Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Ct. No. CK78850, Daniel Zeke Zeidler, Judge, and A. Garcia, Referee.
Leslie A. Barry, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Andrea Sheridan Ordin, County Counsel, James M. Owens, Assistant County Counsel, and Jacklyn K. Louie, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
CHANEY, J.
Monica P. (mother) appeals the juvenile court’sf order granting a section 340.5 restraining order against her and in favor of Edgar Lockett, a social worker with the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (the Department). Mother argues (1) the restraining order is not supported by good cause, and (2) the juvenile court lacked authority to include in the restraining order a restriction that she stay away from the Department’s Pasadena office. As explained below, we are not persuaded by mother’s arguments. We affirm the order.
All section references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
Background
1. Initiation of Proceedings and Section 300 Petition
Mother and her then three-year-old daughter Harmony came to the attention of the Department in March 2009, when the Department received a referral alleging mother was neglecting Harmony. The Department spoke with Harmony’s maternal grandmother (grandmother), who stated she was afraid for Harmony’s life because mother would call and, in the background, grandmother could hear Harmony saying “no stop it.” Grandmother also indicated that mother had been diagnosed with a compulsive disorder and had been depressed. Mother had taken medication for her mental and emotional problems, but believed she no longer needed the medication. Grandmother also stated that mother believed people—including grandmother and mother’s aunt—were harassing her.
During an initial visit to mother’s home, a social worker found the home in disarray. Clothes, spoiled food and trash were everywhere, making it difficult to walk through the house. Mother said she had not been feeling well and that Harmony makes a mess. She denied neglecting or emotionally abusing Harmony. She said her neighbors, at her aunt’s request, had been harassing her by banging on the walls. Mother agreed to let Harmony stay with grandmother while the Department took steps to assess, and to help mother improve, her mental health and stability.
Unfortunately, however, mother failed to make sufficient improvement and the Department filed a section 300 petition six months later, in September 2009. The Department alleged mother’s mental and emotional problems made her unable to care for Harmony and that her home was filthy and unsafe for Harmony. The juvenile court found a prima facie case for detaining Harmony and ordered her to stay with grandmother. Mother was granted monitored visits with Harmony.
2. Mother’s Pattern of Conduct
Prior to the restraining order at issue here, mother displayed delusional and unpredictable behavior. She had multiple mental health evaluations. She went to counseling. She took parenting classes. And she participated in monitored visits with Harmony. Although at times she behaved normally, she also had episodes of delusion, obsession, paranoia and anger. She continued to believe others were out to get her and to take Harmony away from her. Although she denied it, she continued to leave threatening phone messages for grandmother, as well as for her aunt and cousin. Her therapist noted in a more recent report that mother was “decompensating.” In other words, she was getting worse.
Mother’s relatives and Harmony’s childcare provider confirmed mother’s unusual and unstable behavior. They reported witnessing mother display compulsive behavior, such as washing her hands excessively and making strange noises. She was also known to talk to herself. Mother believed her relatives were harassing her by, among other things, putting speakers in her house and hiding Harmony’s father. Mother’s relatives reported receiving harassing phone calls from her, in which she would curse and make threats. In one phone call, mother referenced her cousin, who had been shot in the leg. Mother said she would be shot again, in the other leg. A social worker characterized the messages as “very disturbing.” Mother denied making any threatening phone calls.
Various medical professionals met with mother to assess her mental health. They each indicated that, during their individual meetings with her, she tried to hide or to minimize any emotional or mental dysfunction or stress she might have been experiencing. One doctor offered to prescribe medication for her anxiety, but she declined. One psychologist noted that, during their meeting, mother was extremely anxious, sweating profusely and defensive about her mental health. She also noted mother’s hands appeared to have been washed excessively. Another psychologist reported that, although mother is difficult to evaluate (because she can be extremely defensive about her condition and is not always behaving abnormally), there is a “definite concern about the ‘unpredictability’ of such a person.”
Mother also met with a therapist for weekly counseling sessions and took parenting classes. Toward the start of counseling, her therapist reported mother as being anxious, but also “pleasant,” “cooperative,” “nurturing” and “protective.” In late 2009, the therapist noted mother had made progress in coping with her anger and interacting with her daughter. More recently, however, the therapist stated she was “extremely concerned” about mother. She reported that there had been an “overt change in [mother] as she continues attempts to mask anger and frustration, delusions and paranoia. Therefore, it is noted that her condition appears to be decompensating.”
Finally, mother also displayed her compulsive and paranoid behavior during monitored visits with Harmony. She washed her hands often and unnecessarily. She insisted Harmony do the same, even when Harmony resisted. She talked to herself. Although the monitored visits were mother’s chance to visit with her daughter, mother often sat alone, coloring or playing with puzzles, rather than interacting with Harmony. On one occasion, mother purposely broke a toy Harmony had brought to the visit, then immediately denied doing it. After sitting in on a monitored visit, one doctor described mother as “mentally ill, had no interaction with her child[,] presented with a flat affect and was nonresponsive during the monitored visit.” Sometimes, when a monitor tried to redirect mother, she got frustrated and angry. Her frustration and anger finally boiled over during one monitored visit, to which we now turn.
3. Mother’s Threats
In July 2010, during a monitored visit at the Department’s Pasadena office, mother threatened Edgar Lockett (the social worker assigned to the case). During that visit, mother took Harmony to the bathroom and locked the door. Mr. Lockett knocked on the door and told mother she could not do that during a monitored visit. This infuriated mother. She began cursing and threatening Mr. Lockett, saying, “don’t worry you will get your ass kicked by the end of the day just watch.” Another Department employee called security personnel, who escorted mother to the lobby of the office, where she made another threat, saying, “I will tear this place up if I don’t get my daughter.” Following the incident, Mr. Lockett filed a police report with the Pasadena Police Department.
4. Restraining Order
In light of mother’s threats, the Department filed a request for a restraining order in August 2010. In addition to Mr. Lockett, two other Department employees witnessed mother’s behavior during the monitored visit and submitted brief statements supporting the Department’s request for a restraining order. The lobby receptionist witnessed mother’s second threat. He also submitted a brief statement in support of the restraining order. At the hearing for a temporary restraining order, mother’s counsel stated that mother did not agree with the Department’s description of the incident. She insisted she did not threaten Mr. Lockett. The juvenile court granted a temporary restraining order, prohibiting mother from harassing Mr. Lockett and requiring her to stay at least 100 yards from Mr. Lockett, his residence, his car and his place of work (i.e., the Department’s Pasadena office). The court scheduled the hearing for a permanent restraining order a few weeks later, in September 2010.
Before granting the restraining order, the juvenile court noted the Department’s representation that, if the court granted the restraining order, the Department would transfer the case to a different office so that mother could continue with her monitored visits. In this appeal, the Department filed an unopposed “Motion to Take Judicial Notice and Additional Post-Judgment Evidence on Appeal,” to which the Department attached juvenile court filings indicating the Department transferred the case to a new office and assigned a new social worker to the case. We grant the motion.
Before that hearing, however, mother violated the temporary restraining order. One afternoon in late August, mother came to the Department’s Pasadena office demanding to see a Department employee (not Mr. Lockett). The Department receptionist described mother as agitated and intimidating. She refused to leave and was talking to herself. The police were called. When they arrived, they were shown a copy of the temporary restraining order. Mother denied knowledge of the temporary restraining order, although she admitted having received a copy of it in court. She said the order applied only to her daughter. A police officer told mother she could either leave the building or be detained. She resisted and said no one was going to take her anywhere.
The police asked mother to take a seat while they spoke with Department staff. A Department employee said no charges would be brought if mother left the office and did not return. The police finally were able to escort mother—who remained agitated and argumentative—out of the building. After she was gone, Department staff noticed a stick, approximately 15 inches long, on the floor under the chair where mother had been sitting. No one knew how long the stick had been there or whether mother had brought it in with her. After reviewing a Department report summarizing the incident, the Los Angeles County Office of Security Management advised that, for the protection of Department employees, matters such as this should be taken seriously.
The hearing on the permanent restraining order was brief. Mother told her attorney to “submit” the matter based on her written statement to the court. In her statement, mother claimed she did not threaten Mr. Lockett, but, in fact, he had harassed her. She claimed she had simply told Mr. Lockett she did not have to be monitored when taking her daughter to the bathroom because she was not a criminal and there were no allegations of sexual abuse against her. She said Mr. Lockett “immediately started to harass” her and “started to get in [her] face.” She called the police so that she could file a harassment report. Although police responded to the call, they did not take a report from mother.
The juvenile court granted a three year restraining order with the same terms as the temporary restraining order. Mother appealed.
Discussion
1. Waiver
As an initial matter, the Department argues mother did not object to the restraining order in the juvenile court and, therefore, waived her challenge on appeal. We disagree.
Although mother’s counsel did not argue against the restraining order, counsel was clear that mother sought to rely on her written statement to the court, in which she objected to the restraining order. In her letter, mother stated: “I feel this is not necessary to grant Edger Lockett the restraining order. I simply said that I do not need to be monitored when taking my child to the restroom. I do not have a sexual abuse case and I’m not a criminal I said to Edger Lockett. So there for [sic] I should not have to be monitored. He immediately started to harass me about the situation so I called the police so they can take out a harassment report. He started to get in my face. I walk [sic] down stairs and waited for the police to arrive... I was upset and my daughter was uncomfortable.” In other words, mother believed the court lacked good cause to grant a restraining order.
Thus, although she did not make the exact arguments she now makes on appeal, we conclude mother objected to the issuance of the restraining order below and preserved her challenges on appeal.
In her written statement, mother also asked the court not to “grant this restraining order due to the fact that I’m attending school for administration justice/private security and does [sic] not want this to effect [sic] my clearance of my background.” We do not consider this portion of mother’s statement, however, because possible repercussions of a restraining order are not relevant to whether good cause exists for the juvenile court to grant a restraining order under section 340.5.
2. Restraining Order
Mother argues the restraining order must be reversed because it is not supported by good cause. In addition, she argues the juvenile court lacked authority to order her to stay away from the Department’s Pasadena office. We disagree on both counts.
Section 340.5 provides in relevant part: “Whenever pursuant to Article 10 (commencing with Section 360) a social worker is assigned to provide child welfare services, family reunification services, or other services to a dependent child of the juvenile court, the juvenile court may, for good cause shown and after an ex parte hearing, issue its order restraining the parents of the dependent child from threatening the social worker, or any member of the social worker’s family, with physical harm.” (§ 340.5, subd. (a).) “Good cause” is defined as “at least one threat of physical harm to the social worker, or any member of the social worker’s family, made by the person who is to be the subject of the restraining order, with the apparent ability to carry out the threat.” (§ 340.5, subd. (b).)
a. Standard of Review
We review the issuance of a restraining order for abuse of discretion. (Salazar v. Eastin (1995) 9 Cal.4th 836, 849-850; In re Matthew F. (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 883, 886.) When the juvenile court’s discretion is challenged on the sufficiency of the evidence, “we view the evidence in a light most favorable to the respondent, and indulge all legitimate and reasonable inferences to uphold the juvenile court’s determination. If there is substantial evidence supporting the order, the court’s issuance of the restraining order may not be disturbed. [Citation.]” (In re Cassandra B. (2004) 125 Cal.App.4th 199, 210-211.) Substantial evidence is evidence that is “‘reasonable, credible and of solid value.’” (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 971.)
b. Good Cause
Mother contends the restraining order is not supported by good cause because there is no evidence she had the apparent ability to carry out the threats she made. We disagree.
Mother does not contest that she threatened both Mr. Lockett and the Department’s entire Pasadena office with physical harm. Rather, she focuses on whether she could have carried out those threats. Although mother does not have a violent history, she has demonstrated a pattern of conduct including aggressive outbursts, threats against others, and generally unstable and unpredictable behavior. Notably, her therapist had recently reported that mother’s behavior had begun to “decompensate,” or worsen. Additionally, nothing suggests that mother lacked the ability to carry out her threats. There is no indication she was infirm and the record reveals that, at the time the restraining order was issued, she was 27 years old, 5 feet 6 inches tall, and weighed over 200 pounds. In fact, after she threatened Mr. Lockett, security personnel had to escort her from her monitored visit with Harmony. Similarly, when she appeared at the Department’s Pasadena office in violation of the temporary restraining order, police officers had to escort her out. The County Office of Security Management advised the Department to take her threats seriously for the protection of Department employees. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the order, we conclude the restraining order is supported by substantial evidence.
As mentioned above, after police escorted mother out of the Department’s Pasadena office when she violated the temporary restraining order, a 15-inch stick was found under the chair in which she had been sitting. In coming to our conclusion, we do not consider that stick. Other than being under a chair she used, there is no evidence linking it to mother.
c. Pasadena Office
Mother also argues the restraining order is improper because it is “considerably more restrictive than is permitted by section 340.5.” She claims the juvenile court had no authority to order her to stay away from the Department’s Pasadena office, where Mr. Lockett worked. We disagree.
Initially, although neither party mentions it, we note that the deferential standard of review does not apply when the juvenile court misapplies the law. (In re Matthew F., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 886.) Whether the court was authorized to order mother to stay away from Mr. Lockett’s place of work is a purely legal question subject to de novo review. (See ibid.)
In any event, applying either the abuse of discretion standard or the de novo standard, we conclude the juvenile court did not err in requiring mother to stay away from the Department’s Pasadena office. Ordering mother to stay away from Mr. Lockett’s place of work—as well as from his residence and car—was part and parcel of protecting him. Had the court not restrained mother from those places, she conceivably could have interfered with them when Mr. Lockett was away in an attempt to harm him when he returned. Moreover, mother not only threatened Mr. Lockett, she threatened the entire Pasadena office when she said, “I will tear this place up if I don’t get my daughter.” Under section 340.5, courts are authorized to protect all social workers, including supervisory personnel, who provide services to dependent wards of the court. (In re Matthew F., supra, 132 Cal.App.4th at p. 888.) Accordingly, the court was within its authority to order mother to stay away from the Pasadena office.
Interestingly, although her same argument would seem to apply, mother does not contend the juvenile court exceeded its authority in ordering her to stay away from Mr. Lockett’s residence or his car.
Disposition
The order is affirmed.
We concur: MALLANO, P. J., JOHNSON, J.