Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5230-13T2
06-30-2016
IN THE MATTER OF KERRY HAUBER, SUPERVISING FAMILY SERVICE SPECIALIST 1 (PS8468K), DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES.
Kerry Hauber, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Yannotti and St. John. On appeal from the Civil Service Commission, Docket No. 2014-887. Kerry Hauber, appellant pro se. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent New Jersey Civil Service Commission (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Pamela N. Ullman, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Kerry Hauber appeals the decision of the Civil Service Commission (Commission) which determined she did not meet the experience requirements for the promotional examination for Supervising Family Service Specialist 1, Department of Children and Families. Our examination of the record satisfies us that the Commission's final decision was properly premised on facts in the record and is consonant with relevant statutory provisions. Accordingly, we affirm.
I.
The record discloses the following facts and procedural history. The subject promotional examination was open to candidates who had an aggregate of one year of continuous permanent service in any competitive title, and met the announced requirements, as of the June 21, 2013 closing date. These requirements included graduation from an accredited college or university with a bachelor's degree, and four years of experience in professional social work, direct support counseling, or case management involving high risk child abuse and neglect or other problematic situations involving clients with social, emotional, psychological, or behavioral problems, including gathering and analyzing information, determining needs, and planning and/or carrying out treatment plans, "one year of which shall have been a supervisory capacity."
Five hundred and sixty-one candidates were found eligible for the examination, which resulted in an eligible list of 511 candidates on December 19, 2013, and expiring on December 18, 2016. Based on her application, the Division of Selection Services (DSS) determined Hauber lacked the required one year of supervisory experience as of the closing date and, therefore, she was ineligible. She appealed the decision to the Commission.
On appeal to the Commission, Hauber alleged that as a County Services Specialist, she performed supervisory duties. She described her duties in this title, claiming that she functioned in a supervisory case management position. Specifically, she reviewed case files, supervised cases "by performing follow up," performed "[s]upervisory level coordination of plans," supervised "the entire office in means of stat analysis and accountability," supervised case conferences for case transfers, conducted case audits, authorized referrals for services, and supervised "call-outs of staff when contacted."
Hauber further contended that she "functioned" as an "intake" Supervising Family Service Specialist 2 from April to May 2012 and May to November 2012, a "permanency" Supervising Family Service Specialist 2 from February to March 2012, and a "covering permanency" Supervising Family Service Specialist 1 from February to April 2012. Hauber claimed that her experience as a "SPRU Supervisor" should be credited toward the supervisory experience requirement.
In support of her appeal to the Commission, Hauber submitted copies of the job specifications for the subject title and County Services Specialist, her performance assessment review for the period of September 1, 2012, to August 31, 2013, and a letter of support from her supervisor, who confirms that Hauber worked as a Supervising Family Service Specialist 2 and a Supervising Family Service Specialist 1 during the dates Hauber listed.
The Commission noted her application indicated she possessed the necessary education and general experience, however, she failed to demonstrate the necessary supervisory experience. In arriving at its conclusion, the Commission carefully examined her experience, including her role as a County Services Specialist in which it acknowledged she "performed supervisory duties[.]" However, it determined that those duties "are plainly outside the scope of the announced supervisory experience requirement." Moreover, even if the duties Hauber indicated she performed were relevant to the experience requirement, these duties constituted "out-of-title work. In this regard, out-of-title work, without good cause, is not acceptable for admittance to promotional examinations with open competitive requirements."
Regarding her experience as a Supervising Family Service Specialist 1 and Supervising Family Service Specialist 2, the Commission determined that Hauber filed the information as clarifying information, but since she did not list the experience on her application, it is considered to be amending information and cannot be considered. The Commission determined that, even if she had listed the experience, the titles cannot be considered "because she did not serve in these titles in a recognized appointment." The Commission issued its final decision on May 27, 2014, denying Hauber's appeal. It is from that decision that Hauber presently appeals.
II.
On appeal, Hauber contends: the Commission's decision was arbitrary, capricious and unreasonable, not supported by credible evidence, and failed to meet legal standards; even if her supervisory experience was "out-of-title" it should be considered; the additional experience was "clarifying" and was required to be considered; and, in the alternative, a hearing to determine if she is qualified should be held before an administrative law judge.
Established precedents guide our task on appeal. Our scope of review of an administrative agency's final determination is limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). "[A] 'strong presumption of reasonableness attaches'" to the agency's decision. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.) (quoting In re Vey, 272 N.J. Super. 199, 205 (App. Div. 1993), aff'd, 135 N.J. 306 (1994)), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001). The burden is upon the appellant to demonstrate grounds for reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002); see also Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that "[t]he burden of showing the agency's action was arbitrary, unreasonable[,] or capricious rests upon the appellant"), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 469 (1994).
To that end, we will "not disturb an administrative agency's determinations or findings unless there is a clear showing that (1) the agency did not follow the law; (2) the decision was arbitrary, capricious, or unreasonable; or (3) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence." In re Application of Virtua-West Jersey Hosp. Voorhees for a Certificate of Need, 194 N.J. 413, 422 (2008); see also Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 9-10 (2009).
If our review of the record satisfies us that the agency's finding is clearly mistaken or erroneous, the decision is not entitled to judicial deference and must be set aside. L.M. v. State of N.J., Div. of Med. Assistance & Health Servs., 140 N.J. 480, 490 (1995). We may not simply "rubber stamp" an agency's decision. In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 657 (1999).
The New Jersey Constitution requires that civil service appointments and promotions "be made according to merit and fitness to be ascertained, as far as practicable, by examination, which, as far as practicable, shall be competitive[.]" N.J. Const. art. VII, § 1, ¶ 2. To further that constitutional mandate, "the Legislature, under the New Jersey Civil Service Act, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-1 to 12-6, has declared that the selection and advancement of state employees should be dependent on considerations of merit, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(c), and determined on the basis of relative knowledge, skill, and ability, N.J.S.A. 11A:1-2(a)." In re Police Sergeant, 176 N.J. 49, 57 (2003). By prescribing requirements for appointment and advancement based on merit and ability, "the Act seeks to put civil service positions beyond political control, partisanship, and personal favoritism." Commc'ns Workers of Am. v. N.J. Dep't of Pers., 154 N.J. 121, 126 (1998) (citations omitted).
The Commission has promulgated administrative regulations to effectuate its statutory mandates. See N.J.A.C. 4A:1-1 to 10-3.2. Applicants for promotional examinations shall meet all of the criteria set forth in N.J.A.C. 4A:4-2.6 by the announced closing date, including all requirements contained in the announcement.
In its decision, the Commission comprehensively set forth the reasons why Hauber's employment history did not meet the required one year of supervisory experience as of the closing date. Each of appellant's contested positions, including those which the Commission determined were submitted as amending information, were analyzed and found lacking. There was substantial credible evidence in the record to support the Commission's conclusion. Accordingly, we affirm substantially for the reasons set forth in the Commission's final decision of May 27, 2014.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION