Summary
explaining that "the sole method for a collateral attack on a [final] felony conviction is through an application for a writ of habeas corpus" filed under "Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure"
Summary of this case from In re HillOpinion
No. 06-08-00098-CV
Date Submitted: September 9, 2008.
Date Decided: September 10, 2008.
Original Mandamus Proceeding.
Before MORRISS, C.J., CARTER and MOSELEY, JJ.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Davie Harrison, Sr., has filed a petition for writ of mandamus requesting this Court to order the Honorable John F. Miller, presiding judge of the 102nd Judicial District Court in Bowie County, to issue an order that Harrison be immediately released on mandatory supervision. We deny Harrison's petition because an application for a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy for post-conviction relief.
Harrison was convicted in 1994 of burglary and is currently incarcerated on that charge. According to Harrison, he is eligible for release under mandatory supervision. Harrison alleges he was illegally and arbitrarily denied release by the Amarillo Panel of the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. Harrison also alleges that he was deprived of adequate notice of the hearing and that his due-process rights were violated. A document titled "Inmate Request to Official" is attached to Harrison's petition which states Harrison may have been denied mandatory supervision due to a prior 3g offense. Harrison alleges he filed in Miller's court an application for a writ of habeas corpus that Miller has either denied or refused to rule on. Harrison requests that this Court order Miller to order Harrison's release.
See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 3g (Vernon Supp. 2008).
To the extent Harrison's petition could be interpreted as requesting a writ of mandamus be issued against the parole board, we lack jurisdiction to issue such relief. This Court has no mandamus jurisdiction over the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.221 (Vernon 2004).
In Texas, the sole method for a collateral attack on a felony conviction is through an application for a writ of habeas corpus. The procedure set forth in Article 11.07 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure is the exclusive post-conviction judicial remedy available when the conviction is final and the applicant is confined by virtue of his or her felony conviction. See Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281, 287 (Tex.Crim.App. 1989); McBride v. State, 114 S.W.3d 556, 557 (Tex.App.-Austin 2002, no pet.); see also Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 11.07 (Vernon Supp. 2008); cf. Board of Pardons Paroles ex rel. Keene v. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Dist., 910 S.W.2d 481, 483 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995). Mandamus is an extreme remedy and will not be granted unless no other remedy at law exists. Johnson v. Fourth Court of Appeals, 700 S.W.2d 916, 917 (Tex. 1985). To the extent Harrison's complaints could be considered an application for a writ of habeas corpus, this Court has no original habeas corpus jurisdiction in post-conviction criminal matters. See Tex. Gov't Code Ann. § 22.221; Dodson v. State, 988 S.W.2d 833, 835 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1999, no pet.). Because an application for a writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate vehicle to bring this collateral attack, Harrison is not entitled to a writ of mandamus.
We deny Harrison's petition for writ of mandamus.