Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County No. FJ34890, Shep A. Zebberman, Judge.
Torres & Torres and Steven A. Torres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey and John Yang, Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
KLEIN, P. J.
Hector M. appeals an order continuing wardship under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 following the finding he committed forcible rape. (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(2).) The juvenile court committed Hector M. to the Department of Juvenile Justice. On appeal, Hector M. claims the juvenile court improperly restricted cross-examination of the complaining witness and committed dispositional error. We reject these contentions and affirm the juvenile court’s order.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
1. The prosecution’s evidence.
Fourteen-year-old J.C. testified that one afternoon in October of 2005, she and a friend took a bus to City Terrace Park. After her friend left, J.C. went to a fountain inside the park. She noticed four males near the fountain, including Hector M. J.C. had not previously seen any of the males. Hector M. and another male approached J.C. and asked if she “wanted to fuck.” J.C. started to walk away but the males grabbed her arms. J.C. kicked Hector M.’s companion in the groin, then ran. Hector M. chased J.C. and pulled her into some bushes. J.C. bit Hector M. on the arm but was unable to prevent Hector M. from raping her. J.C. cried throughout the attack, which lasted four or five minutes. During the attack, Hector M. said he knew who J.C.’s friends were and where they “hang around.” When he was finished, Hector M. whistled to his friends and told J.C. she was “good.”
J.C. stayed at the scene for 10 to15 minutes. She walked home crying and took a shower. J.C. noticed she was bleeding. J.C. had not previously had intercourse. J.C. did not immediately report the attack.
Two or three weeks later, Hector M. and his friends approached J.C. as she left a tutoring class at school. Hector M. asked if J.C. remembered him and kissed her on the neck. J.C. did not go to school for about two months after this incident because she did not want to see Hector M. In January of 2006, J.C.’s mother confronted J.C. about missing school and J.C. told her mother about the rape.
2. Defense evidence.
Los Angeles Police Detective Yvonne O’Brien was assigned the case on January 27, 2006. Detective O’Brien took J.C. to the scene of the attack and interviewed J.C. about the incident. J.C. told Detective O’Brien the rape occurred in December of 2005, and that Hector M. threatened to kill her if she tried to escape. J.C. mentioned a later incident with Hector M. at school but did not say Hector M. kissed her during the second incident.
Hector M. testified in his own defense. He claimed he had never previously seen J.C. and that he avoided City Terrace Park because it was gang territory.
3. Jurisdictional finding and disposition.
The juvenile court indicated it found J.C. credible and sustained the petition.
The juvenile court committed Hector M. to the Department of Juvenile Justice, computed his maximum term of confinement and awarded credit for time previously served. This appeal followed.
CONTENTIONS
Hector M. contends the juvenile court improperly restricted cross-examination of J.C. and abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice.
DISCUSSION
1. No prejudicial restriction of Hector M.’s right to cross-examine J.C.
a. Background.
J.C. testified on direct examination that she did not attend school for approximately two months after Hector M. approached her at school. In January of 2006, J.C.’s mother confronted her about “report cards and teachers” and J.C. reported the rape to her mother.
On cross-examination, defense counsel elicited that J.C. had trouble at school and then asked whether J.C.’s grades were sometimes not as good as J.C. wanted them to be. The prosecutor objected on relevance grounds. The juvenile court requested an offer of proof which it conducted outside the presence of the witnesses.
At the outset of the hearing, the juvenile court asked if defense counsel had a line of questioning about J.C.’s grades. Defense counsel responded, “Very brief[ly], grades and attendance. It goes to motive to lie.... I want to find out her grades in school, how she’s done before. To see if this is something new. If this is a pattern of bad behavior. That’s why I want to go into suspensions, just briefly, and attendance... within the past year or so....” Defense counsel asserted the inquiry might provide a reason why J.C. would “lie to make up such a story as this.”
The prosecutor responded it sounded like defense counsel was embarking on a fishing expedition and the juvenile court agreed. Defense counsel continued to assert J.C.’s truancy provided a “great motive” to lie about the attack. Defense counsel insisted he was entitled to determine what “her patterns were like in the past.”
The juvenile court stated it already was aware J.C. did not attend school for two months and the juvenile court understood defense counsel was arguing J.C. had “to concoct this story to save problems with her mom.... ” Defense counsel suggested questioning might reveal J.C. has been ditching school for a year, which would create an even greater motive to lie.
The juvenile court ruled it would not permit defense counsel to pursue this line of questioning.
b. Hector M.’s argument.
Hector M. contends the juvenile court’s ruling erroneously denied Hector M. the right to present a defense, which is federally guaranteed. (Davis v. Alaska (1974) 415 U.S. 308, 315 [39 L.Ed.2d 347].) Hector M. argues J.C.’s credibility was key to the case because she did not report the rape until months later and there was no physical evidence of the offense, such as the bite mark J.C. may have inflicted on her assailant. Given these circumstances, Hector M. claims the juvenile court should have allowed counsel to cross-examine J.C. regarding her history of truancy or other troubling behavior for which J.C. may have sought to avoid punishment by accusing Hector M. of rape. Hector M. argues cross-examination might have revealed other reasons for fabricating the allegation against Hector M. Hector M. also claims he should have been permitted to explore the punishment J.C. received for prior incidents of poor behavior.
Hector M. asserts the error is prejudicial because the case was close due to the delay in reporting the crime. Further, J.C. testified the crime occurred in October but she told Detective O’Brien it occurred in December. Hector M. argues it is unlikely such an important fact would have been misreported by Detective O’Brien. Also, J.C. did not mention to Detective O’Brien that Hector M. kissed her when he saw her at school. Hector M. concludes it was error to preclude exploration of other reasons that might have explained J.C.’s truancy and, because the error is of federal constitutional dimension, the People must demonstrate the error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. (Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 [17 L.Ed.2d 705].)
c. Resolution.
The right to present a defense is a component of the federal guarantee of due process of law. (Crane v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 683, 690 [90 L.Ed.2d 636].) Subject to this constitutional guarantee, a trial court retains wide latitude to exclude evidence that is repetitive or only marginally relevant. (Id. at pp. 689-690; Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 678-679 [89 L.Ed.2d 674].) Thus, “[i]n general, the ‘ “[a]pplication of the ordinary rules of evidence... does not impermissibly infringe on a defendant's right to present a defense.” [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (People v. Cunningham (2001) 25 Cal.4th 926, 998-999.) Consequently, the defense has no right to present cumulative evidence that unduly consumes the court’s time. (People v. Milner (1988) 45 Cal.3d 227, 239-240.)
Here, J.C. testified her mother confronted her because of “report cards and teachers.” Thus, the evidence before the juvenile court at the time of defense counsel’s request established J.C.’s grades had declined and her teachers had reported either disciplinary problems or truancy.
Defense counsel argued J.C.’s truancy could be part of a pattern of bad behavior and would be relevant to show why J.C. would “make up a story such as this.” However, because the evidence already disclosed J.C.’s grades had dropped and she was absent from school for two months, further questioning in this area would have been cumulative to the evidence already presented and the juvenile court properly could limit defense counsel cross-examination of J.C. on that basis.
Moreover, even had the cross-examination been permitted, no different result would have obtained. The record reflects the juvenile court was aware of and understood defense counsel’s argument. However, the juvenile court rejected it. After observing J.C.’s demeanor on the witness stand, the juvenile court found her credible and sustained the petition. Under any standard of review, additional cross-examination with respect to J.C.’s grades or prior instances of her bad behavior would not have altered the outcome of the adjudication. (Chapman v. California, supra, 386 U.S. at pp. 22-24; People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836.) Consequently, Hector M.’s claim of improper limitation of cross-examination of J.C. fails.
