Opinion
No. 341413
06-14-2018
In re R. J. HILL, Minor.
UNPUBLISHED Wayne Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 07-469911-NA Before: SWARTZLE, P.J., and SHAPIRO and BOONSTRA, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-mother appeals as of right the trial court's order terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter, RJH, under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) (conditions that led to adjudication continue to exist) and (g) (failure to provide proper care and custody). The parental rights of respondent-father were terminated in the same order, but he is not part of this appeal. On appeal, respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that (1) statutory grounds existed to terminate her parental rights and (2) termination was in the best interests of RJH. We affirm the trial court's termination of respondent-mother's parental rights to RJH.
The trial court must find that a statutory ground for termination is established by clear and convincing evidence. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App 406, 408; 890 NW2d 676 (2016). We review for clear error the trial court's finding that petitioner established a statutory ground for termination. Id.; see also MCR 3.977(K). "A finding is clearly erroneous if, although there is evidence to support it, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made." In re Schadler, 315 Mich App at 408 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). A trial court must order the termination of a respondent's parental rights if the petitioner establishes a statutory ground for termination by clear and convincing evidence, and the trial court finds by a preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the child's best interest. In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 713; 846 NW2d 61 (2014).
I. STATUTORY GROUNDS
Respondent-mother argues that the trial court erred in finding that statutory grounds existed by clear and convincing evidence to terminate her parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) and (g) because she was in partial compliance with her treatment plan and she was committed to completing services if given more time. We disagree.
A. MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i)
The trial court did not err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) provided a statutory basis for termination of respondent-mother's parental rights. A trial court may terminate a respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) if 182 days have passed since the initial disposition order, and the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]he conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable time considering the child's age."
As the order of disposition related to RJH was entered on August 25, 2016, more than 182 days had passed by the time of the trial court's statutory-grounds finding on October 23, 2017. RJH was brought under the trial court's care due to respondent-mother's failure to supervise RJH and her five siblings, respondent-mother's lack of housing suitable for the children to live in, and respondent-mother's past CPS history with RJH's sibling's—all of whom had been removed from respondent-mother's care at some point.
Regarding her supervision of her children, in 2010 (before RJH was born) there were allegations that respondent-mother left her children alone with someone she barely knew for hours, in a home that was dirty, that did not have enough beds for the children, and where drugs were used and sold. The individual watching the children ultimately had to call the police because respondent-mother left the children in her care for so long without returning. Pertaining to the 2016 petition related to RJH, respondent-mother admitted that she did not fully appreciate the seriousness of the matter until after RJH was removed from the maternal grandparents in July 2017. Respondent-mother did not take action on her treatment plan because she knew that her children were with the maternal grandparents and safe in their care. She relied upon the maternal grandparents to take care of RJH and did not start complying with her treatment plan until RJH was placed in nonrelative foster care. Given respondent-mother's history of failing to supervise her children and lack of commitment to obtaining the skills necessary to supervise RJH, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that this condition still existed and was unlikely to be rectified within a reasonable time.
Regarding housing, the record makes clear that respondent-mother failed to maintain consistent suitable housing throughout the proceedings related to RJH. Respondent-mother had two primary caseworkers during the time RJH was under the trial court's care. The first caseworker testified that, although respondent-mother did have housing during the time the caseworker was responsible for the case, the caseworker was unable to determine whether the housing would be suitable for RJH because respondent-mother hung up on her when she called to schedule an assessment of housing. The second caseworker took over in July 2017. During the early portion of the second caseworker's oversight of the case, respondent-mother had apparently been living with the child's maternal grandmother and had provided that address to the caseworker. Respondent-mother allegedly moved out of that home and into an apartment, but failed to provide any lease or proof of that housing to petitioner. At the termination hearing, respondent-mother testified that she had again changed residences. Respondent-mother testified that two months before the hearing she had obtained a verbal lease for a four-bedroom home with a bedroom ready for RJH to share with one of her adult sisters. Still, respondent did not provide any proof of this housing or its suitability for RJH. Respondent-mother had 14 months to establish and maintain suitable housing, but failed to take the necessary steps to ensure that her housing was verified by petitioner. The trial court did not clearly err in concluding that this condition still existed and was unlikely to be rectified within a reasonable time. Accordingly, because the two primary conditions that led to the initial adjudication—improper supervision and lack of suitable housing—still existed more than 182 days after the initial adjudication, the trial court did not clearly err in concluding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i) supported termination of respondent-mother's parental rights.
B. MCL 712A.19b(3)(g)
Additionally, the trial court did not clearly err in finding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) also provided a statutory basis to terminate respondent-mother's parental rights. A trial court may terminate a respondent's parental rights under MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) if the trial court finds by clear and convincing evidence that "[t]he parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the child's age." "A parent's failure to participate in and benefit from a service plan is evidence that the parent will not be able to provide a child proper care and custody." In re White, 303 Mich App at 710.
