In re Headrick

8 Citing cases

  1. Former Employees of BMC Software, Inc. v. United States Secretary of Labor

    519 F. Supp. 2d 1291 (Ct. Int'l Trade 2007)   Cited 6 times
    Rejecting Government's argument that photos of packaged software (evidence that employer's software was a tangible "article" for TAA purposes) which were appended to Complaint were "unavailable to the [Labor Department]" prior to commencement of court action, where agency investigators never once contacted petitioning workers to request proof of their assertions

    Cir. 1989) (law of public assistance benefits); David v. Sullivan, 777 F. Supp. 212, 220-21 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (expertise in Medicare class actions); Connecticut State Dep't of Social Services, 289 F. Supp. 2d at 204-05 (Medicare benefits law);Bielec v. Bowen, 675 F. Supp. 200, 203-04 (D. N.J. 1987) (expertise in social security disability appeals); Muhur v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 653, 656 (7th Cir. 2004) (immigration law, where lawyer brings "relevant expertise to a case, such as knowledge of foreign cultures or of particular esoteric nooks and crannies of immigration law, in which such expertise is needed to give the alien a fair shot at prevailing"); Cheng v. McCredit, 1995 WL 430953 at * 5 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (granting "special factors" enhancement where party "spoke a very rare Chinese dialect," and was only able to communicate with counsel because counsel's wife spoke the dialect); United States v. Knote, 879 F. Supp. 89, 90 (E.D. Mo. 1995) ("specialized environmental litigation skills"); In re Headrick, 285 B.R. 540, 548-49 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) ("specialized knowledge of Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity issues"); Douglas v. Baker, 809 F. Supp. at 135 (immigration law); Nadler v. Immigration Naturalization Service, 737 F. Supp. at 661-62 (immigration law); Gavette v. Office of Personnel Management, 788 F.2d 753, 754 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (Merit Systems Protection Board appeals); Humane Society of U.S. v. Bush, 25 CIT 851, 854, 159 F. Supp. 2d 707, 712 (2001) (trade and environmental law and litigation); Earth Island Institute, 20 CIT at 1240, 942 F. Supp. at 612-13 (expertise in environmental litigation and Endangered Species Act); andNakamura v. Heinrich, 17 CIT 119, 121 (1993) (knowledge of customs broker statute and regulations). Other cases rejecting particular specialties or areas of legal expertise as justifications for "special factors" enhancements include Chynoweth v. Sullivan, 920 F.2d 648, 650 (10th Cir. 1990) (social security benefits law); In re Headrick, 285 B.R. at 548 (bankruptcy law); In re Moulton, 195 B.R.

  2. Fla. Dep't of Revenue v. Gonzalez (In re Gonzalez)

    CASE NO. 1:15-cv-20023-KAM (S.D. Fla. Sep. 29, 2015)   Cited 1 times

    The finding of this sub-specialty distinguishes the instant case from In Re Moulton, 195 B.R. 954, 959 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1996).In re Headrick, 285 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) is similarly distinguishable. In re Headrick relied upon In re Moulton in finding that "a bankruptcy specialty was not a special factor alone to increase the hourly rate".

  3. In re Garcia

    506 B.R. 89 (N.D. Cal. 2013)   Cited 1 times

    However, it is the Court's task here to ask whether such a conclusion constitutes an abuse of discretion. Given that reasonable judges in various jurisdictions have come to differing conclusions, the Court cannot say that the Bankruptcy Court made an incorrect conclusion of law by determining that knowledge of the Bankruptcy Code may satisfy the first prong of Pirus. These authorities include In re Headrick, 285 B.R. 540, 547โ€“48 (Bankr.S.D.Ga.2001); In re Moulton, 195 B.R. 954, 959 (Bankr.M.D.Fla.1996); In re Kreidle, 145 B.R. 1007, 1020 (Bankr.D.Co.1992).

