Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1829-12T1
08-28-2014
STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF H.D., a juvenile.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant H.D. (Steven J. Sloan, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Mary R. Juliano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Martha Nye, Legal Assistant, on the brief).
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Sapp-Peterson and Sabatino. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Monmouth County, Docket No. FJ-13-2054-12. Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant H.D. (Steven J. Sloan, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Acting Monmouth Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Mary R. Juliano, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel; Martha Nye, Legal Assistant, on the brief). PER CURIAM
In this appeal, H.D., a juvenile at the time of the conduct at issue, appeals from an adjudication of delinquency for committing an act which, if committed by an adult, would have constituted fourth-degree criminal mischief, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3(a)(1). The court imposed a probationary final disposition, together with appropriate fines and penalties. In addition, the court ordered H.D. to make restitution to the victim in the amount of $526.12 . The sole issue H.D. raises on appeal is his contention that "the trial court misapplied the law as there was insufficient evidence and reasonable doubt to support a conviction." We find no merit to this contention and, therefore, affirm.
The facts upon which the Family Part judge concluded H.D. committed criminal mischief unfolded on November 21, 2011, when he was seventeen years old. According to the testimony of the victim, he went to a house party to pick up a friend. The victim drove his mother's Mercedes to the party and parked the vehicle in the driveway of the house. As he was walking into the house party, he saw H.D., walking out of the party with a group of other young men. H.D. and the others were being loud at the time. Two minutes later, when the victim walked out of the house and entered his mother's vehicle, he noticed there was no longer a left side-view mirror on it.
Two months later, the victim received a text message, purportedly from H.D., apologizing for "ripping off [his] mirror." In addition, the victim saw H.D. at another house party in January 2012, and, at that time, H.D. approached him and told him that he did not know the vehicle belonged to the victim when he ripped off the side view mirror. H.D. again offered to pay for the damage but never did. No other witnesses testified.
Upon completion of the testimony, the court found that H.D. purposely and knowingly ripped off the side-view mirror of the victim's vehicle, resulting in damage in excess of $500. The judge credited the victim's testimony and found there was sufficient circumstantial evidence of H.D.'s culpability, coupled with the text messages the victim received and H.D.'s conversation with him at another party. The judge also found the vehicle was in good working order, and within two minutes thereafter, the side-view mirror was ripped off. In addition, the judge found H.D. was within proximity of the vehicle within that two-minute time interval.
The essence of H.D.'s argument on appeal is that the State's proofs were insufficient to support his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To support this position, he relies upon State v. Lucas, 30 N.J. 37, 51 (1959). There, the Court held that "an uncorroborated extra-judicial confession cannot provide evidential basis to sustain a conviction for crime." In other words, a confession generally cannot serve as the sole proof of guilt, without corroboration.
We agree, as Judge Eugene A. Iadanza found, that the requisite corroboration was established here. The victim saw H.D. leaving the house party just as he was entering. The victim returned to his vehicle two minutes later and observed that the side-view mirror had been ripped off. Thus, H.D. was present and had the opportunity to damage the vehicle. In addition, H.D. sent him a text and spoke to him personally, during which he expressed that he did not know the vehicle was the victim's at the time he ripped off the mirror. Finally, the victim overheard H.D. discussing the incident while on speakerphone with one of the victim's friends with whom the victim was visiting.
Our standard of review of a trial court's findings in a bench trial requires that we give deference to the factual findings undergirding the trial court's decision if they are supported by adequate, substantial and credible evidence on the record. State v. Smith, 158 N.J. 376, 383 (1999); State v. Burno-Taylor, 400 N.J. Super. 581, 605 (App. Div. 2008). This deference is particularly appropriate when there are issues of credibility since they relate to "the trial court's feel of the case as to matters such as the demeanor and credibility of witnesses." D.G. ex rel. J.G. v. North Plainfield Bd. of Educ., 400 N.J. Super. 1, 26 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 196 N.J. 346, cert. denied, 555 U.S. 1085, 129 S. Ct. 776, 172, L. Ed. 2d 756 (2008). A trial court's findings of fact will not be disturbed unless they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice. State In re W.M., 364 N.J. Super. 155, 165 (App. Div. 2003).
We have carefully reviewed the record and conclude that the judge's factual determinations were clearly supported by credible testimony. We find no basis for our intervention.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION