Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-1190-12T3
05-28-2014
IN THE MATTER OF MARVIN HARRISON, CORRECTION OFFICER RECRUIT (S9987M), DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
Michael B. Campagna, attorney for appellant Marvin Harrison. John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Civil Service Commission (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Todd A. Wigder, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Before Judges Fuentes and Haas.
On appeal from the Civil Service Commission, CSC Docket No. 2012-2687.
Michael B. Campagna, attorney for appellant Marvin Harrison.
John J. Hoffman, Acting Attorney General, attorney for respondent Civil Service Commission (Lewis A. Scheindlin, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Todd A. Wigder, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Appellant Marvin Harrison appeals from the September 20, 2012 final administrative decision of the Civil Service Commission (Commission) upholding the removal of appellant's name from a list of candidates eligible for appointment to the position of Correction Officer Recruit with the State Department of Corrections (Department). We affirm.
On June 10, 2011, the Commission promulgated a list of candidates eligible for appointment as a Correction Officer Recruit. After receiving the list, the Department asked the Commission to remove appellant's name from the list because he failed to disclose on his employment application that he had been charged on February 2, 2011 with making terroristic threats, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4a, and with criminal mischief, in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:17-3a(1).
Appellant appealed the removal of his name to the Division of State and Local Operations (SLO), which referred the matter to the Commission for review. In his appeal, appellant claimed that his failure to disclose the charges "was due to a misunderstanding and [an] honest mistake." Appellant alleged that a Department recruiter told him that a "charge" for reporting purposes was "anything where an individual was arrested, given a summons or where police had to show up." Appellant asserted that he was charged with making terroristic threats and criminal mischief after he went to the police station to make a complaint against another individual, who then filed the charges against him. Because he was not arrested or given a summons, and no police officer appeared at his home, appellant argued that he believed he had no obligation to disclose the charges.
The two criminal charges were dismissed on March 30, 2011.
However, the Department's Corrections Law Enforcement Application form advised appellant of the information he needed to provide and the criteria used to determine removal from an eligible list. The Application defined "charge" to include "any incident, complaint, summons, and information or other notice of alleged commission of any offense in this or any other state or foreign country." Appellant initialed his application, indicating that he had read the removal criteria, as well as the documents and arrest history required by the Department.
In a January 25, 2012 decision, the Commission found that appellant "was clearly aware of the fact that he was charged with making terroristic threats and criminal mischief" because he produced municipal court documentation that the charges had been dismissed. The Commission also found that appellant was aware from the application form that he needed to disclose all criminal charges. The Commission observed that the "public expects Correction Officers to present a personal background that exhibits respect for the law and rules" and that appellant had withheld information that was material to the law enforcement position he sought. Based upon these findings, the Commission concluded that the Department had presented sufficient cause to remove appellant's name from the Correction Officer Recruit eligible list.
Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration, which the Commission denied in a September 20, 2012 written opinion. The Commission found that appellant had merely repeated the same arguments it had considered and rejected in its January 25, 2012 decision. This appeal followed.
On appeal, appellant argues that the Commission erred in removing his name from the eligible list due to his failure to disclose the terroristic threats and criminal mischief charges on his application form. We disagree.
Established precedents guide our task on appeal. Appellate review of an administrative agency decision is limited. In re Herrmann, 192 N.J. 19, 27 (2007). A "strong presumption of reasonableness attaches" to the Commission's decision. In re Carroll, 339 N.J. Super. 429, 437 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 170 N.J. 85 (2001). Appellants have the burden to demonstrate grounds for reversal. McGowan v. N.J. State Parole Bd., 347 N.J. Super. 544, 563 (App. Div. 2002); see also Bowden v. Bayside State Prison, 268 N.J. Super. 301, 304 (App. Div. 1993) (holding that "[t]he burden of showing the agency's action was arbitrary, unreasonable or capricious rests upon the appellant"), certif. denied, 135 N.J. 469 (1994).
Appellate courts generally defer to final agency actions, only "reversing those actions if they are 'arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable or [if the action] is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the record as a whole.'" N.J. Soc'y for the Prev. of Cruelty to Animals v. N.J. Dep't of Agric., 196 N.J. 366, 384-85 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting Henry v. Rahway State Prison, 81 N.J. 571, 579-80 (1980)). Under the arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable standard, our scope of review is guided by three major inquiries: (1) whether the agency's decision conforms with relevant law; (2) whether the decision is supported by substantial credible evidence in the record; and (3) whether in applying the law to the facts, the administrative agency clearly erred in reaching its conclusion. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194 (2011).
When an agency decision satisfies such criteria, we accord substantial deference to the agency's fact-finding and legal conclusions, acknowledging "the agency's 'expertise and superior knowledge of a particular field.'" Circus Liquors, Inc. v. Governing Body of Middletown Twp., 199 N.J. 1, 10 (2009) (quoting Greenwood v. State Police Training Ctr., 127 N.J. 500, 513 (1992)). We will not substitute our judgment for the agency's even though we might have reached a different conclusion. Stallworth, supra, 208 N.J. at 194; see also In re Taylor, 158 N.J. 644, 656-57 (1999) (discussing the narrow appellate standard of review for administrative matters).
Applying these principles here, we discern no basis for disturbing the Commission's decision to remove appellant from the eligible list. The Commission has promulgated regulations that permit names to be removed from an eligible list for a variety of reasons that disqualify the candidate for appointment. N.J.A.C. 4A:4-4.7; N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1. Specifically, a candidate may be removed from an eligible list when he or she has made a false statement of any material fact or has attempted any deception in any part of the appointment process. N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1(a)6. The regulations also allow appointment authorities to request the removal of a candidate's name for "[o]ther sufficient reasons." N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1(a)9.
Here, the application form specifically advised appellant that he was required to disclose any criminal charges. He knew he had been charged with making terroristic threats and criminal mischief, yet he failed to make the required disclosure on the form. Contrary to appellant's arguments, this omission was clearly material to the position he sought. A correction officer must uphold the law and maintain the public's trust and confidence, as well as prison order and discipline. Bowden, supra, 268 N.J. Super. at 305-06. An officer who does not fully, accurately, and honestly report all information is a serious risk to prison security and public safety. Henry, supra, 81 N.J. at 580. Indeed, prison officials have a right to expect and to rely upon complete and truthful reporting by correction officers. Ibid. Under these circumstances, appellant's failure to disclose the two criminal charges was clearly material to the position he was seeking.
The Commission's decision is therefore fully supported by substantial and credible evidence in the record. We affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the Commission in its well-reasoned January 25, 2012 and September 20, 2012 written opinions.
Affirmed.
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION