Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. CK78113 Stanley Genser, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Marsha F. Levine, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Navid Nakhjavani, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
ASHMANN-GERST, J.
S.G. (mother) appeals from a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to H.G. (the minor, born July 2009), pursuant to section 366.26 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. She contends that the juvenile court erred in finding that the minor was adoptable because his prospective adoptive parents were not informed of the possibility that he could carry the gene for Huntington’s Disease, and that this deficiency impaired the juvenile court’s findings.
Ed S. (father), the alleged father, is not a party to this appeal.
We are not convinced. As set forth below, we grant the motion to take additional evidence of postjudgment events filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS). This evidence confirms that the minor’s prospective adoptive parents were notified that mother suffers from Huntington’s Disease and that this information did not change their decision to care for and adopt the minor. Accordingly, we affirm the juvenile court’s order terminating mother’s parental rights.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
DCFS received a referral three days after the minor was born indicating that mother was displaying bizarre and inappropriate behavior in the hospital delivery room during labor and again after her son was born. In connection with her investigation, the DCFS social worker interviewed the minor’s maternal grandfather, who stated that mother had been adopted at birth and that her biological mother had Huntington’s Disease. According to the maternal grandfather, this information had not been disclosed to him and his wife when they adopted mother.
DCFS filed a section 300 petition on behalf of the minor, and the minor was detained.
In August 2009, DCFS reported that in late July, the minor had been placed in a “Fost-Adopt” home with a family that was “very willing to pursue adoption” if the parents failed to reunify.
On October 30, 2009, the juvenile court sustained counts (b)(4) and (b)(6) of the first amended petition.
Count (b)(4) provides: “[Mother] lives a transient and unstable lifestyle which is detrimental to the child’s physical safety and emotional well-being. [Mother] has had contact with law enforcement for camping out in public on multiple occasions. Such conduct by... mother places the [minor] at risk of physical and/or emotional harm or damage.”
Count (b)(6) makes allegations against father only.
Between October 2009 and May 2010, DCFS reported that mother had not made any progress or completed any programs to work towards reunification. Visits were not favorable. Meanwhile, on March 25, 2010, DCFS indicated that the minor was well-cared for by and appeared well-bonded to his foster parents.
On May 11, 2010, the juvenile court terminated family reunification services for mother and father.
In its September 7, 2010, section 366.26 report, DCFS noted that the adoptions children’s social worker had completed a child protection act assessment on July 29, 2009. At that time, the prospective adoptive parents had indicated a desire to adopt the minor if he did not reunify with his parents. The prospective adoptive parents also had an approved home study. They continued to state their strong desire to adopt the minor. DCFS further reported that the prospective adoptive parents had demonstrated the ability to meet the minor’s needs and were committed to him. He was thriving in their care. He appeared bonded to the prospective adoptive parents. The permanent planning adoption assessment noted that the minor had no known physical health conditions at the time, had no behavioral concerns, and no developmental issues.
Moreover, the social worker had informed the prospective adoptive parents on August 4, 2009, that mother suffered from Huntington’s Disease. According to the social worker, this information did not affect the prospective adoptive parents’ desire to adopt the minor.
DCFS recommended that the juvenile court terminate parental rights and allow the minor to be adopted.
At the section 366.26 hearing on November 22, 2010, the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that the minor was adoptable. It then terminated mother and father’s parental rights.
Mother’s timely appeal ensued.
DISCUSSION
I. DCFS’s Motion to Take Additional Postjudgment Evidence
Following the filing of mother’s appellate brief, DCFS filed its respondent’s brief and a motion to take additional evidence of postjudgment events. Specifically, DCFS asks that we consider an ex parte application submitted to the juvenile court in which the adoptions social worker “informs the [juvenile] court that the caregivers with whom the minor [was] adoptively placed were notified that the birth mother suffers from Huntington’s Disease.” The caregivers told the social worker that “this information [did] not change their decision to care for and adopt the minor.”
Pursuant to In re Josiah Z. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 664, 676, we hereby grant DCFS’s motion. First, the appellate rules authorize DCFS’s motion and “appellate courts routinely consider limited postjudgment evidence in the context of” defending lower court judgments. (Ibid.) Second, we are not using this postjudgment evidence to “second-guess” the juvenile court’s resolution of issues. (Ibid.) Third, the “beneficial consequence” of admitting this evidence will be to “expedit[e] the proceedings and promot[e] the finality of the juvenile court’s orders and judgment.” (In re Zeth S. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 396, 413; see also In re Josiah Z., supra, at p. 676.)
