Opinion
B307975
06-29-2021
Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Office of the County Counsel, Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Shante Sylvester, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County Nos. 20CCJP01049, 20CCJP01049 A-D, Victor G. Viramontes, Judge. Affirmed.
Linda J. Vogel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Office of the County Counsel, Rodrigo A. Castro-Silva, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy, Assistant County Counsel, Shante Sylvester, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
COLLINS, J.
Appellant H.C. (mother) has four children, daughters H.H. and Y. and sons H.K. and Yu. The juvenile court took jurisdiction over all four children pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 , declared them dependents of the court, and removed them from mother's custody. In this appeal, mother challenges the findings and order only as they concern Y. She contends that substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional findings that Y. either suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. We disagree and affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Referral and Initial Investigation
The family came to the attention of the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) on February 18, 2020, when H.H., then 17, and H.K., then 14, reported to police that mother had threatened to kill them. According to H.H., mother and mother's cousin insulted H.K.'s sexual identity either earlier that day or the previous day. H.K. told H.H. about the incident, and H.H. sent a text message to mother's cousin chiding her for being disrespectful to H.K. Mother's cousin forwarded H.H.'s text message to mother, who then sent H.H. a text message stating, “Bitch you will [be] in a body bag watch this I don't give a fuck about no police now keep that energy when I pull the fuck up... this will be ya last day disrespecting me.” Mother also sent a video to H.K. depicting herself holding a gun and stating, “That's what the fuck I thought.” H.H. told the emergency response social worker that she was afraid to go home to mother, who had previously attacked her with a broom, kicked her in the head, and hit and “socked” her in the face. H.H. added that her younger siblings, Yu., then 10, and Y., then 9, had been present during some of the physical altercations, though mother only got physical with H.H. and H.K. H.K. left the police station without talking to the social worker.
The social worker called mother, who said that H.H. and H.K. were disrespectful and refused to follow her rules. Mother stated that H.K. in particular was “out of control.” Mother gave the social worker permission to remove H.H. and H.K. from her care, stating, “I will sign my rights over to you.” When the social worker told mother that she would also have to assess the safety of Yu. and Y., mother yelled that the social worker would not be seeing those children.
The social worker made an unannounced visit to mother's home later that day. Mother generally corroborated H.H.'s summary of the incident involving H.K. and admitted to sending the “body bag” text to H.H. Mother denied sending H.K. a video of herself holding a gun. She admitted, however, that she had gotten into physical altercations with both H.H. and H.K. Mother was unable to recall any recent altercations with H.H., but stated that she and H.K. engaged in an altercation after Yu. and Y. found a cup belonging to H.K. containing alcohol. Mother confronted H.K. about the alcohol, he threw the drink at her, and “it then became physical.”
H.H.'s presumed father, J.H., was incarcerated. H.K.'s presumed or biological father, M.K., was also incarcerated. Yu. and Y.'s presumed father, Y.S., was separated from mother and did not live with the family.
Mother told the social worker that she only used physical discipline on Yu., “whoop[ing]” him on the buttocks with an open hand. She also stated that she had Yu. “do standards” or “corner time.” “Corner time” was the only type of discipline she used with Y. Mother stated that she “does not really discipline” H.H., “because she is not really around.” Mother stated that she tried to discipline H.K. by taking items like his cell phone away, but they argue and she admitted calling him names related to his recently disclosed bisexual identity.
The social worker interviewed Yu. and Y. separately. Yu. told her that he had seen mother and H.K. argue, but had never seen mother and H.K. or H.H. engage in a physical altercation. Yu. further stated that mother punishes him by “grounding” him, but had hit him with her hand in the past. He stated that Y. “does not really get disciplined.” Y. also told the social worker that she does not really get disciplined, because “she mostly follows the rules.” Y. said that mother struck Yu. with a belt “when he does not listen” or insulted mother, recently “probably yesterday.” Y. also stated that she had seen mother and H.K. strike one another in the face with open hands and fists. Y. added that she, Yu., and mother's friend had all been present during the alcohol incident involving H.K., and that the fight ended when mother's friend intervened. The social worker did not observe any marks, bruises, or signs of neglect on Yu. or Y.
