Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. JJ13319 Charles Scarlett, Judge.
Bruce G. Finebaum, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Pamela C. Hamanaka, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Paul M. Roadarmel, Jr. and Sonya Won, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
MANELLA, J.
Hector E. appeals from an order continuing wardship (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 602) upon a finding that he possessed tools to commit vandalism or graffiti (Pen. Code, § 594.2, subd. (a)) and that he transported a controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, § 11352, subd. (a)). He was placed in a camp-community placement program with drug rehabilitation for six months and contends the evidence was legally insufficient to establish a violation of Penal Code section 594.2, subdivision (a). For reasons stated in the opinion we affirm the order continuing wardship.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
On April 6, 2006, at approximately 3:45 p.m., Los Angeles Deputy Sheriff Duane Jerome Bookman was in a marked patrol car and in uniform in the area of the Metro Station at Florence in Los Angeles when he saw appellant walking northbound. Upon seeing the deputy, appellant quickly stuffed something in his pants pocket and continued walking. Deputy Bookman stopped his patrol car and asked appellant what he put in his pants pocket. Appellant pulled a marker out of his pocket and said, “‘It’s only a marker.’” When Deputy Bookman asked him what the marker was for, appellant said he did not belong to a tagging crew and that he was “a oner.” Deputy Bookman had heard that term before and knew it to mean that he was “a tagger by himself.”
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends absent his statement the prosecution failed to establish the corpus delicti of the charged offense and without that statement, the evidence was legally insufficient to support a true finding.
Penal Code section 594.2, provides in pertinent part, “(a) Every person who possesses a masonry or glass drill bit, a carbide drill bit, a glass cutter, a grinding stone, an awl, a chisel, a carbide scribe, an aerosol paint container, a felt tip marker, or any other marking substance with the intent to commit vandalism or graffiti, is guilty of a misdemeanor. [¶] . . . [¶] (c)(1) ‘Felt tip marker’ means any broad-tipped marker pen with a tip exceeding three-eights of one inch in width, or any similar implement containing an ink that is not water soluble. [¶] (2) ‘Marking substance’ means any substance or implement other than aerosol paint containers and felt tip markers, that could be used to draw, spray, paint, etch, or mark.”
“‘The standard of proof in juvenile proceedings involving criminal acts is the same as the standard in adult criminal trials. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] In considering the sufficiency of the evidence in a juvenile proceeding, the appellate court ‘must review the whole record in the light most favorable to the judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial evidence--such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. We must presume in support of the judgment the existence of every fact the trier of fact could reasonably deduce from the evidence [citation] and we must make all reasonable inferences that support the finding of the juvenile court. [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (In re Babak S. (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1077, 1088-1089.)
“‘“‘The corpus delicti of a crime consists of two elements[:] the fact of the injury or loss or harm, and the existence of a criminal agency as its cause.’”’ [Citation.] ‘In any criminal prosecution, the corpus delicti must be established by the prosecution independently from the extra judicial statements, confessions or admissions of the defendant.’ [Citations.] Such independent proof may consist of circumstantial evidence [citations] and need not establish the crime beyond a reasonable doubt [citations]. [¶] The purpose of the corpus delicti rule is to assure that ‘the accused is not admitting to a crime that never occurred.’ [Citation.] The amount of independent proof of a crime required for this purpose is quite small; [this] quantum of evidence [has been described] as ‘slight’ [citation] or ‘minimal’ [citation]. The People need make only a prima facie showing ‘“permitting the reasonable inference that a crime was committed.”’ [Citations.] The inference need not be ‘the only, or even the most compelling, one . . . [but need only be] a reasonable one . . . .’ [Citation.]” (People v. Jones (1998) 17 Cal.4th 279, 301-302.)
The prosecution made such a showing in this case. Appellant was in possession of a marker and suspiciously stuffed it in his pocket when he saw the deputy. A reasonable inference from this action is that appellant intended to use it to commit vandalism and did not want the deputy to see the object. This amounted to the necessary quantum of evidence to allow consideration of appellant’s extra judicial statement that he was a “oner,” a “tagger by himself.”
Appellant additionally claims there was no testimony regarding whether the “marker” in appellant’s possession was of the variety prohibited under the statute i.e., that the marker tip exceeded three-eights of one inch in width and/or contained non-water soluble ink. Penal Code section 594.2, subdivision (a) prohibits possession of “any other marking substance” and the instant marker was such a substance.
DISPOSITION
The order continuing wardship is affirmed.
We concur: WILLHITE, Acting P.J. SUZUKAWA, J.