was unable to incorporate what she had learned into practice. That is, she failed to demonstrate that she could safely and properly parent her children.
Respondent asserts that she was not provided with necessary services, specifically family therapy, a parenting partner, and supportive visitation. Because respondent failed to raise the adequacy of her services in the trial court, this issue has not been preserved. In re Frey, 297 Mich App at 247. In any event, the record does not support respondent's representations that DHHS failed to make these referrals. Indeed, the record confirms that respondent was offered, and on occasion, participated in these very same services. Initially, respondent indicated that she was unwilling to work with a parent partner. Then she acquiesced. Indeed, in early 2017, respondent was participating in the parenting-partner program. Respondent's parenting partner reported at that time that respondent was attending the support group, that she was very resourceful, and that she accepted redirection well. The parenting-partner program was also assisting respondent with housing resources. Similarly, respondent participated in the supportive visitation program. At the termination hearing, a caseworker testified that she recently contemplated again providing respondent with a supportive parenting coach. However, the program refused to continue working with respondent because of her noncompliance. Further, this caseworker explained that, at that point, after three years of services, there were no other referrals available to respondent because she had completed all of her services. Another caseworker at the termination hearing testified that respondent was offered individual therapy and the children all received counseling. However, family therapy was not offered. This caseworker explained that respondent told him that she was unwilling to do any more therapy. Thus, the record does not support respondent's representation that she was not referred for necessary services. Instead, it is clear that the services were offered, but that respondent simply failed to benefit from them.
Respondent also notes on appeal that she had suitable housing. Indeed, at the February 2019 termination hearing, the caseworker testified that respondent's house was appropriate, that it had functioning utilities, a supply of food, and the necessary beds. However, while respondent finally established a home that was structurally suitable and fairly well-equipped, this did not render the home appropriate for her children because, while in that home, respondent was not able to properly parent her children.
On the basis of the foregoing, the trial court did not clearly err by finding that clear and convincing evidence supported termination of respondent's parental rights to the children under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), (c)(ii), and (j). The evidence supported a finding that despite a multitude of services, over the span of a decade, respondent was neither in a position to properly parent her children nor reasonably likely to be able to do so within a reasonable time, and the children were reasonably likely to be harmed if returned to her care.
B. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent also challenges the trial court's finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children's best interests. We disagree.
Once a statutory ground for termination has been established, the trial court must find that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests before it can terminate parental rights. MCL 712A.19b(5); In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012). Whether termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 90; 836 NW2d 182 (2013). We review for clear error a trial court's finding that termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests. In re Jones, 286 Mich App 126, 129; 777 NW2d 728 (2009).
A trial court may consider several factors when deciding if termination of parental rights is in a child's best interests, including the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home. In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42. The trial court may also consider psychological evaluations, the child's age, and a parent's history. In re Jones, 286 Mich App at 131. After considering the totality of the record, the trial court concluded that a preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the best interests of all seven children. After reviewing the record, we are not left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.
Respondent simply asserts that the court erred because a familial bond existed, she consistently attended parenting time, and she complied with her treatment plan. However, respondent ignores that while she may have participated in services, she did not benefit from them. Respondent was never able to integrate into her parenting what she had been taught through a multitude of services. She similarly ignores that during parenting time, her words and actions were inappropriate and damaging. Finally, while respondent and the children may have a bond, that factor did not outweigh the children's need for a safe and stable home that was free from emotional volatility. Respondent continued to struggle with mental health issues that impaired her ability to safely and appropriately parent her children. She continued to be involved in altercations with several individuals and she lacked insight into the nature of her conduct. Respondent clearly did not comprehend the severity of her mental illness and the need for treatment. The evidence confirmed that the children would be at risk of harm in respondent's care.
Between 2007 and 2016, respondent's three oldest children, CH, CWH and GW, were removed from respondent's care three times. At the time of termination, these children, now teenagers, had most recently been in care for three years. All three children were placed in residential facilities designed to meet their educational and significant psychological needs. All three were in therapy. The parties stipulated that these three children wished to be returned to respondent's care. However, there was testimony that reuniting these children with respondent would significantly impair their continued growth and development. When exposed to respondent, both CH and GW frequently mimicked respondent's poor behavior. Their caseworker explained that these children required a stable and more appropriate environment to address and overcome these behavioral issues. By contrast, CWH excelled in school and had earned an opportunity to enroll in an elite high school. He had been placed in his current residential facility three separate times, i.e., after each removal. His therapist explained that each time CWH returned to the facility, he presented with significant behavioral issues that took several months to resolve. This therapist was gravely concerned that if CWH were returned to respondent's care, he would lose the opportunities he had worked so hard to earn. The therapist explained that CWH benefited from a structured environment. The therapist was concerned for this child's continued forward progress should the child be returned to respondent's care.
Respondent's middle child, MT, has similarly been in care for three years. For most of those three years, she was placed in the same foster home. Indeed, her original foster parents had at one time expressed an interest in adopting the child. However, shortly before the termination hearing began, the foster parents requested that the child be moved because of behavioral issues. MT's caseworker explained that this child, like her siblings, exhibited significant behavioral issues that mimicked respondent's poor conduct. Moreover, respondent had made more than 20 CPS complaints against MT's original foster parents. Respondent's behavior had impacted MT's placement and taken a toll on the child's well-being. Further, respondent's conduct made it apparent that she was unwilling to put her children's interests ahead of her own.
The three youngest children, eight-year-old JW, three-year-old CD, and 16-month-old MR, have also been significantly impacted by respondent's instability. Like her older siblings, JW has been in care for three years. She had clearly experienced too much in her young life, as evidenced by the comments a caseworker overheard the child make to the effect that "we're in care for a reason and they're just trying to keep us safe." Finally, the two youngest children, CD and MR, had spent their entire young lives in foster care. They deserve the opportunity to be placed in a home where they will have stability, consistency, and finality, goals that will only be achieved through termination of respondent's parental rights. Considering the unique circumstances of each child, the trial court did not clearly err when it held that termination of respondent's parental rights was in the children's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ James Robert Redford
/s/ Mark J. Cavanagh
/s/ Deborah A. Servitto