Opinion
No. 5-974 / 05-1806
Filed January 19, 2006
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Johnson County, Stephen C. Gerard III, District Associate Judge.
A mother appeals the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights. AFFIRMED.
W. Eric Nelson of Nelson Law Office, Coralville, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kathrine S. Miller-Todd, Assistant Attorney General, J. Patrick White, County Attorney, and Deborah Farmer Minot, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee State.
Kelly D. Steele, Cedar Rapids, for father of Q.J.A.
Chad W. Thomas, Iowa City, for father of J.H.
Noelle Murray, Coralville, guardian ad litem for minor children.
Considered en banc.
I. Background Facts Proceedings
Lyndsey is the mother of Hannah, born in 1996, Damond, born in 1997, Quincy, born in 2000, and Jaxson, born in 2003. In October 2003, the juvenile court entered an order for the removal of the children after drugs, drug paraphernalia, and precursors for the manufacture of methamphetamine were found in Lyndsey's home. Lyndsey took the children to Tennessee before they could be removed by the State. The children were retrieved and placed in foster care.
Jonathan is the father of Hannah and Damond. Jonathan did not participate in the juvenile court proceedings, and he is not a party to this appeal. Marshall is the father of Quincy. Marshall voluntarily consented to the termination of his parental rights, and he is not a party to this appeal. John is the father of Jaxson. John's parental rights were not terminated.
The children were adjudicated to be in need of assistance (CINA) pursuant to Iowa Code sections 232.2(6)(b) (2003) (parent is imminently likely to neglect child), (c)(2) (child is likely to suffer harm due to parent's failure to supervise), and (n) (parent's drug or alcohol abuse results in child not receiving adequate care). Lyndsey has a history of alcohol abuse. She continued to associate with people known to have substance abuse problems. Lyndsey had a pattern of dishonesty, which created confusion and chaos for those around her.
In December 2004, the State filed a petition for termination of Lyndsey's parental rights. On October 17, 2005, the juvenile court entered an order terminating Lyndsey's parental rights under sections 232.116(1)(d) (2005) (circumstances continue despite the receipt of services), (f) (child four or older, CINA, removed at least twelve months, and cannot be returned home) (Hannah, Damond, and Quincy), (h) (child three or younger, CINA, removed at least six months, and cannot be returned home) (Jaxson), and (i) (child meets definition of CINA, is in imminent danger, and services would not correct conditions). Lyndsey appeals the termination of her parental rights.
II. Standard of Review
The scope of review in termination cases is de novo. In re R.E.K.F., 698 N.W.2d 147, 149 (Iowa 2005). The grounds for termination must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re T.B., 604 N.W.2d 660, 661 (Iowa 2000). Our primary concern is the best interest of the children. In re J.L.W., 570 N.W.2d 778, 780 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997).
III. Merits
A.
Lyndsey requested that a Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) be appointed in this case. The juvenile court entered an order on September 14, 2004, requiring the CASA program to designate a person to participate in this case. The record, however, does not show any participation in the case by a CASA, or any explanation as to why this did not occur. On appeal, Lyndsey claims the State failed to engage in reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children because there was no CASA participation in the case.
We note that the Court Appointed Special Advocate program is a volunteer program, and its level of staffing would depend upon the number of people who volunteer to be a special advocate. See In re I.L.G.R., 433 N.W.2d 681, 687 n. 9 (Iowa 1988) ("The Court Appointed Special Advocate program is a volunteer program. . . .").
The State has the obligation to make reasonable efforts in a case, but it is a parent's responsibility to demand services if they are not offered prior to the termination hearing. In re H.L.B.R., 567 N.W.2d 675, 679 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997). Here, the juvenile court complied with Lyndsey's request by ordering the CASA program to designate a person to participate in the case. Lyndsey did not raise before the juvenile court, however, the argument that she now makes, that because there was no CASA participation in this case there was a lack of reasonable efforts by the State. We conclude this claim has not been preserved for our review. See In re N.W.E., 564 N.W.2d 451, 455 (Iowa Ct.App. 1997) (noting an issue not presented in the juvenile court may not be raised for the first time on appeal).
B.
The petition to terminate parental rights was filed on December 20, 2004. The termination hearing was held on January 24, 25, 26, and 31, and February 9, 2005. The termination order was not filed until October 17, 2005. Lyndsey contends the delay in the filing of the termination order denied her the fundamental right to procedural due process.
Although we do not condone the lengthy delay in this case, we note that again, Lyndsey did not raise this issue before the juvenile court. Furthermore, on appeal Lyndsey has not cited any authority to support her claim that a delay in filing a case violates due process rights. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.14( c) ("Failure in the brief to state, argue or cite authority in support of an issue may be deemed waiver of that issue.").
We affirm the decision of the juvenile court.