2. No abuse of discretion in the order for commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice.
a. Hector M.’s background; disposition.
The probation report indicates Hector M. was the subject of a non-detained petition for possession of marijuana at the age of 14 years in 2003.
At the age of 15 years Hector M. was charged with possession of a weapon at school on two different occasions. The first incident occurred in September of 2004. A non-detained petition was sustained and Hector M. was placed home on probation. In March of 2005, Hector M. was the subject of a petition alleging possession of a weapon at school, possession of a concealed firearm and possession of a loaded firearm. When this petition was sustained, Hector M. was committed to camp-community placement (camp).
In January of 2006, at the age of 16 years, Hector M. was returned to camp after the juvenile court sustained a petition alleging possession for sale of a controlled substance. Hector M. was in camp on that commitment at the time of the adjudication of this case.
At the disposition hearing, defense counsel argued Hector M. was doing extremely well at camp and urged that he be allowed to remain there. Defense counsel reasoned the first camp placement Hector M. served was inadequate to address Hector M.’s methamphetamine problems. “He needed more help and [now] he’s getting it.” The juvenile court rejected this argument and committed Hector M. to the Department of Juvenile Justice.
b. Hector M.’s contention.
Hector M. contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in committing him to the Department of Juvenile Justice. Hector M. notes that, at the time of the disposition hearing, he already was in camp and his adjustment was described as “good.” Hector M. was working as a kitchen helper, he was avoiding negative behavior, he attended counseling regularly, he had been meeting his school requirements and he appeared on track to complete his camp goals.
Hector M. argues the commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice precludes an opportunity for the juvenile court to oversee Hector M.’s behavior. (In re Allen N. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 513, 516 [no conditions of probation permitted where minor committed to state authorities].) Further, he could have obtained the services he required in the local programs in which he already was participating.
Hector M. also claims the juvenile court erred in failing to consider less restrictive alternatives. Hector M. argues society could have been protected by a commitment to long-term camp and, at the same time, Hector M. could have received the services he needed. Hector M. asserts the seriousness of the offense alone is an insufficient basis for a commitment to the Department of Juvenile Justice, but it may be considered along with all other relevant factors. (In re Samuel B. (1986) 184 Cal.App.3d 1100, 1103-1104.)
c. Resolution.
We review a commitment order in light of the purpose of the juvenile delinquency laws, which “is twofold: (1) to serve the ‘best interests’ of the delinquent ward by providing care, treatment, and guidance to rehabilitate the ward and ‘enable him or her to be a law-abiding and productive member of his or her family and the community,’ and (2) to ‘provide for the protection and safety of the public....’ ” (In re Charles G. (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 608, 614-615.) “[T]he statutory scheme contemplates a progressively more restrictive and punitive series of dispositions starting with home placement under supervision, and progressing to foster home placement, placement in a local treatment facility, and finally placement at the [Department of Juvenile Justice]. [Citation.]... A [Department of Juvenile Justice] commitment is not an abuse of discretion where the evidence demonstrates a probable benefit to the minor from the commitment and less restrictive alternatives would be ineffective or inappropriate.” (In re M.S. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.)
Here, Hector M. had a prior sustained petition for possession of marijuana and he previously had been placed home on probation for possession of a weapon at school. After he committed that offense, he again possessed a weapon at school, this time a loaded firearm, and was committed to camp. After he completed the camp commitment, he forcibly raped J.C. Thereafter, Hector M. was committed to camp for a drug offense and he was in camp at the time the offense against J.C. was adjudicated.
Based on these facts, the juvenile court reasonably could conclude there was no less restrictive alternative to state level placement. Hector M.’s history of escalating crime, combined with his commission of a violent felony, indicated nothing short of a locked, restrictive environment was needed to meet the dual needs of protection of the public and the rehabilitation of Hector M. (In re M.S., supra, 174 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment (order continuing wardship) is affirmed.
We concur: KITCHING, J. ALDRICH, J.