II. Substantial Evidence Supports the Juvenile Court’s Adoptability Finding
After the termination of reunification services, a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and companionship of the child is no longer paramount. Rather, at this point, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 464.) If the juvenile court determines by clear and convincing evidence that a child is likely to be adopted, the juvenile court shall terminate parental rights and order the child placed for adoption. (§ 366.26, subd. (b).)
A juvenile court’s finding that a child is adoptable is reviewed for substantial evidence. (In re I.W. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1525.) “On review of the sufficiency of the evidence, we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576.)
In making the determination of adoptability, the juvenile court “must focus on the child, and whether the child’s age, physical condition, and emotional state may make it difficult to find an adoptive family.” (In re Erik P. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 395, 400.) The juvenile court is generally aided by the social worker’s adoption assessment report which, by statute, must include: (1) details of search efforts for absent parents; (2) a review of the amount and nature of the contacts between the child and his or her biological family; (3) details regarding the child’s medical, mental, emotional, developmental, and scholastic development; (4) a preliminary assessment of the prospective adoptive family, including criminal and child welfare history, their ability to meet the child’s needs, and their understanding of the financial rights and responsibilities of adoption; (5) a review of the child’s relationship with the prospective adoptive family and, if applicable, a statement from the child regarding his or her wishes regarding placement and adoption; and (6) an analysis of the likelihood that the child will be adopted. (In re Crystal J. (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 407, 411; § 366.21, subd. (i)(1).)
“Deficiencies in an assessment report surely go to the weight of the evidence, and if sufficiently egregious may impair the basis of a court’s decision to terminate parental rights.” (In re Crystal J., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 413.) A deficiency in the assessment report is presumptively erroneous and can only be rebutted by other evidence that supplants the areas of deficiency. (Ibid.)
Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that the minor was adoptable. Mother’s primary argument on appeal is that the prospective adoptive parents were never informed that the minor might carry the gene for Huntington’s Disease. The evidence indicates the contrary. Specifically, in August 2009, the social worker informed the prospective adoptive parents that mother had Huntington’s Disease. This information did not affect the prospective adoptive parents’ desire to adopt the minor. This evidence refutes mother’s claim that the failure to provide the prospective adoptive parents with critical information compels reversal of the juvenile court’s finding of adoptability. (See In re Crystal J., supra, 12 Cal.App.4th at p. 413 [totality of the evidence supported the juvenile court’s adoptability finding].)
We do not consider whether mother forfeited this challenge by failing to raise it below, and we reach this issue on the merits.
In light of this additional evidence, we need not determine whether the juvenile court found the minor “generally” adoptable or “specifically” adoptable. (In re Carl R. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1061.)
Mother also asserts that DCFS failed to assess the capability of the prospective adoptive parents to meet the minor’s needs. We cannot agree. As set forth above, DCFS repeatedly advised the juvenile court that the prospective adoptive parents were meeting the minor’s needs. While there may be a 50 percent chance that the minor has the gene for Huntington’s Disease, he is not symptomatic. It is far too speculative for us to guess at when he will develop symptoms (if ever), what those symptoms will be (if any), and what his needs will be. (See, e.g., In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 225.)
The cases cited in mother’s opening brief are distinguishable. Unlike the circumstances in In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624, information regarding the minor’s adoptability, namely the possibility that he carries the genetic marker for Huntington’s Disease, is not “sorely lacking.” In In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, the Court of Appeal reversed a finding of adoptability on the grounds that although the child’s physical health weighed in favor of an adoptability finding, her emotional and psychological issues presented an obstacle to adoption. (Id. at p. 512.) Moreover, although her foster parents were willing to explore the possibility of adoption, that possibility was inadequate to demonstrate that another family would be willing to adopt. (Ibid.) In contrast, there is no evidence of any obstacle to adoption here; in fact, the prospective adoptive parents are willing to adopt the minor, even with the knowledge that he may carry the gene for Huntington’s Disease. Finally, in In re Valerie W. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1, the Court of Appeal concluded that an incomplete assessment of the child’s condition “undermine[d] the court’s determination that [he was] adoptable.” (Id. at p. 15.) Specifically, the child’s needs were not identified and documented in the required reports; neither the juvenile court nor the parties were informed of the child’s diagnosis or possible diagnoses, prognosis, or any needs for treatment or special care. “Without this critical information, the [juvenile] court was foreclosed from assessing whether each prospective adoptive parent had ‘the capability to meet [the child’s] needs, and the understanding of the legal and financial rights and responsibilities of adoption.’ [Citation.]” (Ibid.) Here, the prospective adoptive parents were informed of the fact that mother suffered from Huntington’s Disease.
Considering all the evidence, we conclude that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur:, DOI TODD Acting P. J., CHAVEZ J.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.