  4. Carter v. Guthries Motors, Inc. (In re Carter)

    CASE No. 17-50682 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. Sep. 28, 2018)   Cited 3 times

    In re Pischke, No. 99-43206, 2003 WL 26114156, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. May 22, 2003) (citing Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988)). If a plaintiff fails to provide evidence of prevailing rates, a court may determine the appropriate award based on its own experience. Norman, 836 F.2d at 1303; see also Headrick v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue (In re Headrick), 285 B.R. 540, 547 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) (concluding that hourly rates awarded in previous cases within the Southern District of Georgia may serve as guidance when determining the market rate). The below chart gives a brief summary of the fee schedule compiled by Plaintiffs' counsel, Mr. Hayes, with respect to his work in this case up to the date he filed the Motion for Default Judgment. (A.P. ECF No. 17-1 at 1-2.)

  5. In re Fohrmeister

    Case No. 8:13-bk-14728-RCT (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Dec. 30, 2016)

    Nevertheless, the court finds that nominal damages of $200, $100 per Default Notice, are appropriate under the facts of this case. See Headrick v. Ga. Dep't of Revenue (In re Headrick), 285 B.R. 540, 550 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) (awarding debtors $200 in nominal damages resulting from violation of the stay); In re Withrow, 93 B.R. at 439; see also In re Diaz, 452 B.R. 257, 276 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2009) (awarding nominal damages of $500.00), rev'd on other grounds, 647 F.3d 1073 (11th Cir. 2011). Accordingly, it is ORDERED:

  6. Lugo v. Islands Motorsports, LLC (In re Lugo)

    Adversary Proceeding Number 13-4083 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. May. 21, 2014)

    In a recent case I found an attorney's requested hourly rate of $ 175.00 per hour to be reasonable. In re Beavers, 2014 WL 1424624, at *2 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. April 11, 2014)(Davis, J.); see also Headrick v. Dep't. of Revenue (In re Headrick), 285 B.R. 540, 547 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001)(Dalis, J.)(holding that hourly rates found reasonable in previous cases from the Southern District of Georgia can establish the market rate for the area where the debtors' brief did not address the issue). Based on my recent ruling in Beavers and because Debtor's attorney did not proffer a showing of his own hourly rate or the prevailing market rate for the area, I conclude that the reasonable hourly rate to be applied in this case is $175.00 per hour.

  7. In re Autery

    Case No. 08-30473-elp (Bankr. D. Or. Mar. 8, 2010)

    There is no set metric for determining the amount of emotional distress damages, so I look to existing caselaw for guidance. Creditor's violation of the stay in this case caused more harm than that caused in In re Headrick, 285 B.R. 540, 549 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001), wherein debtors were awarded $200 after receiving two collection notices. However, creditor caused less harm than in In re Fynn, 185 B.R. 89, 93 (S.D. Ga. 1995) (cited with approval in Dawson, 346 B.R. at 1150), wherein debtor was awarded $5,000 after her checking account was frozen in violation of the automatic stay and, as a result, she was forced to cancel her son's birthday party.

  8. In re Roche

    Case No. 05-63544-MGD, Adversary Proceeding No. 05-09040 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. May. 16, 2006)   Cited 1 times

    This is the consistent holding of other courts on this issue, which note that even fees expended on an appeal are compensable. In re Roman, 283 B.R. 1, 9-10 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2002); Beard v. Walsh (In re Walsh), 219 B.R. 873 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1998) (actual damages include fees for appeal of order finding stay violation, even if appeal is non-frivolous); In reOmine, 329 B.R. 343 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2005); In re Joslyn, 75 B.R. 590, 593 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1987) ("attorneys' fees do not stop accruing under ยง 362(h) as of the collateral recovery date"); Headrick v. Dep't. of Revenue (In re Headrick), 285 B.R. 540 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2001) ([Debtors] "were entitled to attorney fees and costs for prosecuting the stay violation, including all representation before this court and all appeals"). For the Court to adopt the rule urged by Defendants would essentially gut the remedy afforded by Section 362, since a creditor could prolong litigation over the damages issue with the knowledge that a debtor's attorney would be frequently "working for free" after the stay violation itself ended. Section 362(h) can have no real meaning if it is not read to support the ability of a debtor to have legal representation to recover the damages at issue.