Opinion
No. 04-15-00094-CV
02-24-2016
IN THE MATTER OF H.L.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
From the 436th District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2014-JUV-00757
The Honorable Lisa Jarrett, Judge Presiding Opinion by: Jason Pulliam, Justice Sitting: Sandee Bryan Marion, Chief Justice Karen Angelini, Justice Jason Pulliam, Justice AFFIRMED
H.L., a juvenile, appeals the juvenile court's order of disposition committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department ("TJJD"). In a single issue on appeal, H.L. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion when it committed him to TJJD on a six-year determinate sentence because the facts and circumstances indicate he would be best served in a less restrictive community-based environment, such as probation and commitment to a residential treatment facility. We affirm the juvenile court's order of disposition.
BACKGROUND
On April 29, 2014, H.L.'s parents discovered H.L. purchased a significant amount of electronic gaming equipment by using his father's credit card without permission. H.L.'s parents decided to store the electronics at the house of a family friend, William Kelly. While P.L., H.L.'s father was away from home on this errand, H.L. threatened his mother, C.L., with burning some important papers and also threatened to set fire to their home. Upon receiving a phone call from C.L. relaying these threats, P.L. returned home immediately, accompanied by Kelly.
As the adults discussed how to proceed in the situation, they became suspicious of H.L.'s activities in the upstairs of the house. P.L. investigated and discovered H.L. exiting a bedroom. P.L. smelled lighter fluid and found a fire had been set in that bedroom. As P.L. extinguished the fire, H.L. attacked him with a knife. Father and son struggled as P.L. called out to Kelly for help. H.L. stabbed his father twice in the shoulder before P.L. and Kelly were able to subdue H.L. and hold him until police arrived.
The State filed an original petition alleging H.L. engaged in delinquent conduct, specifically, the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, a second degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(a)(2) (West 2011). The Bexar County grand jury approved the petition, and the case was called for trial. H.L. waived a jury, stipulated to the evidence, and pled true to the petition without a plea bargain. The juvenile court found H.L. engaged in delinquent conduct, and following a disposition hearing, the juvenile court committed H.L. to TJJD. Thereafter, H.L. perfected his appeal.
ANALYSIS
In his sole issue on appeal, H.L. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion by ordering him committed to TJJD. H.L. argues the facts and circumstances in this case indicate he would be best served by commitment to a less restrictive community-based placement, such as a residential treatment facility.
Standard of Review
Although commitment to TJJD is the most severe form of punishment contemplated by the juvenile justice scheme, it is unnecessary for a juvenile court to exhaust all possible less severe alternatives before committing a juvenile to TJJD. See In re J.R.C., 236 S.W.3d 870, 875 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2007, no pet.). A juvenile court possesses broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a child who has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent behavior. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04 (West 2014); In re E.K.G., No. 04-15-00230-CV, 2016 WL 519717, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2015); In re P.E.C., 211 S.W.3d 368, 370 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2006, no pet). Absent an abuse of discretion, a reviewing court will not disturb the juvenile court's disposition or modification of a disposition. In re E.K.G., 2016 WL 519717, at *3; In re P.E.C., 211 S.W.3d at 370.
An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court acts unreasonably or arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. In re E.K.G., 2016 WL 519717, at *3; In re K.J.N., 103 S.W.3d 465, 466 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, no pet.). The guiding rules and principles in juvenile cases involving commitment outside the child's home are found in the Juvenile Justice Code, which is located in the Texas Family Code. If a juvenile court commits the child to TJJD, it must find and state in its disposition order that: (1) it is in the child's best interest to be placed outside the child's home; (2) reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child's removal from the home and to make it possible for the child to return to the home; and (3) the child, in the home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that he needs to meet the conditions of probation. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.04(i) (West 2014). When, as here, the grand jury approved the petition and the juvenile court concluded the juvenile committed the delinquent conduct of aggravated assault, the juvenile court may commit the juvenile to TJJD. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 53.045 (a)(6), 54.04(d)(2) (West 2014).
In determining whether the juvenile court abused its discretion by committing H.L. to the TJJD, the appellate court evaluates whether the juvenile court's findings underlying its order are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. In re E.K.G., 2016 WL 519717, at *8. In evaluating the legal sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court's findings, the appellate court considers evidence favorable to the finding if a reasonable fact finder could and disregard evidence contrary to the finding unless a reasonable fact finder could not. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex. 2005); In re E.K.G., 2016 WL 519717, at *8; In re T.E.G., 222 S.W.3d at 679. Anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. Cont'l Coffee Prods. Co. v. Cazarez, 937 S.W.2d 444, 450 (Tex. 1996); In re E.K.G., 2016 WL 519717, at *8-9. When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding, the appellate court sets aside the finding only if, after considering and weighing all of the evidence in the record pertinent to the finding, it determines the credible evidence supporting the finding is so weak, or so contrary to the overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that the finding should be set aside. Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176 (Tex. 1986); In re E.K.G., 2016 WL 519717, at *8-9; In re T.E.G., 222 S.W.3d at 679-80.
DISCUSSION
Trial Court's Findings
In this case, the juvenile court made the required statutory findings under Family Code section 54.05(i) when it found, in part:
3. [T]he child, in the child's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation.See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 54.05(i). Although these three findings are essential, other evidence may also justify an order committing a juvenile to TJJD. See In re E.K.G., 2016 WL 519717, at *9; In re T.K.E., 5 S.W.3d 782, 785-86 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1999, no pet.).