The social worker also spoke to A.W., an elderly family friend with whom mother and the children had been residing “on and off” for approximately one year. A.W. denied observing mother engage in verbal fights or physical altercations with any of the children. A.W. stated that mother mostly disciplined the children by talking to them, but occasionally “will smack the younger children (Yu[.] and Y[.]) on the leg with an open hand.”
The social worker spoke to H.K. the following day. H.K. corroborated H.H.'s and mother's accounts of the incident leading up to the “body bag” message, and added that mother had “tried to attack him with a shoe” during the incident. H.K. confirmed that mother sent him a video of her holding a gun, and showed the social worker the text message thread. H.K. further disclosed that mother had tried to stab him approximately a week earlier, after he failed to answer his phone when she called. H.K. did not sustain any injuries during that incident; mother stabbed a dresser instead. H.K. echoed his siblings' comments about mother's disciplinary style; he said she “whooped” Yu. with an open hand but otherwise “yell[ed]” at the children when they misbehaved.
After these initial investigations, DCFS and mother agreed to a seven-day safety plan for H.H., and DCFS took H.K. into protective custody. DCFS informed mother that it planned to seek removal orders for H.H., Yu., and Y., and mother responded, “Just take them.” However, she refused to disclose Yu. and Y.'s whereabouts to the social worker.
On February 19, 2020, H.H. sent the social worker two text messages and an email retracting her allegations. In one of the text messages, H.H. stated that mother was a “very good mom, ” and H.H. did not want Yu. and Y. “to be taken away from her.” In the email, H.H. reiterated, “I didn't think that if I told the story the way I did that they would take the kids away from my mom I thought it would just be me and [H.K.] would be taken out the house [sic] because that's what I wanted....” H.H. further asserted she had lied about mother “putting her hands on me and kicking me and spitting on me, ” and that an aunt, not mother, was in the gun video.
On February 20, 2020, DCFS obtained removal orders for H.H., Yu., and Y. When a social worker and law enforcement officers went to mother's home to remove Yu. and Y., mother claimed that DCFS had picked up Yu. and Y. from school the previous day. DCFS subsequently contacted Yu. and Y.'s school, which reported that mother had picked up the children the day before. DCFS filed a missing persons report for Yu. and Y.
II. Section 300 Petition and Detention Hearing
DCFS filed a section 300 petition on February 21, 2020. In counts a-1, b-1, and j-1, sounding under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j), DCFS alleged that all four children were at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger, and abuse because mother physically abused H.H. on prior occasions “by repeatedly striking the child's body with the mother's fists and hands, ” and “threatened to kill the child and place the child's body in a body bag.” In counts a-2, b-2, and j-2, DCFS made identical allegations, differing from the first three only in that they named H.K. rather than H.H. as the victim of the alleged abuse. In counts b-3 and j-3, DCFS alleged that Yu. and Y. were “at risk of harm and damage” due to mother's inability to provide appropriate care and supervision to H.H. and H.K.
The court held a detention hearing on February 24, 2020. Mother did not appear. When the social worker initially apprised her of the hearing, then only for H.K., mother stated that she did not plan to attend because she did not care about court proceedings for H.H. or H.K. Counsel for DCFS represented at the hearing that DCFS had called mother again, but mother did not answer and DCFS was unable to leave a voicemail. The court detained all four children and issued protective custody warrants for Yu. and Y. The warrants were recalled on May 4, 2020, after the children were located.
III. Amended Section 300 Petition
On June 3, 2020, DCFS filed an amended section 300 petition. The amended petition retained from the original petition counts a-1/b-1/j-1 alleging the physical abuse of H.H., a-2/b-2/j-2 alleging the physical abuse of H.K., and b-3/j-3 alleging risk of harm to Yu. and Y. from the inappropriate parental care and supervision of H.H. and H.K. The amended petition added counts a-3/b-4, alleging that mother and father Y.S. (father) had a history of engaging in violent altercations in front of the children and mother failed to protect the children from father after he was arrested for domestic violence. It also added count b-5, alleging that mother refused to provide adequate care for H.H. and Yu. on two occasions in 2019, and count b-6, alleging that father was unable to provide regular care for Yu. and Y. due to mental and emotional problems, including a suicide attempt.
IV. Section 385 Petition
On or about June 8, 2020, DCFS filed a section 385 petition seeking to restrict mother's visitation with the children. The request was prompted by two alleged incidents. First, on the weekend of May 23 to 24, 2020, H.K. was having an extended sibling visit with Yu. Mother called H.K. during the visit; the call was video recorded and forwarded to DCFS. According to the petition, mother “continuously blamed child H[.K.] for the DCFS involvement and placement issues, ” insulted his sexuality, told him to “leave [Yu.] the fuck alone, ” and said she would be calling H.K.'s placement to pick him up and end the visit immediately. H.K. cried and showed other signs of emotional distress. A few minutes later, mother called DCFS and reported that Yu.'s caregiver no longer wanted H.K. in her home and asked that he be removed immediately. The caregiver denied making such a request; H.K. was subsequently re-placed with her and Yu.
The second incident occurred on June 1, 2020. According to H.K. and Yu.'s caregiver, mother arrived early for a scheduled visit with H.K. and Yu. at their new joint placement. The caregiver was not home. Mother “pulled up to the house and tried to force her way in and take [H.K.], telling him to pack his shit because they were leaving.” The caregiver's teenage daughter intervened, mother shoved her, and the daughter hit back before the caregiver's adult sons intervened and ended the fight. Mother threatened the sons that she was “gonna have your house shoot [sic] up” before leaving the premises. Mother called the police claiming she was a victim. She also called a rideshare to bring H.H. to the premises so H.H. could fight the caregiver's daughter.
During the incident, H.K. called maternal grandmother and asked her to come get mother, because she was “over here... trying to kill us.” Maternal grandmother called DCFS, as did H.K. and Yu.'s caregiver. Sheriff's deputies responded to the scene and arrested H.H., because she, too, had threatened to have people shoot up the caregiver's home. DCFS generated a new referral and removed H.K. and Yu. from the placement. H.K. told DCFS that he had previously lied about mother “not putting her hands on me” and was upset about being removed from the caregiver, whom he stated “really cares about me more than my mother.”
The court heard the section 385 petition on June 10, 2020. Prior to the hearing, DCFS filed two last-minute informations notifying the court that mother had been sending “contentious” and “profane” emails to DCFS and recording her interactions with social workers despite their requests that she not do so. DCFS also noted that mother had asked for all the children to be placed separately, on the unsubstantiated basis that H.K. was a danger to Yu., but that Yu. refused to be placed without H.K.
At the hearing, counsel for the children indicated that the children had different feelings about visiting mother. Daughters H.H. and Y. both wanted to continue with telephonic and in-person visits. Sons H.K. and Yu., however, did not want to have any contact with mother. The court ruled that mother could have unmonitored phone and text contact with H.H., who was then almost 18, but also had to engage in at least one therapeutic monitored visitation session per week with H.H. The court ordered monitored telephonic and in-person visitation for Yu. and Y., but ordered that mother have no contact with H.K outside a monitored therapeutic setting. The court ordered mother to work out a written visitation schedule and to stop recording her interactions with DCFS personnel.
V. Jurisdiction and Disposition Report
DCFS filed a 56-page jurisdiction and disposition report on June 18, 2020. As is most relevant here, the report documented interviews with the children, mother, and father. Y. told DCFS that living with mother was “fine.” Y. stated that sometimes mother, H.H., and H.K. would get into fights; she and Yu. “heard a couple things, but we had the TV out loud.” Y. also stated that mother “doesn't really” hit H.H. or H.K. around Yu. and Y. Y. also noted that mother “used to be close[ ] with H[.K.].” Y. denied that mother struck her, and also denied witnessing any domestic violence between mother and father. She added that father currently lived in Texas, and that she “has been in communication” with him.”
Yu. told DCFS that living with mother had been “kind of bad.” Mother called him “dumb bitch” and other names, slapped him in the face, struck him with cell phone cords and belts, and occasionally left bruises on his arms and legs; he covered up the bruises with his clothes. Yu. also reported that he had seen mother strike his siblings: “She hasn't hit Y[.] in a while. She usually hits H[.K.] and me. She usually punches H[.K.] a lot, in his arms and chest, but me she will hit with cords and belts.” Yu. further reported that he had seen mother pull H.H.'s hair, sometimes to the point where it came out, and “throw” both H.H. and H.K. Yu. stated that he had also seen mother hit, “throw hard glass” at, and “pull[ ] a knife on” father.
H.H. reported having a “good mother-daughter relationship” with mother. She denied that mother hit her, and “was explicit and insisted that her mother has never hit her in the face, kicked her, or attacked her with a broom.” H.H. stated that she had reported the “body bag” message to police “out of anger, ” and said she “just want[s] this situation to be over” and her siblings to be “left alone” by DCFS.
H.K. stated that mother angered easily, but did not engage in physical altercations with him. However, he also stated that mother became upset with him when she caught him with alcohol. She “hit me in my nose, ” “threw the cup and she dragged my hair.” He added that mother also spit on him and kicked his face. H.K. also reaffirmed that mother threatened to put him and H.H. in body bags, and expressed concern about her ability to manage her anger and moods. H.K. reported witnessing domestic violence between mother and father. On June 8, 2020, about a week after the incident involving mother at his caregiver's home, H.K. contacted DCFS and said that H.H. previously “told me to just lie so that we don't get taken away from my mom. H[.H.] didn't want my little brother and sister to be in foster homes. She thought that by lying they would get returned to my mom.” He also stated that mother and father had made him and his siblings lie to DCFS during their previous cases. He added that mother had bruised him when he was six or seven years old and covered the bruises with makeup. H.K. also reported that mother and father got into approximately four or five fights per year; that father masturbated in front of him; and that father attempted to kill himself in March 2019.
DCFS spoke to mother about the allegations on several occasions. During one conversation, on April 9, 2020, mother stated that she was incapable of engaging in physical altercations: “I had bronchitis and I couldn't attack them, because I am always short of breath.” Mother denied striking H.H. and H.K.; as to the latter, she admitted throwing the cup of alcohol but stated that she “couldn't hit him.” Mother also denied sending the “body bag” message and gun video, and stated that H.H. and H.K. lied about those incidents. Mother stated that Yu. and Y. “are always safe” and would “never be at risk.” She wanted to terminate parental rights over H.K., “because this situation caused me all this, ” but wanted Yu. and Y. “dropped off the case.” Mother admitted that she had a temper and was a quick fighter in the past, but claimed, “[t]he older that I got its [sic] not there anymore.” She stated that she had hit the children in the past, but denied hitting them recently. Mother acknowledged past domestic violence between herself and father but stated that their relationship ended in 2018.
DCFS also spoke to father early in the case. He denied that mother had anger management issues and stated that she had never been aggressive. Father denied seeing mother physically or verbally abuse the children.
At the conclusion of its report, DCFS recommended that the court take jurisdiction over the children and declare them dependents. It recommended that both mother and father receive family reunification services. In light of the June 1, 2020 incident and “conflictive family dynamic, ” DCFS recommended that mother's services include anger management and parenting classes, even though mother already had completed some of both.
