Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Solano County Super. Ct. No. J 35137
NEEDHAM, J.
In these consolidated appeals, C.M. challenges two orders issued in dependency proceedings initiated under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300: an order placing her daughter H.M. with H.M.’s father, and a subsequent order terminating the juvenile court dependency over H.M. We will affirm the orders.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
H.M. was born in October 1990. Her mother is appellant C.M. Her father is L.M.
A. First Dependency Proceeding and Appeal
H.M. was the subject of a dependency proceeding from November 2004 to July 2006. By order signed on August 14, 2006, and filed on August 16, 2006 (August 2006 Order), the juvenile court granted sole legal and physical custody to H.M.’s father, granted twice monthly weekend visitation with C.M, and terminated dependency jurisdiction. C.M. appealed. The orders were upheld in case number A115260 in August 2007.
B. Second Dependency Proceeding and Appeals
Meanwhile, a new dependency petition was filed on behalf of H.M. on May 10, 2007. The petition alleged there was a substantial risk of serious physical harm and serious emotional damage based upon the father’s history of substance abuse and a recent arrest for driving under the influence. The petition also alleged substantial risk of serious emotional damage to H.M. if she were placed in C.M.’s care (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300, subd. (c)). H.M. was detained and placed in foster care.
1. Jurisdictional/Dispositional Order (Appeal No. A119940)
C.M was given notice of the continued jurisdiction and disposition hearings. At the jurisdictional and dispositional hearing on October 25, 2007, L.M. submitted to the allegations of the petition as amended. The court sustained the allegation as to C.M., who did not appear at the hearing. H.M. was continued in foster care. The dispositional findings and orders were filed and served on November 2, 2007.
On November 27, 2007, C.M. filed a notice of appeal from the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders of November 2. (Appeal No. A11940.) We dismissed the appeal on April 9, 2008, based on C.M.’s failure to file an opening brief.
2. Status Review (Appeal No. A121065)
A contested status review hearing was set for February 15, 2008. The parties filed briefs and documents supporting their positions.
The Department’s revised status report recommended placement of H.M. with her father, with the provision of family maintenance services. In support of its recommendation, the Department observed that the foster parents of H.M. and her brother were moving out of state, and the minors needed another placement.
H.M.’s father was in compliance with his case plan: he was in the progress of completing parenting education, he had completed treatment programs for substance abuse, and he tested negative for alcohol and illegal substances. Since May 2007, he had missed only one of approximately 41 supervised visits with H.M. Through his efforts, H.M. participated in at least one family therapy session with her father and a therapist. The father indicated he was prepared to have H.M. and her brother returned to his care, but recognized the challenges and was open to learning new techniques and strategies for parenting and interacting with H.M. and her brother.
The Department added: “Not only has [the father] been compliant with service provision he has consistently and actively initiated contact with service providers. He voluntarily entered St. Helena Hospital for treatment, he reestablished contact with his individual therapist and instructed him to contact the department, he has complied with the provision of the drug court, and he identified local AA meetings in his community and has participated in regular visitation absent any incidents of abuse or neglect. Thus, the family situation at the moment seems stable and absent immediate harm to the minor [H.M.].” Acknowledging the severity of the previous case history of the family, the Department recommended that the father provide documentation regarding his medical prescriptions and that the family participate in family functional therapy.
As to C.M, the Department asserted she had completed parenting education classes, but there was evidence she would need further parenting education. H.M. maintained she did not want to visit with C.M. due to C.M.’s manipulative behavior. Despite the Department’s urging, C.M. had failed to attend any court hearings in the dependency proceeding other than the initial detention hearing in May 2007. The Department did not recommend services for C.M. other than visitation, noting that H.M.’s father “is the custodial parent and the individual that [H.M.] views as the parental figure in her life.”
The Department concluded: “A Structured Decision Making Reunification Reassessment tool was completed on 2/11/08. According to the tool, the reunification risk level at this time is moderate and no safety threats were identified at this time. The recommendation for placement indicates: Return Home to the father’s care. The factors contributing to this outcome are directly related to the father having complied with all case plan components to date and the quality and consistency of the parent/child visitation. Reunification with the mother [C.M.] would present a risk due to the lack of relationship [H.M.] has had with her mother during the course of the year due to her mistrust of her mother.”
The matter was continued to March 4, 2008. Through her counsel, H.M. expressed her desire that no visitation be provided for C.M.
On March 4, 2008, the juvenile court ordered H.M. to be returned to her father with the provision of family maintenance services. As to C.M., family reunification services were terminated. The court granted the father exclusive educational rights as to H.M. and ordered that C.M. not have access to H.M.’s educational records. Finding that visitation between C.M. and H.M. would be detrimental to H.M., the court also ordered that there be no contact between C.M. and H.M. pending further court order. The status review findings and orders were filed on March 5, 2008.
C.M. filed a notice of appeal. (A121065.) She seeks reversal of the order placing H.M. with her father.
3. Termination of the Dependency (Appeal No. A122317)
On May 9, 2008, the Department filed a JV-180 request to change the March 5 order, seeking termination of dependency jurisdiction, reinstatement of the custody orders set forth in the August 2006 Order (which had awarded sole legal and physical custody to the father in the first dependency action), and vacating a status review hearing that had been set for August 12, 2008. The application asserted that H.M. was just six months away from her 18th birthday, had completed all of her high school credits, was taking college courses, continued to be employed, had a driver’s license and a vehicle, and would not be at risk of abuse or neglect due largely to her age and her capacity to meet many of her own needs. The matter was set for a hearing on May 20, 2008. The hearing was continued to June 3, 2008, to ensure that C.M. had an adequate opportunity to respond.
C.M. filed a statement to disqualify the juvenile court judge, contending the judge had a conflict of interest because she held a California Bar number while acting as a judge and purportedly breached her fiduciary duty by placing H.M. with H.M.’s father and failing to order the Department to investigate the father’s alleged transportation of H.M. to China for sexual purposes. She filed a document entitled “Non Offending Parent [C.N.M.]’s Notice of Non Appearance at Improperly Noticed Hearing; and Demand for Timely Service of Any W&I 300 Petition and Supporting Reports from Solano County Department of Health and Human Service and for Continuance.” She also filed an “Application for Warrant Based Upon Admitted Criminal Act,” by which she sought to have the social worker arrested.
At the hearing on June 3, 2008, H.M. and all parties present supported the Department’s request to terminate dependency jurisdiction, with reinstatement of the August 2006 Order as requested in the JV-180. C.M. did not appear at the hearing. Nor did her attorney. The juvenile court struck C.M.’s request for disqualification, on the ground she failed to state a legal basis for disqualification, and declined to issue an arrest warrant for the social worker, finding the social worker had not lied or committed perjury.
By written order filed and served on June 6, 2008, the juvenile court granted the Department’s JV-180 request and terminated jurisdiction over H.M. No new custody orders were issued. At least implicitly, the August 2006 Order pertaining to custody was reinstated.
On August 4, 2008, C.M. appealed. (Appeal No. A122317.) Appeal numbers A121065 and A122317 were consolidated on September 8, 2008.
4. H.M. Turns 18 Years of Age
On October 27, 2008, after C.M. filed her opening briefs in the consolidated appeals, H.M. turned 18 years of age.
II. DISCUSSION
C.M. seeks reversal of the order placing H.M. with her father, reversal of the order terminating juvenile court jurisdiction, and reinstatement of the dependency. The Department contends the appeals are moot and the orders were not erroneous.
A. Mootness
We generally must dismiss an appeal if the issue has been rendered moot by the occurrence of events pending the appeal. (Eye Dog Foundation v. State Board of Guide Dogs for the Blind (1967) 67 Cal.2d 536, 541.) Specifically, if intervening events make it impossible for the reviewing court to grant appellant effective relief, the appeal ordinarily should be dismissed. (Ibid; Ebensteiner Co. v. Chadmar Group (2006) 143 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1178.)
The Department argues that both appeal number A121065 and appeal number A122317 are moot because, while they were pending, H.M. turned 18. However, the juvenile court does not automatically lose dependency jurisdiction once a dependent turns 18. Under Welfare and Institutions Code section 303, the juvenile court may retain jurisdiction until the dependent is 21 years of age. Jurisdiction should be retained only if there is an existing or foreseeable threat of harm to the dependent, and the juvenile court must pay substantial deference to the wishes of the dependent who has reached the age of majority. (In re Holly H. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1324, 1327; see In re Robert L. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 789, 797 [juvenile court abused its discretion in continuing dependency jurisdiction after child was placed in long-term foster care, where there was no evidence of current or future threatened harm to the dependent].)