4. [I]t is in the child's best interest to be placed outside the home and that reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child's removal from the home and to make it possible for the child to return to the child's home.
The juvenile court additionally cited the following reasons for placing H.L. in TJJD:
6. The child and/or family was previously referred to the following counseling or psychological services: Counseling through CHCS; ROPES; Krier Correctional Treatment Facility; and Intensive Clinical Services; The nature of the offense and/or circumstances in the child's home necessitates removal of the child from the home; Child stabbed his father after setting a bed on fire; Child in need of supervision and structured therapeutic environment; Serious nature of offense; Weapon used in the commission of offense and serious nature of injuries to victim; Insufficient period of time for placement outside home; Parents unable to adequately supervise child; Psychologist recommends placement outside home; Child is danger to self or others; and Parent unwilling to have child in home due to being victim in case.
Evidence
At H.L.'s disposition hearing, P.L. testified that his family had run out of options with regard to obtaining help for H.L. Throughout his childhood and adolescence, H.L. was observed, counseled, and received treatment. Recently, he attended several "intense" counseling sessions. The counselor suggested P.L. contact Child Protective Services for additional help, but the instant offense occurred before the family could pursue that avenue of assistance. P.L. testified it seemed "every door was closed" to them. According to P.L., H.L. had been medicated, but the medications were frequently changed in an effort to find a successful regimen. P.L. informed the juvenile court that while he did not want H.L. returned to his home, he believed the best option for his son would be "community-based help in San Antonio" where H.L. would be able to receive counseling and services that focused specifically on his disability. C.L.'s testimony largely echoed her husband's, with the exception that she stated she would welcome H.L. home.
Dr. Joann Murphy, the expert testifying on H.L.'s behalf, opined that H.L. could be rehabilitated through counseling and psychotherapy, rather than commitment. However, Dr. Murphy also admitted it was "possible" the treatment center at TJJD was a good option for H.L. Finally, Warren Wolf, H.L.'s guardian ad litem spoke before the court and requested the least restrictive approach, telling the juvenile court that he believed H.L. would benefit more from community-based programs than commitment.
James "Scott" Corley, a juvenile detention officer, testified that while in custody awaiting the disposition hearing, H.L. was discovered in possession of a contraband marker. When Corley escorted H.L. to the security area, H.L. requested that he be able to secure his possessions in his room. Upon arriving at his room, H.L. slammed the door shut on Corley and began removing his shirt, which Corley testified is an indication of aggression or of a juvenile intent on harming himself. Corley and another officer entered the room, and H.L. grabbed Corley around the throat. When Corley broke the hold, H.L. attempted to grab Corley's groin. Additional officers were needed to secure H.L. and escort him to the security area. Detention officer Jay Zapata watched over H.L. in the security area. Zapata testified that H.L. remained restrained for an unusually long time at H.L.'s own request because H.L. insisted he did not know or care what would happen if the restraints were removed. Eventually, H.L. calmed, and the restraints were removed after approximately an hour.
A predisposition report, prepared by juvenile probation officer Brent Houdmann, was admitted into evidence without objection. The report detailed H.L.'s history of criminal behavior, which included cruelty to animals and a penchant for starting fires. It was twice determined that H.L. was in need of supervision for inappropriately touching female classmates, and he received probation for destruction of property, previously assaulting his father, and twice assaulting his mother with a deadly weapon.
Following a previous adjudication for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, H.L. was placed on fifteen months' probation, during which he was placed at the Krier Correctional Facility. H.L. completed the prescribed mental-health program as required, which H.L.'s parents testified suited him. However, despite completing the program, H.L. committed yet another aggravated assault with a deadly weapon.
Houdmann testified that the juvenile probation department contacted several residential treatment facilities regarding placement for H.L., but received responses indicating H.L. was not an appropriate candidate for the facilities, or the facilities' services were not appropriate to handle someone with H.L.'s disabilities. Houdmann informed the juvenile court he believed H.L.'s parents had done all they were able to do with H.L., and further stated the juvenile probation department had run out of options. Houdmann recommended H.L. be committed to TJJD with a possible transfer to the Texas Department of Criminal Justice.
Application
Although it is not necessary for a juvenile court to exhaust all possible alternatives before committing a juvenile to TJJD, the evidence in this case revealed H.L. had already been placed in a community-based facility without successful result. See In re E.K.G., 2016 WL 519717, at *12; J.R.C., 236 S.W.3d at 875. Additionally, the evidence revealed other less severe alternatives had been assessed and utilized but were not viable or available alternatives. Further, the juvenile court had before it evidence that included the nature and circumstances of the instant offense, a predisposition report that detailed H.L.'s past criminal behavior, counseling, and psychological treatment, and live testimony regarding H.L.'s behavior since the time of the offense. The evidence presented provided sufficient basis for the juvenile court's declination to place H.L. in a community-based facility and instead commit him to TJJD.
Because this evidence amounts to more than a scintilla of evidence to support the juvenile court's finding TJJD was the only viable option, it is legally sufficient. Further, the evidence is strong and credible. Therefore, the evidence is factually sufficient to support the juvenile court's finding.
Based upon a review of the evidence before the juvenile court, we conclude the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering H.L. committed to TJJD for a determinate sentence of six years.
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we overrule H.L.'s sole issue on appeal and affirm the juvenile court's disposition order.
Jason Pulliam, Justice