Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Super. Ct. No. JD226985
HULL, J.H.L. (appellant), the father of H.L. (the minor), appeals from the juvenile court’s orders adjudging the minor a dependent child of the court, removing the minor from parental custody, and denying appellant reunification services and visitation with the minor. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 360, subd. (d), 395; further unspecified section references are to this code.) Appellant’s sole contention on appeal is that the juvenile court committed reversible error in denying visitation with the minor. Disagreeing with that claim, we affirm the juvenile court’s order.
Facts and Proceedings
On February 13, 2008, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) filed an original juvenile dependency petition on behalf of the three-year-old minor. That petition alleged the minor was at a substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm, abuse, or neglect based on the death of a younger sibling of the minor. According to the petition, appellant had left the minor’s sibling unattended in a bathtub filled with water for an extended period of time.
DHHS reported the minor appeared to be developmentally delayed and also lacked muscle tone. According to the mother of the minor, the minor was born with a hole in his heart, which had been repaired. The mother also reported the minor was mentally retarded.
On March 13, 2008, appellant was arrested on felony child endangerment charges. Until his arrest, appellant had visited with the minor, pursuant to a supervised visitation order by the juvenile court. Thereafter, appellant remained in custody.
In its May 2008 report, DHHS recommended that the minor not visit appellant during the latter’s incarceration. According to DHHS, appellant was not permitted contact visits while in custody. The social worker opined that visitation would be “emotionally detrimental to the [minor] given the [minor’s] young age and developmental delays.”
At the June 27, 2008, combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing, the juvenile court adjudged the minor a dependent child, ordered the minor removed from parental custody, denied appellant reunification services, and ordered appellant to have no contact with the minor “pending further order of the court.” The court adopted the finding recommended by DHHS that visitation with the minor would “jeopardize the safety of the [minor]....”
Discussion
Appellant contends the juvenile court committed reversible error in denying him visitation with the minor. According to appellant, there was an inadequate showing of detriment to justify terminating his visits with the minor. Appellant also claims that the fact the court denied him reunification services does not warrant termination of visitation. Finally, appellant suggests the court made no “finding of detriment based on factual evidence in the record.”
When the juvenile court denies reunification services to a parent, the court “may continue to permit the parent to visit the child unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 361.5, subd. (f).) Thus, the court has the discretion to allow visits to continue, unless it finds visits would be detrimental to the minor. In that event, the court must deny continued visitation. (In re J.N. (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 450, 457.)
It is true, as appellant asserts, that at review hearings held before selection of a permanent plan the juvenile court must permit visitation to continue pending the section 366.26 hearing, “unless it finds that visitation would be detrimental to the child.” (§ 366.21, subd. (h), see also § 366.22, subd. (a).) However, contrary to appellant’s claim, the hearing that is the subject of this appeal is the disposition hearing.
In visitation matters generally, the juvenile court is accorded broad discretion. On appeal, absent a showing of a clear abuse of discretion, the reviewing court will not interfere with the exercise of that discretion. (In re Megan B. (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 942, 953.) An abuse of discretion means the juvenile court “‘“exceeded the limits of legal discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd determination [citations].”’” (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318, quoting In re Geoffrey G. (1979) 98 Cal.App.3d 412, 421.)
In this case, as we have seen, the juvenile court had before it a DHHS report stating that continued visits between the minor and appellant would be “emotionally detrimental” to the minor. To appellant’s assertion that previous visits were not problematical for the minor, the response must be that circumstances had changed. As appellant now was incarcerated and could not have contact visits with the minor, DHHS assessed that such visitation would be detrimental to the minor, in light of his young age and developmental delays. That determination does not seem unreasonable under the circumstances.
The record reflects that, as of the June 2008 hearing, the minor was four years old. It shows also that the minor was a “special needs child [who] wears diapers.” He had a “very limited vocabulary” and was described by his mother as “mentally retarded.” On this record, it is not surprising that the juvenile court found, as it did, that continued visits with appellant during the latter’s incarceration would “jeopardize the safety” of the minor.
The juvenile court did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or beyond the bounds of reason in denying visitation between the minor and appellant. We conclude appellant has failed to demonstrate an abuse of discretion or other error. (Cf. In re Stephanie M., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 318.) Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s implied finding at the disposition hearing that continued visits would be detrimental to the minor. (Cf. In re Marquis D. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1813, 1825.)
Disposition
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: SCOTLAND, P. J., ROBIE, J.