As the Department points out, the record now before us would likely support the juvenile court if it had refused to continue jurisdiction on the ground H.M. had reached the age of majority. Indeed, if the matter were presented to the juvenile court, it would likely terminate jurisdiction on that ground, for the same reasons it terminated jurisdiction in response to the JV-180. Furthermore, H.M. joined in the Department’s request for termination of jurisdiction, suggesting she would not consent to the continuation of jurisdiction if the matter were remanded. In other words, it is overwhelmingly likely that, even if we were to grant C.M.’s requested appellate relief and reverse the order placing H.M. with her father and the order terminating jurisdiction, the juvenile court upon remand would be inclined to terminate jurisdiction again, this time based on H.M.’s reaching the age of majority. Taking this at face value, we could not issue effective appellate relief, and the appeals would be moot.
The conundrum, however, is that we would grant C.M. appellate relief in these appeals only if we were to conclude the juvenile court had erred in terminating jurisdiction pursuant to the Department’s JV-180. And yet, if the court erred in terminating jurisdiction on the basis of the JV-180, it is unclear how or whether the juvenile court could, upon remand, properly proceed to terminate jurisdiction for her reaching the age of majority based on essentially the same record that we had found lacking. Accordingly, we question under these circumstances whether the mootness doctrine should be applied.
C.M. responds to the mootness argument in an October 22, 2008 submission entitled “APPELLANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY REVERSALS IN CONSOLIDATED APPEALS A122317 AND 121065 [¶] OBJECTION TO ANY DETERMINATION THAT APPEAL IS MOOT AND OR IS DISMISSED DUE TO ABUSED MINOR REACHING 18 YEARS OLD.” She states: “To the extent that [H.M.] would agree to dismissal of this Appeal as moot due to her reaching 18 years of age, that agreement must be scrutinized to ascertain why she, [H.M], would not want all of the issues in this Appellate addressed since they are directly related to the indisputable failures of the lower Court and Respondent to apply the laws and Rules of Court which are designed to protect [H.M.] in her best interests. That scrutinizing must include who would counsel [H.M.] to waive her rights under the law.” C.M. also touches upon the mootness issue in her opening brief in appeal number A122317. To the extent she addresses mootness in the context of H.M. turning 18, C.M. advises that we must decide whether the appeal is moot on a case-by-case basis depending on the facts before the court, citing In re Kristin B. (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 596.) She asserts: “For example, when a parent’s appeal of jurisdictional issues continues to be valid even after the child is returned to parental custody, which occurred and is on appeal in consolidate appellate case A121065, it may be more difficult to show that an issue concerning the propriety of removing the child from the parent’s home is still viable.”
We therefore proceed to the merit of C.M.’s appeals.
B. Order Terminating Jurisdiction
At or after the six-month review hearing, dependency jurisdiction may be terminated in the discretion of the juvenile court. (See Bridget A. v. Superior Court (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 285, 316.)
Ample evidence supported the juvenile court’s termination of dependency jurisdiction. It was undisputed that H.M. was employed, attending college, and of legal age to live independently, as set forth in the Department’s JV-180. The Department’s JV-180 further asserted that H.M. would not be at risk of abuse or neglect upon termination of jurisdiction, due largely to her age and her capacity to meet many of her own needs. No admissible evidence of current or future harm to H.M. was presented at the hearing, at which neither C.M. nor her attorney appeared. All the parties present, including H.M. and her counsel, agreed to the termination of jurisdiction. The court stated at the hearing that the combination of the factors cited by the Department resulted in a finding that termination of jurisdiction would not result in a risk to H.M.’s safety. It is apparent from the record that the juvenile court found, explicitly or at least implicitly without objection, that there was no need for continued supervision and the conditions that justified taking jurisdiction in the first place no longer existed.
C.M. argues, essentially, that termination of jurisdiction was inappropriate because the court did not address the matters she had raised in connection with the placement of H.M. with H.M.’s father. To the contrary, the court did address C.M.’s issues to the extent she raised them properly with the court. The fact that her arguments did not prevail does not mean the court failed to address them. Moreover, our role is not to reweigh the evidence before the juvenile court. Notwithstanding C.M.’s assertions, ample evidence supported findings justifying the termination of jurisdiction.
Because C.M. has failed to establish that the court erred in terminating jurisdiction, we will affirm the order that is the subject of appeal number A122317.
