Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, No. FJ43953, Shep Zebberman, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Tonja R. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Keith H. Borjon, and Sharlene A. Honnaka, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
WOODS, Acting P. J.
The minor H.G. appeals from the juvenile court’s order declaring him a ward of the court and ordering him home on probation after finding he had possessed marijuana for sale. The minor contends two of his probation conditions are unconstitutional. We affirm the order as modified.
The minor’s additional challenge to the juvenile court’s order setting a maximum period of physical confinement is well taken. Because he was placed home on probation, the court’s calculation of that maximum term is of no legal effect. (See In re Ali A. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 569, 572-574 [when minor placed home on probation, juvenile court is not required to include maximum term of confinement in disposition order; maximum term of confinement contained in such an order is of no legal effect]; In re Joseph G. (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 1735, 1744 [“[o]nly when a court orders a minor removed from the physical custody of his parent or guardian is the court required to specify the maximum term the minor can be held in physical confinement”].) Accordingly, we strike that portion of the juvenile court’s order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The minor, then 17-years old, was detained by police after he attempted to hide a black plastic bag in some bushes when he realized officers were watching him. A search of the bag yielded three plastic baggies containing a combined weight of 82.85 grams of marijuana.
The People filed a wardship petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 alleging the minor had possessed marijuana for sale (Health & Saf. Code, § 11359). The juvenile court sustained the petition, declared the minor a ward of the court, ordered him home on probation subject to certain terms and conditions of probation, and calculated a maximum period of physical confinement as three years.
The minor is not challenging the juvenile court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 700.1).
DISCUSSION
Among the minor’s conditions of probation the juvenile court imposed conditions 15 and 21. Relying on In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 891-892, the minor contends these two probation conditions are vague or overbroad, albeit for different reasons.
Condition 15
Condition 15 limits a minor’s ability to associate with others. As it is printed in the minute order (the conditions of probation form checked by the juvenile court) condition 15 reads, “Do not associate with anyone known to be disapproved of by parents [and] Probation Officer [¶] Other: Any member of a criminal street gang.” (Italics added.)
At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court modified the knowledge requirement of condition 15 by ordering the minor not to “associate with anyone known to you to be disapproved by your parents, your probation officer, or a member of criminal disapproved of [a] criminal street gang.”
The minor contends both the printed and orally pronounced versions of condition 15 are vague and overbroad because they omit a knowledge requirement concerning the minor’s association with “any member of a criminal street gang.” The minor argues the condition should be amended to add “any known member of a criminal street gang.”
The minor maintains the juvenile court’s apparent attempt to modify the printed version by adding a knowledge requirement at the disposition hearing was unsuccessful. According to the minor, condition 15, as orally pronounced, could be understood as precluding the minor from associating with anyone known to him to be disapproved of by a gang member. As a result, probation condition 15 as recited in the minute order cannot yield to the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement of judgment as it ordinarily would. (People v. Farell (2002) 28 Cal.4th 381, 384, fn. 2; People v. Mesa (1975) 14 Cal.3d 466, 471.)
We agree with the People, in modifying condition 15 at the disposition hearing, the juvenile court reasonably intended to prohibit the minor from associating with “anyone known to [him] to be” in one of three categories: (1) persons disapproved of by his parents, (2) persons disapproved of by his probation officer, and (3) members of a criminal street gang. Probation conditions must be interpreted in a reasonable manner. (See People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 382.) Because no other interpretation of condition 15 is reasonable, no modification of the condition is necessary. We note the express knowledge requirement the minor claims is lacking is particularly implied in condition 15A (“Do not participate in any type of known gang activity”) and should be considered in context with condition 15. (See In re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at pp. 891-892, citing with approval appellate court decisions upholding otherwise unconstitutional probation conditions where the juvenile court has effectively added the missing knowledge requirement by additional oral or written comments.)
Condition 21
As to condition 21, the minor further contends by orally ordering him “not [to] use or [to] possess narcotics, controlled substances, poisons, or related paraphernalia” the court is precluding the minor from using legally prescribed medication he may require for medical reasons, thereby rendering that condition overbroad. According to the minor, condition 21 should therefore be modified on remand to state he is not to use or to possess “illegal drugs.”
The juvenile court has wide discretion in determining probation conditions and may impose and require any and all reasonable probation conditions that it deems to be fitting and proper. (In re Tyrell J. (1994) 8 Cal.4th 68, 81, overruled on other grounds in In re Jaime P. (2006) 40 Cal.4th 128, 130.) The record shows the minor’s prior contact with the juvenile court was when he was arrested for committing burglary when he was 12 years old. His mother first denied and then admitted to having seen evidence of her son’s drug use. The mother also reported to police the minor was “out of control” and had been associating with gang members. While the minor argues he is being denied access to legal prescription narcotics or controlled substances, he points to no evidence in the record of his medical need for such narcotics or controlled substances. And, given the minor was found to have possessed a significant quantity of marijuana for sale, his relative youth as a substance abuser, and the prior lack of parental control, the juvenile court acted within its discretion in fashioning a probation condition to discourage the minor from using narcotics or controlled substance medication, which could be abused. (In re Todd L. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 14, 20 [juvenile court condition of probation requiring defendant not to use or to possess narcotics or other controlled substances was proper based on minor’s social history].) Thus, “[a] condition of probation which is [legally] impermissible for an adult criminal defendant is not necessarily unreasonable for a juvenile receiving guidance and supervision from the juvenile court.” (Id. at p. 19.)
DISPOSITION
The maximum term of confinement is stricken. As modified, the juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
We concur: ZELON, J., JACKSON, J.`