Opinion
No. C7-97-1588.
Filed December 30, 1997.
Appeal from the District Court, Hennepin County, File No. 9711253.
John W. Verant, (for respondent)
Teresa M. Graham, (pro se appellant)
Considered and decided by Lansing, Presiding Judge, Willis, Judge, and Holtan, Judge.
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (1996).
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Graham appeals the district court's order enjoining her from any contact with respondent Higbee, his family, his employers, and his church. Because the record supports the district court's finding that Graham harassed Higbee, we affirm.
DECISION
We review harassment restraining orders under an abuse of discretion standard. See Anderson v. Lake , 536 N.W.2d 909, 911 (Minn.App. 1995) (domestic abuse case law applies to harassment restraining orders); Mechtel v. Mechtel , 528 N.W.2d 916, 920 (Minn.App. 1995) (standard of review of domestic abuse orders is abuse of discretion).
A district court may issue a restraining order if it "finds * * * reasonable grounds to believe that [harassment has occurred]." Minn. Stat. § 609.748, subd. 5(a)(3) (1996). Harassment includes: "(1) repeated, intrusive, or unwanted acts, words, or gestures that are intended to adversely affect the safety, security, or privacy of another." Id. , subd. 1(a)(1). The record supports the district court's finding that appellant engaged in harassment.
Appellant argues that she was prohibited from presenting her defense when the district court quashed or refused to enforce her subpoenas. A district court has broad discretion to determine whether evidence should be admitted "and its ruling will not be disturbed unless it is based on an erroneous view of the law or constitutes an abuse of discretion." Uselman v. Uselman , 464 N.W.2d 130, 138 (Minn. 1990). Likewise, a district court has discretion to enforce or quash a subpoena. Phillippe v. Commissioner of Pub. Safety , 374 N.W.2d 293, 297 (Minn.App. 1985). The district court did not abuse its discretion by ruling that the evidence appellant sought to subpoena was not relevant to the harassment proceedings. See Johnson v. Washington County , 518 N.W.2d 594, 601 (Minn. 1994) (rulings on relevancy are within trial court's discretion). Higbee's testimony was sufficient to support the court's harassment finding and appellant's witnesses would not have rebutted his testimony.
Appellant sought to subpoena (a) court personnel, to prove bias of the court system and the harassment court judge, (b) child protection personnel, to contest their findings concerning the relationship of respondent with his wife and children, and (c) personnel of the Air Force and Computing Devices International, respondent's employers, to establish that they did not want the protection of a protective order. The court granted them the right to reject any such order.
We also hold that appellant was not prejudiced by the method of service. Appellant was served personally by a commercial server. A party is not prejudiced by service that substantially complies with the rules of procedure and provides adequate notice of the nature and scope of the proceeding. LeRoy v. Marquette Nat'l Bank , 306 N.W.2d 815, 816 (Minn. 1981); see also Pederson v. Clarkson Lindley Trust , 519 N.W.2d 234, 235 (Minn.App. 1994) (cases should be decided on merits rather than technicalities, and rules governing service should be liberally construed to avoid depriving litigant of day in court).
Finally, we reject appellant's constitutional arguments. The record reveals that appellant was afforded due process during the district court proceedings. Further, appellant's First Amendment rights are subject to reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. Welsh v. Johnson , 508 N.W.2d 212, 215 (Minn.App. 1993). The restriction imposed by the district court was content-neutral: it is limited to Higbee and those associated with him, and it does not violate appellant's First Amendment rights. See id. (order prohibiting party from "any communication" with victim of harassment, but allowed ample alternative channels of communication, did not violate First Amendment).