In light of our affirmance of the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction in appeal number A122317, we must briefly revisit the mootness doctrine. The termination of juvenile court jurisdiction during the pendency of C.M.’s appeal from the order placing H.M. with her father may render appeal number A121065 moot. (In re Michelle M. (1992) 8 Cal.App.4th 326, 327-330 (Michelle M.) [no jurisdiction over appeal from order placing child in other parent’s custody, where juvenile court had terminated its jurisdiction]. But see In re Kristin B., supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at p. 605 [where a judgment terminating parental rights is challenged on appeal, an earlier appeal from an earlier order is not moot if the error is of such magnitude as to infect the outcome of the termination action or the defect undermines the initial jurisdictional finding].)
C.M. argues that the jurisdictional issues are not moot, even though the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction, either because the court implicitly made jurisdictional orders or because it failed to make an exit order. While her position is not the clearest, her reference to In re Joshua C. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1544 (Joshua C.) may be germane. There, the appellate court held that an appeal challenging continuing custody and visitation orders, by attacking jurisdictional findings, was not moot despite the dismissal of the dependency proceedings, because the custody and visitation orders continued to affect the appellant adversely. (Id. at pp. 1547-1548.) Here, C.M. is not challenging the jurisdictional orders (which had been the subject of appeal number A119940), and the custody and visitation orders reinstated by the juvenile court have previously been affirmed on appeal (appeal number A115260). Nonetheless, the fact that the juvenile court reinstated these orders could lead to the conclusion that these are new custody and visitation orders, issued at a different time under different circumstances, and thus subject to review. Again, we will proceed to the merits of C.M.’s appeal.
C. Order Placing H.M. With Her Father
At the six-month review hearing, the court must determine whether the child should be returned to the custody of his or her parent. (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.21, subd. (e).) There is a statutory presumption the child will be returned to parental custody unless the court finds the child’s return would create a “ ‘substantial risk of detriment to the physical or emotional well-being’ of the child.’ ” (Bridget A., supra, 148 Cal.App.4th at p. 305.)
Substantial evidence supports the court’s placement of H.M. with her father, who was the custodial parent when the dependency proceeding was initiated. By the time of the six-month review, H.M.’s father was in compliance with his case plan, had consistently and actively initiated contact with service providers, and had maintained consistent quality visits with H.M. He indicated he was prepared to have H.M. and her brother returned to his care, but recognized the challenges and was open to learning new techniques and strategies for parenting and interacting with H.M. and her brother. The Department concluded the reunification risk level was moderate and no safety threats were identified. By contrast, reunification with C.M. would present a risk due to her lack of relationship with H.M. H.M. did not want to visit with C.M. due to her manipulative behaviors. There was also evidence C.M. needed further parenting education and had not attended any court hearings since the initial detention hearing.
C.M.’s arguments in this regard have no merit. First, she brings to our attention the father’s past criminal history. The Department, however, considered that history in making its recommendation, and our role is not to reweigh the evidence before the juvenile court. Next, C.M. contends the juvenile court did not specify a factual basis for its finding that a return of H.M. to her would be detrimental and the return of H.M. to her father would not be detrimental, did not explain the necessity for and appropriateness of the placement, and did not set forth the extent of the parties’ progress toward alleviating or mitigating the causes necessitating H.M.’s placement in foster care. The court did, however, indicate its review of the Department’s recitation of these facts, and additionally noted in its own findings that even contact between C.M. and H.M. would be detrimental to H.M. because of H.M.’s express wish to have no contact with C.M. and the past history between C.M. and H.M., including a no contact order. The court and the parties – except for C.M. – discussed the court’s order fully at the hearing, and no objection was made to the adequacy of the court’s findings. Lastly, C.M. faults the court for not accepting her accusations that H.M. was taken to China for sexual purposes. While she submitted declarations from herself and her attorney, they are filled with inadmissible hearsay. In any event, the court expressly addressed and considered each of the declarations at the status review hearing. Neither C.M. nor her attorney appeared at the hearing or timely objected to the juvenile court’s rulings in that regard. In short, we have considered the entirety of C.M.’s contentions and, based on the record, conclude they are meritless.
C.M. has failed to demonstrate error in the juvenile court’s placement of H.M. with her father, or any other error in regard to the juvenile court’s order of March 5, 2008. The order in appeal number A122317 is affirmed.
III. DISPOSITION
The orders are affirmed.
We concur. JONES, P. J. STEVENS, J.
Retired Associate Justice of the Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Five, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.