There is ample evidence in the record of respondent-mother's failure to participate in and benefit from the service plan petitioner offered. Respondent-mother was referred for services in September 2016 for the petition related to RJH. The services included in her plan were parenting classes, individual and family therapy, housing support, income support, visitation, and a psychological evaluation. From September 2016 to the dispositional hearing in October 2017, respondent-mother was referred for parenting classes seven times. She was terminated each time for lack of cooperation or failure to attend. Respondent-mother told her caseworker that, despite all six of her children having become court wards, she did not need parenting classes because she knew how to parent her children.
Over the same time period, respondent-mother was referred for individual and family therapy six times and terminated each time. Respondent-mother was referred for a psychological evaluation seven times, but never completed it. Despite being offered housing assistance, by the time of the termination hearing, respondent-mother had still failed to provide proof of housing suitable for RJH. Additionally, the initial caseworker had no knowledge of respondent-mother maintaining a legal source of income, and the second caseworker testified that respondent-mother asserted that she received disability benefits, but never provided any verification of those benefits.
Respondent-mother consistently visited RJH, and her visits were appropriate. Respondent-mother was bonded to RJH, and they loved each other. Visitation, however, is the only requirement of respondent-mother's service plan with which she substantially complied. Respondent-mother admitted that she did not initially want to participate in services because she felt like she was being treated unfairly due to her history with CPS and she knew that RJH was safe in the maternal grandparents' care. According to respondent-mother, however, she had a change of heart in the month leading to the termination hearing and decided that she wanted to "fight for [her] baby." At the time of the dispositional hearing, respondent-mother asserted that she had housing, received disability income, ran a makeup business, and had attended therapy for two weeks before the hearing. Again, respondent-mother's assertions were largely unverified by other record evidence.
Respondent-mother had 14 months to complete the services in her treatment plan, and she failed to do so. At the time of the hearing, she was substantially noncompliant with several aspects of her treatment plan. Respondent-mother's noncomplicance was evidence that she was unable to provide proper care and custody for RJH and would be unable to do so within a reasonable time. Therefore, the trial court did not err in concluding that MCL 712A.19b(3)(g) supported termination of respondent-mother's parental rights to RJH.
II. BEST INTERESTS
Respondent-mother next argues that the trial court erred in finding that termination of her parental rights was in RJH's best interests because she frequently visited RJH, and they had a bond and loved each other. Respondent-mother's argument on best interests is found in a single paragraph in her brief on appeal. Because respondent-mother has failed to develop this argument on appeal, she has waived the issue. See Riemer v Johnson, 311 Mich App 632, 653; 876 NW2d 279 (2015). Even looking past the waiver, we conclude that the trial court did not err by finding that termination was in RJH's best interests.
It is the petitioner's burden to prove that termination is in the child's best interests by a preponderance of the evidence. In re Schadler, 315 Mich App at 408. The trial court must weigh all of the evidence when making its best-interests determination and may consider, among other relevant factors, "the child's bond to the parent, the parent's parenting ability, the child's need for permanency, stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over the parent's home," as well as the "parent's history of domestic violence, the parent's compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent's visitation history with the child, the children's well-being while in care, and the possibility of adoption." In re White, 303 Mich App at 713 (internal citations omitted). "If the court finds that there are grounds for termination of parental rights and that termination of parental rights is in the child's best interests, the court shall order termination of parental rights and order that additional efforts for reunification of the child with the parent not be made." MCL 712A.19b(5).
RJH was placed with her maternal grandparents for over a year during the course of the proceedings and was removed and placed in a nonrelative foster home just before the termination hearing. The maternal grandfather testified that he and the maternal grandmother were willing to adopt RJH. The trial court acknowledged that under In re Mason, 486 Mich 142, 164; 782 NW2d 747 (2010), placement with a child's relative weighs against termination. The trial court noted that RJH was currently in a nonrelative placement, but concluded that, even if RJH was still placed with the maternal grandparents, the other factors weighed in favor of termination. The trial court determined that RJH was entitled to stability, permanency, and finality and that respondent-mother could not provide RJH with a stable and secure home. According to the trial court, termination was in RJH's best interests so that she could be adopted by a family who could provide her with a stable and secure home.
The evidence demonstrated that respondent-mother was bonded to RJH. She visited RJH daily while RJH lived with the maternal grandparents, and weekly after RJH was removed from their care. Respondent's love for the child, however, is not enough to overcome her parenting deficiencies. Respondent-mother's five other children were all taken into care at some point during their lives. Two of her children were removed from her care and placed with their biological fathers. Three of her children simply aged out of the system. Despite this, respondent-mother claimed that she did not need parenting classes because she knew how to parent her children. Respondent-mother failed to comply with most of her service plan and therefore failed to address her parenting deficiencies. Because respondent-mother failed to address the deficiencies that led to the removal of her children, we conclude that the trial court did not err in determining that termination of respondent-mother's parental rights to RJH was in the child's best interests.
Affirmed.
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Mark T. Boonstra