Opinion
No. 7515DC762
Filed 18 August 1976
1. Insane Persons 1 — involuntary commitment — required findings Prerequisite to a valid involuntary commitment to a mental health care facility, G.S. 122-58.7(i) mandates that the district court make two distinct findings: (1) that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate as those terms are defined in G.S. 122-86, and (2) that the respondent is imminently dangerous to himself or others.
2. Insane Persons 1 — careless and reckless driving — respondent imminently dangerous to herself or others Evidence that respondent drove her car carelessly and recklessly was sufficient to support the trial court's determination that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself or others.
APPEAL by respondent from Paschal, Judge. Judgment entered 4 August 1975 in District Court, ORANGE County. Heard in the Court of Appeals 20 January 1976.
Attorney General Edmisten, by Isaac T. Avery III, for the State.
Jerry P. Davenport for respondent appellant.
Judge MORRIS dissenting.
This is a proceeding for involuntary commitment to a mental health facility pursuant to Ch. 122, Article 5A, of the General Statutes.
On 25 July 1975 respondent's mother submitted a sworn petition alleging that her daughter, Mary Alberta Hatley, was mentally ill and imminently dangerous to herself or others. She based her opinion on respondent's erratic behavior, her threatening a relative with a brick, driving an automobile carelessly and recklessly, her inability at times to communicate with others, her failure to react normally in "caring for herself," and being "out of contact with reality."
A magistrate ordered that respondent be taken into custody for purpose of being examined by a qualified physician. Pursuant to the order, respondent was examined by Dr. Tom Wilson, a physician at North Carolina Memorial Hospital in Chapel Hill. He concluded that respondent was mentally ill and imminently dangerous to herself or others and recommended that she be committed to John Umstead Hospital.
At Umstead Hospital, respondent was examined by Dr. M. Elmaghraby, a physician, who confirmed Dr. Wilson's opinion and recommended that she be hospitalized for medication and rehabilitation.
On 4 August 1975 a hearing was held on the petition in district court. After receiving evidence from the petitioner, (the respondent offering no evidence) and considering the medical reports, the court made findings of fact and ordered that respondent be committed to Umstead Hospital for a period not to exceed 90 days.
Respondent appealed.
G.S. 122-58.7(i) provides:
"To support a commitment order, the court is required to find, by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence, that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate, and imminently dangerous to himself or others. The court shall record the facts which support its findings."
Prerequisite to a valid commitment the quoted statute mandates that the district court make two distinct findings (1) that the respondent is mentally ill or inebriate as those terms are defined in G.S. 122-36, and (2) that the respondent is "imminently dangerous to himself or others." In re Carter 25 N.C. App. 442, 213 S.E.2d 409 (1975).
In the case at hand, the district court found and concluded that respondent was mentally ill and there is no exception to that finding and conclusion. Respondent's only exception is to the finding that she was imminently dangerous to others "without there being any evidence that there was a recent overt act, attempt or threat."
The district court's finding No. 7 is as follows:
"7. That based on the evidence the Court finds that the respondent is imminently dangerous to herself in that she was driving in a careless and reckless manner such that the lives of persons with whom she came in contact might or could be endangered and in that she entered a house at a time when that house was not physically present [sic] by that neighbor who usually occupied the house."
In her testimony, after stating that respondent was born in 1943 and had been treated in mental institutions on several occasions, respondent's mother testified that ". . . [s]he could be a danger in that when she is driving a car in the condition that she is currently in, she may operate the car as in a way to endanger others on the road. And she has been driving her car recently." On cross-examination she testified that respondent drove carelessly and dangerously in that when "backing up" she would not look over her shoulder as she should and would "back up" too fast. She further testified that when driving respondent would not "make the proper sign."
We think the court's finding, however inartfully stated, that respondent was imminently dangerous to herself and others was adequately supported by the evidence relating to her driving an automobile. Needless to say, an automobile driven by an incompetent driver can be a lethal instrumentality, a real danger to the driver and other people on the highway.
Respondent insists that to be valid a finding that one is imminently dangerous to herself or others must be based on evidence showing a recent overt act, attempt or threat and that such evidence was lacking in this case. Assuming, arguendo, that respondent's argument is correct, we think there was evidence of an overt act, namely, the improper operation of an automobile.
It will be noted that respondent does not challenge the determination that she was mentally ill. It could be persuasively argued that the mere operation of an automobile on a public highway by a mentally ill person constitutes an overt act imminently dangerous to the driver and others. Here, the evidence not only showed that respondent was driving her car but that she was driving carelessly and dangerously.
The judgment is
Affirmed.
Chief Judge BROCK concurs.
Judge MORRIS dissents.