VI. Last-Minute Informations
DCFS filed several last-minute informations with the court in advance of the adjudication hearing. In a last-minute information filed August 14, 2020, DCFS reported that no visitation schedule had been set because mother had not provided her availability. However, mother and her relatives showed up unannounced at Yu.'s placement, and mother called Yu.'s caregiver “making racist comments and displaying inappropriate behavior over the phone.” Mother also reported that Yu. had been physically and sexually abused at the placement. Both H.K. and Yu. refused to participate in visitation with mother.
On September 9, 2020, DCFS reported that all four children had their first sibling visit on September 6, 2020 and “were happy to see each other.” Both H.K. and Yu. continued to refuse visitation with mother. Mother told DCFS that she had completed her court-ordered programs but did not provide any paperwork to confirm the assertion. DCFS noted that “mother's behaviors, ” including failing to provide DCFS with her availability for visitation, accusing DCFS of discriminating against the family, and “making demands on how the Department should be servicing the children, ” had “created a barrier in providing reunification services.”
VII. Jurisdiction Hearing
The court adjudicated the amended petition from September 9 to 14, 2020. At the beginning of the hearing, mother's counsel moved to dismiss all counts. Counsel for H.H. joined the motion in its entirety. Counsel for H.K., Yu., and Y. joined as to counts a-3 and b-4, which alleged that the children were at risk due to domestic violence between mother and father. Counsel for father joined as to counts a-3, b-4, and b-5; count b-5 concerned mother's alleged failure to provide care for H.H. and Yu. in 2019. After hearing argument, the court struck H.H. from counts b-3 and j-3 and otherwise denied the motion.
Mother called several witnesses. H.H., the first witness, testified that she was not afraid of mother and had a “very good relationship” with her. H.H. stated that mother also had a good relationship with H.K. “until he started acting out” as he got older. She further testified that mother never hit her or H.K.; during the alcohol incident, mother broke up a fight between H.H. and H.K. H.H. denied telling the police that mother kicked and socked her in the head. H.H. stated that mother had a good relationship with Yu. and Y.: “They love my mom. They adore her.” According to H.H., Yu. “gets in trouble because [he] likes to act out sometimes, ” but Y. “doesn't get in trouble like that because [she] doesn't really do anything. She does sometimes but not a lot. Not like that.” H.H. stated that mother disciplined the children by making them sit in the corner or taking away their things. She also stated that all of the children “get treated the same. My mom doesn't make a difference between any of us.”
H.K. testified that he and mother “were good” until he turned about 13 and a half and “gr[e]w into a different person.” He further stated that he believed mother tried to help him, but did not know how. H.K. characterized the alcohol incident as a physical fight between himself and H.H., which mother had to break up. While breaking up the fight, mother kicked H.K. in the face. On cross-examination by counsel for DCFS, H.K. stated that the alcohol incident was “absolutely not” the first time he and mother got physical. He also testified that mother had “pulled a knife” on him “a week before we got put in foster care.” H.K. had never seen a gun in the house, however.
Mother's next witness was family friend A.W. She testified that mother and the children lived with her for eight or nine months during 2019 and for two months in early 2020. A.W. observed mother's parenting during that time and described her as “a very good mother.” A.W. testified that mother had received some calls about Yu.'s behavior at school. After the first call, mother talked to Yu. After the second call., mother “spanked him, ” “on his butt, ” with “a very good strong hand” but not with objects such as a belt or phone charger. A.W. stated that Y. was “a sweet little girl” who did not cause any problems or require discipline. A.W. never saw mother discipline H.H. or H.K. beyond taking away their phones. She also testified that there was “no fighting, no cursing, no yelling, nothing of that sort, ” because she did not allow any of that in her home.
Mother testified as her final witness. She stated that she and father were still married, but were separated and lived apart; they talked about matters concerning the children over the phone. Mother stated that she had “a good relationship” with all four of the children. She clarified that her relationships with each child were “a little bit different, ” and that “it switches [sic] because each kid goes through something. So sometimes I'm more closer [sic] to one kid than another.”
When asked about the allegations in the case, mother denied threatening to put H.H. in a body bag. She explained that she had been voice texting H.H. while she was driving, and “the voice text, it probably misconstrued that way.” Mother also denied sending H.K. a video of herself with a gun; she said it was not possible because she did not like guns or own a weapon. When asked about the alcohol incident involving H.K. mother stated that H.K. “went ballistic” when she confronted him and “tried to attack” and threatened to kill mother. At the time, Y. “was in the other room” and H.H. “came out” and got into a fight with H.K. Mother and mother's aunt were able to break up the fight. Afterward, mother talked to H.K. for two hours, telling him that he was important to her and she loved him. Mother later moved all of the knives in the house to the garage, because H.K. expressed suicidal ideations and again threatened to kill her.
Mother acknowledged that she struck Yu. on his buttocks with her hand, but denied hitting him with a belt or leaving bruises on his body. She testified that Yu. told DCFS otherwise “because he didn't get his way.” Mother stated that she and Yu. “were great before he went into the system, ” even though he had some behavioral challenges at school. Mother stated that she had been taking classes and participating in therapy during the case, and she had learned how to handle things differently with Yu. in the future. Mother testified that H.H. and Y. “are totally fine”; “with my girls, I have no problems.” She described her relationship with H.H. as “really good, ” and her relationship with Y. as “beautiful.” The court admitted into evidence mother's exhibits: certificates of completion from her anger management courses and a progress letter from her therapist.
After hearing extensive argument from counsel, the court determined that DCFS had carried its burden of proof on some of the allegations but not others. The court ruled that DCFS carried its burden of proof on counts a-1/b-1/j-1 alleging that mother physically abused H.H. and thereby placed her and the other children at risk of serious physical harm. The court also sustained counts a-2/b-2/j-2, which alleged that mother physically abused H.K. and thereby placed him and the other children at risk of serious physical harm. The court specifically ruled that the children's statements contained in DCFS's exhibits were “more credible than the denials of the mother, ” “even despite the fact that H[.H.] has since changed her testimony.” The court added that it also relied on “the text messages, the statements of the police officers, ” and “the statements of the youngest child, [Y.], for whom there's no allegation, ...which I think speaks to the risk for all of the children here.” The court sustained the b-3/j-3 allegation as to H.K., “given the mother's statements in the record, ” but reiterated that count b-3/j-3 was dismissed as to H.H. The court also sustained the b-6 count alleging that father's mental and emotional problems placed Yu. and Y. at risk. The court dismissed counts a-3/b-4 concerning domestic violence between mother and father as “historical.”
VIII. Disposition Hearing
The court held a disposition hearing on September 15, 2020. Mother did not attend the hearing. The court granted mother's counsel's request to “consider the testimony that was heard for adjudication, ” and also admitted exhibits proffered by DCFS, mother, and father.
During argument, counsel for DCFS requested “suitable placement for everyone.” Counsel for H.H. requested that H.H. be released to mother, as she felt safe with mother and would be turning 18 “very soon.” Counsel for H.K. joined DCFS's arguments and asked the court to remove H.K. from mother's care. Counsel for Yu. and Y. reported that her clients wanted to live with mother, but, pursuant to section 317, subdivision (e)(2), she joined DCFS's request that Yu. and Y. “remain suitably placed.” Counsel for Yu. and Y. also requested that the court grant DCFS discretion to liberalize mother's visits with Yu. and Y. as progress was made. Counsel for mother argued that all four children should not be declared dependents or removed from mother's care.
Section 317, subdivision (e)(2) provides: “If the child is four years of age or older, counsel shall interview the child to determine the child's wishes and assess the child's well-being, and shall advise the court of the child's wishes. Counsel shall not advocate for the return of the child if, to the best of his or her knowledge, return of the child conflicts with the protection and safety of the child.”
The court ruled that DCFS carried its burden on removal and declared all four children dependents of the court. The court further found by clear and convincing evidence, “based on the facts found true in the sustained petition, ” that “there is or would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the children if the children were returned home, and there are no reasonable means by which the children's physical health can be protected without removing the children from the mother and [father's] physical custody.” The court added that its concerns about physical abuse “related to all of the children” and “create[d] an ongoing risk.”
DISCUSSION
Mother timely appealed the court's jurisdictional and disposition findings. She contends that the jurisdictional findings pertaining to Y. are not supported by substantial evidence, and the dispositional findings concerning Y. accordingly must be overturned as well. We disagree.
I. Governing Law
The purpose of section 300 “is to provide maximum safety and protection for children who are currently being physically, sexually, or emotionally abused, being neglected, or being exploited, and to ensure the safety, protection, and physical and emotional well-being of children who are at risk of that harm.” (§ 300.2; see In re Giovanni F. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 594, 599.) The juvenile court may take jurisdiction over a child pursuant to one or more subdivisions of section 300.
Section 300, subdivision (a) provides for jurisdiction where “The child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by the child's parent or guardian.” (§ 300, subd. (a).) For purposes of subdivision (a), “a court may find there is a substantial risk of future injury based on the manner in which a less serious injury was inflicted, a history of repeated inflictions of injuries on the child or the child's siblings, or a combination of these and other actions by the parent or guardian that indicate the child is at risk of serious physical harm.” (Ibid.) “[R]easonable and age-appropriate spanking to the buttocks” does not constitute “serious physical harm” if there is no evidence of serious physical injury. (Ibid.)
Section 300, subdivision (b)(1) permits the court to take jurisdiction where a child “has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness, as a result of the failure or inability of his or her parent or guardian to adequately supervise or protect the child....” (§ 300, subd. (b)(1).) Section 300, subdivision (j) permits the court to take jurisdiction over a child where the “child's sibling has been abused or neglected, as defined in subdivision (a), (b), (d), (e), or (i), and there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected, as defined in those subdivisions.” (Id., subd. (j).) In assessing whether to take jurisdiction under subdivision (j), the court “shall consider the circumstances surrounding the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the age and gender of each child, the nature of the abuse or neglect of the sibling, the mental condition of the parent or guardian, and any other factors the court considers probative in determining whether there is a substantial risk to the child.” (Ibid.)
In juvenile court, DCFS bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that jurisdiction exists at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. (In re Yolanda L. (2017) 7 Cal.App.5th 987, 992-993.) Evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions and may assist DCFS in meeting this burden, though DCFS must establish a nexus between the parent's past conduct and a current risk of harm. (In re Matthew S. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1311, 1318; see In re Roger S. (2018) 31 Cal.App.5th 572, 583.)
On appeal, we review the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings under the substantial evidence standard. (In re I.J. (2013) 56 Cal.4th 766, 773.) In doing so, we determine if substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the findings. (Ibid.) We review the record in the light most favorable to the court's determination, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings. (Ibid.) We do not revisit issues of fact and credibility, which are the province of the juvenile court, nor do we reweigh the evidence or exercise independent judgment. (Ibid.) We simply determine whether there are sufficient facts to support the juvenile court's findings. (Ibid.) On appeal, the appellant bears the burden of showing there is no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's findings or orders. (In re E.E. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 195, 206.)
II. Analysis
The court found that Y. was subject to its jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j). Mother challenges the court's findings under all three subdivisions. With respect to the findings under subdivision (a), she argues that there was no substantial evidence that Y. either suffered or was at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm. With respect to the findings under subdivision (b)(1), she argues that the b-1 and b-2 counts concerning her abuse of H.H. and H.K. fall outside the scope of the statute; that the b-3 count concerning her inability to properly supervise H.K. had no nexus to her treatment of Y.; and that the b-6 count concerning father's mental health was unsupported by substantial evidence that Y. was currently at risk. Finally, mother contends the findings under subdivision (j) cannot stand because “the finding requires a reasonable inference of substantial risk under subdivision (a) or (b)(1), and there is none.”
“‘When a dependency petition alleges multiple grounds for its assertion that a minor comes within the dependency court's jurisdiction, a reviewing court can affirm the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over the minor if any one of the statutory bases for jurisdiction that are enumerated in the petition is supported by substantial evidence. In such a case, the reviewing court need not consider whether any or all of the other alleged statutory grounds for jurisdiction are supported by the evidence.' [Citation.]” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.) We follow this practice here and consider the subdivision (j) allegations, which most closely reflect the situation regarding Y.
“Subdivision (j) applies if (1) the child's sibling has been abused or neglected as defined in specified other subdivisions and (2) there is a substantial risk that the child will be abused or neglected as defined in those subdivisions.” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 774.) Here, mother does not challenge the court's findings that she abused or neglected H.H. and H.K. within the meanings of subdivisions (a) and (b)(1). She argues only that the second prong of subdivision (j) is not satisfied, because H.H., H.K., and Y. “are sufficiently different that substantial evidence does not support a risk of the same for Y[.].” Mother specifically asserts that the “children's ages, temperament, past behavior, and relationships with Mother render any [sic] inference that a[s] of the time of the jurisdictional hearing [Y.] was at substantial risk.” She contrasts Y., “a nine year old girl who is obedient at home and excels at school” with H.K., “a fourteen-year old boy who has been expelled from school multiple times, disregards what Mother tells him, dabbles in drugs, and does as he pleases.”
Substantial evidence supports the court's findings to the contrary. As mother herself testified, her relationships with her children “switch[] because each kid goes through something. So sometimes I'm more closer [sic] to one kid than another.” The record before the court demonstrated that these “switches” occurred rapidly, and in unpredictable and volatile fashion. H.H. testified that she and mother had a “very good” relationship, but the relationship devolved to the point of death threats after H.H. sent a single text message to an extended family member. Similarly, H.K. testified that he and mother historically had a good relationship, but that things changed between them as he got older. The record shows that a single incident involving underage consumption of alcohol resulted in H.K. getting punched in the face, and a single incident involving an unanswered phone call resulted in mother attempting to stab H.K. before stabbing a piece of furniture instead. The juvenile court reasonably could infer from these and other incidents described throughout the record that Y. faced substantial risk of finding herself in a similar situation: Y. stated that she “mostly follows the rules, ” and A.W. stated that she had seen mother strike Y. on occasion. The court did not, as mother suggests, need expert testimony specifically regarding Y. to draw such an inference.
Moreover, the record showed that Y. was present during numerous violent incidents between mother and her older siblings. She witnessed the alcohol incident involving mother, H.K., H.H., and, eventually, mother's friend. Y. also told social workers that she saw mother and H.K. strike one another in the face with open hands and fists, and saw mother strike Yu. with a belt when he did not listen. It is not a great leap to infer that Y. is likely to wind up in the middle of a physical altercation between mother and other members of the family, or herself become a target of physical force due to a single transgression. Even if her siblings remained outside mother's care, substantial evidence supports a reasonable inference that Y. currently faced a substantial risk of becoming involved in family disputes: namely, the June 1, 2020 incident, in which mother went to H.K. and Yu.'s placement, threatened to have the house shot up, and called a rideshare to bring H.H. to the scene to fight the caregiver's teenage daughter. Mother contends the likelihood that Y. will be placed at risk is mere “speculation, ” but evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions (In re Matthew S., supra, 41 Cal.App.4th at p. 1318), and the court “‘need not wait until a child is seriously abused or injured to assume jurisdiction and take the steps necessary to protect the child.'” (In re I.J., supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 773.)
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: MANELLA, P. J., CURREY, J.