In re Holder

5 Citing cases

  1. In re Holloway

    132 B.R. 771 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. 1991)   Cited 6 times

    Section 547(e)(2) provides for a relation back period if the security interest is perfected within ten days after the creation of the security interest. If perfection occurs outside the ten day period, the transfer is considered to have been made on the date of perfection. In re Holder, 18 B.C.D. 917, 94 B.R. 395 (B.C., M.D.N.C. 1988). This determination is necessary to ascertain whether a transfer is made on account of an antecedent debt. "The effect of the perfection provision of § 547(e) is that if a transfer made for a contemporaneous consideration is not perfected at once or within the statutory grace period, the consideration will be `antecedent to the delayed effective date of the transfer.'"

  2. In re Walker

    161 B.R. 484 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1993)   Cited 12 times
    Stating “as a matter of administrative practicality, the date on the title certificate constitutes the lender's perfection date. Commercial reality demands that parties be able to rely upon the lien perfection information contained [on] the title ... [g]reat uncertainty would be injected into credit and other transactions involving motor vehicles if parties were allowed to impeach or contradict the lien recording information....”

    In re Hamilton, 892 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1990); In re Holloway, 132 B.R. 771 (Bankr.N.D.Okla. 1991); In re Holder, 94 B.R. 395 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. 1988); In re Scoviac, 74 B.R. 635 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1987); In re Murray, 27 B.R. 445 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1984).

  3. In re Smallwood

    204 B.R. 519 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 1997)   Cited 1 times

    Furthermore, Congress did not amend Section 547(e)(1), which provides the definition for `perfection' as used in Section 547. At page 63. Other cases holding that federal law prevails in determining time of perfection include In re Holder, 94 B.R. 395 (Bkrtcy. M.D.N.C. 1988), In re Walker, 161 B.R. 484 (Bkrtcy.D.Idaho 1993), and In re Ross, 193 B.R. 902 (Bkrtcy.W.D.Mo. 1996). In consideration of the foregoing, it is the opinion of this Court that PNC Bank should prevail upon its defense that its lien on the debtors' vehicle is not avoidable by the plaintiff under 11 U.S.C. § 547(b).

  4. In re Beasley

    183 B.R. 857 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1995)   Cited 9 times

    See also In re Walker, 161 B.R. 484, 501 (Bankr.D. Idaho 1993), aff'd, 178 B.R. 497 (D.Idaho 1994); In re Holloway, 132 B.R. 771, 773 (Bankr.N.D.Okla. 1991); In re Holder, 94 B.R. 395, 398 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd, 94 B.R. 394 (M.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd, 892 F.2d 29 (4th Cir. 1989) (issue of applicability of state law relation-back period not appealed to the circuit court); In re Scoviac, 74 B.R. 635, 637-38 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1987); In re Murray, 27 B.R. 445, 451 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1983).

  5. In re Loken

    175 B.R. 56 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1994)   Cited 31 times
    Concluding that "varying grace periods provided for under state law are irrelevant." Id. at 64.

    There is also ample support for the contrary position. See In re Hamilton, supra, 892 F.2d at 1235; In re Holloway, 132 B.R. 771, 773 (Bankr. N.D.Okla. 1991); In re Holder, 94 B.R. 395, 398 (Bankr.M.D.N.C. 1988); In re Scoviac, 74 B.R. 635, 637-38 (Bankr.N.D.Fla. 1987). The Panel is in the fortunate position of being able to consider two recent excellent opinions from bankruptcy courts in the Ninth Circuit which clearly set forth the arguments of the two schools of thought.