Opinion
No. 349729
01-28-2020
In re HAYNES/HARRIS, Minors.
If this opinion indicates that it is "FOR PUBLICATION," it is subject to revision until final publication in the Michigan Appeals Reports. UNPUBLISHED Saginaw Circuit Court Family Division
LC No. 19-035777-NA Before: CAMERON, P.J., and SHAPIRO and SWARTZLE, JJ. PER CURIAM.
Respondent-father appeals the trial court's order of adjudication, which held that statutory grounds existed to exercise jurisdiction over the minor children, and initial dispositional order, which held that the minor children would continue to be placed with the Department of Health and Human Services ("DHS"). We affirm.
This matter arises from respondent's history of domestic violence with the mother of his minor children. Beginning in December 2017, several referrals were made to Franklin County Children's Services in Columbus, Ohio, in relation to respondent and mother engaging in domestic violence in the presence of their two eldest children. Respondent's eldest children were placed in foster care, and the Ohio Court exercised jurisdiction over them in September 2018. Respondent was ordered to comply with and benefit from the case service plan. During the course of the Ohio proceedings, respondent's youngest child was born. The Ohio Court exercised jurisdiction over her, but she remained in her mother's care. Respondent did not attend supervised visitation with his youngest child, and respondent stopped attending supervised visitation with his two eldest children in October 2018. Respondent also failed to comply with the services outlined in the case service plan.
The mother of the minor children is not a party to this appeal.
In January 2019, respondent's eldest children were returned to the care of their mother, and they moved to Michigan. A petition was filed in Michigan after the children's mother attempted to hit respondent with her motor vehicle. In relevant part, the petition requested that the trial court place the minor children in the care of DHS; exercise jurisdiction over the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2); and terminate respondent's parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(a) (desertion), (g) (failure to provide care and custody) and (j) (child will be harmed if returned to parent). The trial court authorized the petition and temporarily placed the children in the care of DHS. After a combined adjudication trial and termination hearing, the trial court determined that it was proper to exercise jurisdiction over the minor children pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1) and (2). The trial court held that termination of respondent's parental rights was premature. After an initial dispositional hearing, the trial court continued the children's placement with DHS and ordered respondent to comply with and benefit from the case service plan. This appeal followed.
Respondent argues that the trial court erred by determining that the minor children came within the statutory requirements of MCL 712A.2(1) and (2) after the adjudication trial and by ordering the minor children to remain in the care of DHS following the initial dispositional hearing. We disagree.
"Child protective proceedings are generally divided into two phases: the adjudicative and the dispositional. The adjudicative phase determines whether the probate court may exercise jurisdiction over the child[ren]." In re Brock, 442 Mich 101, 108; 499 NW2d 752 (1993). Jurisdiction may be acquired "by trial, plea of admission, or plea of no contest." In re PAP, 247 Mich App 148, 153; 640 NW2d 880 (2001). If a trial is held, "the factfinder must determine by a preponderance of the evidence that the child[ren] come[] within the statutory requirements of MCL 712A.2 . . . ." In re Brock, 442 Mich at 108-109. If the court acquires jurisdiction, the dispositional phase follows and the trial court "determines what action, if any, will be taken on behalf of the child[ren]." Id. at 108. This includes ordering the children's parents to participate in the service plan. See MCL 712A.18f(4).
Respondent first argues that the trial court improperly considered the Ohio case file when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction. We disagree. "A trial court's decision to admit or exclude evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion." See People v Thorpe, 504 Mich 230, 251; 934 NW2d 693 (2019).
The Michigan Rules of Evidence apply in adjudication trials. See MCR 3.972(C)(1). "Relevance is the fundamental component of the law of evidence. Evidence that is irrelevant should not be admitted at trial. Evidence that is relevant should be admitted, unless barred by some other rule." In re Dearmon, 303 Mich App 684, 696; 847 NW2d 514 (2014), quoting 2 Jones, Evidence (7th ed), § 11:1, p 258. See MRE 401. Relevant evidence is "evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." MRE 401.
In this case, we conclude that evidence of what occurred during the Ohio case was relevant to whether the trial court should exercise jurisdiction and terminate respondent's parental rights. In relevant part, the petition alleged that the trial court should exercise jurisdiction and terminate respondent's parental rights because of respondent's history of domestic violence, which resulted in the eldest children being taken into care in Ohio. The Ohio case file outlined respondent's history of domestic violence with the children's mother and his failure to comply with services in Ohio. Consequently, we conclude that the evidence contained within the Ohio case file tended to make it more probable that the children were subject to a substantial risk of harm to their mental well-being, MCL 712A.2(b)(1); that the children's home was an unfit place for them to live because of domestic violence, MCL 712A.2(b)(2); that respondent was unable to provide proper care or custody to the children, MCL 712A.19b(3)(g); and that the children were at risk of harm if returned to respondent, see MCL 712A.19b(3)(j). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by admitting the Ohio case file into evidence.
The trial court held that it was proper to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(2) because respondent's history of domestic violence with the children's mother had not been rectified. Jurisdiction is proper under MCL 712A.2(b)(2) where a juvenile's "home or environment . . . is an unfit place for the juvenile to live" because of "neglect, cruelty, drunkenness, criminality, or depravity on the part of a parent. . . . " In In re Miller, 182 Mich App 70, 80; 451 NW2d 576 (1990), this Court held that violence between parents in the children's presence was relevant to show that the parents were unfit by reason of criminality or depravity.
In this case, beginning in December 2017, Children's Services in Ohio received reports of domestic violence involving respondent and the children's mother. In early 2018, respondent was charged with domestic violence. Although respondent argues that the criminal charge was later dismissed, the dismissal of the charge is inconsequential given the testimony of the children's mother that respondent had physically abused her in the presence of their two eldest children and that this caused their oldest child to fear for her mother's safety. Despite the fact that respondent was offered services to rectify the concerns with domestic violence in the Ohio case, respondent failed to complete a batterer's assessment as instructed. Although respondent argues that he completed an online domestic violence course, the Ohio caseworker testified that she was unable to verify the extent of respondent's participation in—or whether he even completed—the course. Further, respondent testified at the adjudication trial that he had "never had an issue with domestic violence or violence. Never ever." Thus, the record supports that respondent failed to acknowledge or understand the seriousness of the domestic violence that his two eldest children had witnessed. Respondent also attempted to blame the children's mother for the domestic violence. Thus, record evidence supports that respondent did not benefit from the online class and that he failed to participate in other services that were offered in Ohio to rectify the domestic violence issue.
Although respondent argues that the children's mother is not credible, in a bench trial, the trial court is the finder of fact, and it must "determine the weight and credibility of the evidence presented." Wright v Wright, 279 Mich App 291, 299; 761 NW2d 443 (2008) (emphasis added). During the oral ruling after the adjudication trial, the trial court impliedly found that the testimony of the children's mother concerning her history of domestic violence with respondent was credible and held that it was proper to exercise jurisdiction over the children based on respondent's unresolved issues with domestic violence. Thus, the record supports that the trial court made a credibility determination when deciding whether to exercise jurisdiction over the children. This Court gives "deference to the trial court's special opportunity to judge the credibility of witnesses" and will not disturb credibility determinations on appeal. In re HRC, 286 Mich App 444, 459; 781 NW2d 105 (2009). --------
In sum, we conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court's conclusion, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the children's home was unfit because respondent had not rectified his issues with domestic violence at the time the petition was filed. See In re MU, 264 Mich App 270, 279; 690 NW2d 495 (2004) ("[T]he trial court must examine the child[ren's] situation at the time the petition was filed."). Although the evidence does not support that respondent's youngest child ever witnessed respondent engage in domestic violence, this is not dispositive given the domestic violence witnessed by respondent's eldest children. See In re LaFrance Minors, 306 Mich App 713, 730; 858 NW2d 143 (2014); In re Powers, 208 Mich App 582, 592-593; 528 NW2d 799 (1995), superseded in part on other grounds by MCL 712A.19b(3)(b)(i). Because the trial court correctly exercised jurisdiction over the minor children under MCL 712A.2(b)(2), we need not consider whether jurisdiction was also appropriate under MCL 712A.2(b)(1). See In re SLH, 277 Mich App 662, 669; 747 NW2d 547 (2008) ("In order to find that a child comes within the court's jurisdiction, at least one statutory ground for jurisdiction contained in MCL 712A.2(b) must be proven. . . ."). Nonetheless, we have considered it and conclude that the trial court properly exercised jurisdiction pursuant to MCL 712A.2(b)(1).
Finally, respondent argues that the trial court improperly continued the children's placement with DHS, which is reflected in the order of initial disposition. However, because respondent has fully abandoned the argument on appeal, we need not address the argument. See Prince v MacDonald, 237 Mich App 186, 197; 602 NW2d 834 (1999). To the extent that we have considered the argument, we find that it lacks merit. See MCR 3.965(C)(2).
Affirmed.
/s/ Thomas C. Cameron
/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro
/s/ Brock A. Swartzle