We note that the appellant failed to properly commence a separate proceeding to validate his designating petition by not purchasing a second index number ( see Matter of White v Bilal, 21 AD3d 573, 574; Matter of Mennella v Deputy Chief Admin. Judge, N.Y. City Cts., 302 AD2d 530, 530-531; Matter of Pal v Aponte, 237 AD2d 443, 444).

The second order to show cause and petition were filed under the same index number as the original order to show cause and petition seeking a judgment dismissing the disciplinary charges. In light of his failure to obtain a second index number and pay a second filing fee, the petitioner never properly commenced the second proceeding (see Matter of Gershel v. Porr, 89 N.Y.2d 327; Matter of Pal v. Aponte, 237 A.D.2d 443). Thus, the Supreme Court should have dismissed the second proceeding for this reason rather than making a determination on the merits.

The petitioner's failure to purchase a new index number prior to service of the notice of petition and petition herein requires dismissal of the present proceeding ( see, CPLR 304, 306-a N.Y.C.P.L.R.; Matter of Gershel v. Porr, 89 N.Y.2d 327, affg 226 A.D.2d 636; Midamerica Fed. Sav. Bank v. Gaon, 242 A.D.2d 610; Mandel v. Waltco Truck Equip. Co., 243 A.D.2d 542; Oquendo v. Rios, 240 A.D.2d 552; Venditti v. Town of Alden, 239 A.D.2d 910; Matter of Pal v. Aponte, 237 A.D.2d 443). Bracken, J. P., Rosenblatt, Krausman and Goldstein, JJ., concur.

In failing to obtain a second index number and pay a second filing fee, the plaintiff never properly commenced this action (see, Matter of Pal v. Aponte, 237 A.D.2d 443; CPLR 306-a), and service of process was a nullity (see, Matter of Gershel v. Porr, 89 N.Y.2d 327, 330). The Supreme Court therefore properly granted the defendant's motion to vacate the default judgment and dismiss the complaint.

Pursuant to CPLR 306-a, in order to commence an action, a plaintiff must file the summons and complaint with the clerk of the court and purchase an index number. Here, because the personal injury action was not an adjunct of the pre-action discovery ( see, e.g, Poley Paving Corp. v. United Cerebral Palsy Assn., 241 A.D.2d 847), but was a new action against a different party, the plaintiffs were required to comply with CPLR 306-a by purchasing a new index number and by filing the summons and complaint with the clerk of the court ( see, Matter of Gershel v Porr, 89 N.Y.2d 327; Oquendo v. Rios, 240 A.D.2d 552; Venditti v. Town of Alden, 239 A.D.2d 910; Matter of Pal v. Aponte, 237 A.D.2d 443; cf., Ruiz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 216 A.D.2d 258). The plaintiffs failed to comply with these requirements.

Although the Supreme Court did not enter an order dismissing the original action against the appellant after determining that he had not been properly served with process, in view of its finding, the court no longer had authority to retain jurisdiction over the appellant ( see, Matter of Gershel v. Porr, 89 N.Y.2d 327, 332). Accordingly, the original action was effectively dismissed as against the appellant on April 13, 1994, and the plaintiff could not properly commence a new action without filing a second summons and complaint, and paying an additional filing fee ( see, Matter of Gershel v. Porr, supra; Venditti v. Town of Alden, 239 A.D.2d 910; Matter of Pal v. Aponte, 237 A.D.2d 443). We further note that since the appellant raised the failure to properly effect service in his answer to the recommenced action, and raised the propriety of re-serving the summons and complaint under the original index number at a second hearing on whether he had been properly served and in his cross motion to dismiss the complaint, there was no waiver of the filing requirements ( see, Hertz v. Schiller, 239 A.D.2d 240; cf., Matter of Fry v. Village of Tarrytown, supra).

The claims now being asserted by the plaintiffs were interposed no earlier than the November 16, 1995, date on which Index Number 6838/95 was purchased. Any filings made prior to that time under Index Number 7390/94 were ineffective, and did not constitute either the commencement of the plaintiffs' action or the interposition of the plaintiffs' various claims (see, Matter of Gershel v. Porr, 89 N.Y.2d 327; Matter of Pal v. Aponte, 237 A.D.2d 443; Matter of Winston v. Freshwater Wetlands Appeals Bd., 224 A.D.2d 160; Brown v. Doxsee Sea Clam Co., 231 A.D.2d 440; Matter of Vetrone v. Mackin, 216 A.D.2d 839; cf., Ruiz v. New York City Hous. Auth., 216 A.D.2d 258; Matter of Miner Co. v. Lone Wolf Insulation, 219 A.D.2d 831). The plaintiffs' argument that the interposition of the claims contained in the present amended summons and complaint relates back to the interposition of the claims asserted in the prior proceeding against MVAIC is meritless (see generally, Buran v. Coupal, 87 N.Y.2d 173; Mondello v. New York Blood Ctr., 80 N.Y.2d 219; Brock v. Bua, 83 A.D.2d 61; see also, Piccinich v Forrest City Tech Place Assocs., 234 A.D.2d 528; Yovane v. White Plains Hosp. Ctr., 228 A.D.2d 436).

Plaintiff's instant application was brought under the index number of the action that resulted in the judgment the plaintiff/judgment creditor is seeking to enforce. Because plaintiff failed to file a petition, pay the filing fee and secure a new index number as required by CPLR §304(a) and §306-a, this application is defective (Gershel v Porr, 89 NY2d 327 (1996); Pal v Aponte, 237 AD2d 443 [2d Dept 1997]).