In re Hanna

23 Citing cases

  1. In re Selmonosky

    204 B.R. 820 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1996)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that plaintiff must show that debtor unlawfully took and carried away property belonging to another with intent to permanently deprive owner of same to establish larceny

    The issue preclusive effect of arbitration awards in dischargeability actions has been specifically addressed by several bankruptcy courts. See Swanson v. Tam (In re Tam), 136 B.R. 281, 285 (Bankr.D.Kan. 1992); see also Clayton, 168 B.R. at 704-05; Arndt v. Hanna (In re Hanna), 163 B.R. 918 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1994); cf. Thames River Assoc. Ltd. Partnership v. William Guiel and Son (In re Thames River Assoc. Ltd. Partnership), 160 B.R. 696, 698 n. 2 (Bankr.D.Conn. 1993) (claim preclusion regarding validity of lien).

  2. In re Carozza

    167 B.R. 331 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994)   Cited 4 times
    Observing that "[a]ll elements required for a determination that Debtor's obligation pursuant to the State Court's judgment is non-dischargeable have been decided, with collateral estoppel effect, and Plaintiff is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."

    Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); RESTATEMENT 2d JUDG. § 68; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV.L.REV., 1, 2-3 (1942) ). See, e.g., Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 46, 66 (2d Cir.1978); see also Arndt v. Hanna (In re Hanna), 163 B.R. 918, 924 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y.1994) ( "Collateral estoppel is applicable in bankruptcy dischargeability proceedings.") (quoting Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284-85 n. 11, 111 S.Ct. 654, 658 n. 11, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991) ). The Montana language has become a four-part test which may be applied to the issue in question to discern whether its prior determination will collaterally estop a party from again litigating it:

  3. In re Murphy

    Chapter 7 No. 99 B 25354, Adversary Proceeding No. 00 A 00047 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2001)

    Id. at 34. Arbitration awards do not necessarily have preclusive effects in subsequent proceedings in federal court. Arndt v. Hanna (In re Hanna), 163 B.R. 918, 923 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). This is especially true when the prior decision, either by an arbitration panel or a state court, does not indicate the basis of the liability or a finding as to whether the debtor had committed fraud.

  4. In re Murphy

    Bankruptcy No. 99 B 25354, Chapter 7, Adversary No. 00 A 00047 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jul. 17, 2001)

    Id. at 34. Arbitration awards do not necessarily have preclusive effects in subsequent proceedings in federal court. Arndt v. Hanna (In re Hanna), 163 B.R. 918, 923 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1994); see also Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 223, 105 S.Ct. 1238, 84 L.Ed.2d 158 (1985). This is especially true when the prior decision, either by an arbitration panel or a state court, does not indicate the basis of the liability or a finding as to whether the debtor had committed fraud.

  5. In re Zangara

    217 B.R. 26 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1998)   Cited 17 times
    Holding arbitration proceeding afforded debtor due process rights

    of O'Brien's staff that certain unauthorized purchases in O'Brien's accounts were mere mistakes that Zangara would have corrected by the appropriate personnel at RTFC and that O'Brien should ignore the Regulation T Notices from RTFC and/or its clearing agent demanding payment for the trades (First Amended Statement of Claim, para. 11). O'Brien further alleged that Zangara, without authority, then sold positions from O'Brien's account at a loss to cover the unauthorized purchases (First Amended Statement of Claim, para. 11). By awarding O'Brien $121,461.75 in damages, including punitive damages, which are only awarded upon a finding that the securities salesman knowingly made a false representation in connection with the transaction (§§ 27.01(a) and 27.01(c), Tex. Bus. Com.Code), the arbitrators necessarily made the finding that Zangara made false representations upon which O'Brien relied to his detriment. Furthermore, the Debtor relies solely on Judge Duberstein's 1994 decision in In re Hanna, 163 B.R. 918 (Bankr.E.D.N Y 1994) (hereinafter " Hanna I") to demonstrate that this Court cannot give preclusive effect to the Award. Specifically, the Debtor makes much of the fact that in Hanna I, Judge Duberstein found that "the absence of factual findings or any explanation of the arbitrators' rationale renders the basis of their decision ambiguous and is fatal to the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment."

  6. In re Hanna

    197 B.R. 413 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1996)   Cited 5 times

    The Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied by this Court and the issues were set down for trial. See the opinion of this Court cited at 163 B.R. 918 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1994). This matter having come on for trial, and after consideration of the arguments of counsel, the evidence presented, briefs and other documents submitted after the trial, this Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52 made applicable to this proceeding by Rule 7052.

  7. In re Weinstein

    173 B.R. 258 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994)   Cited 16 times
    Holding a jury finding that the debtor breached his fiduciary duty by, among other things, making inadequate distributions to beneficiaries and paying himself excessive commissions, established the debtor's actions "went far beyond mere failure to account for funds held in trust" and amounted to defalcation under section 523

    Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210 (1979) (citing Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326 n. 5, 99 S.Ct. 645, 649 n. 5, 58 L.Ed.2d 552 (1979); RESTATEMENT 2D JUDG. § 68; Scott, Collateral Estoppel by Judgment, 56 HARV.L.REV., 1, 2-3 (1942)). Collateral estoppel principles apply to dischargeability proceedings under section 523(a) of the Bankruptcy Code. Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 n. 11, 111 S.Ct. 654, 658 n. 11, 112 L.Ed.2d 755 (1991); see also Arndt v. Hanna (In re Hanna), 163 B.R. 918, 925 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1994); Davidcraft Corp. v. Baer (In re Baer), 161 B.R. 334, 337 (Bankr.E.D.N.Y. 1993) ("[T]he Bankruptcy Court may hold on the basis of the state court proceedings that the debt is nondischargeable."). The following four-part test has been established to determine whether collateral estoppel effect may be accorded a prior court's findings:

  8. Hess v. Mastrodonato

    No. 00-CV-6508L (W.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2001)   Cited 3 times
    Reciting the elements for false representation under § 523

    For Mastrodonato to succeed on his claim of non-dischargeability, he was required to establish each of the following elements: (1) the debtor made a false representation; (2) that at the time the representation was made, the debtor knew it was false; (3) that the debtor made the representation with the intention and purpose of deceiving the creditor; (4) that the creditor relied on the representations; and (5) that the creditor sustained loss or damages as the proximate result of the representations having been made. See, e.g., In re Halperin, 215 B.R. 321, 334 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1997); In re Hanna, 163 B.R. 918, 925 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994); In re Schwartz Meyers, 130 B.R. 416, 422 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (reducing the level of proof necessary to block discharge of debts deceptively obtained because "Congress evidently concluded that the creditors' interest in recovering full payment of debts [of this type] outweighed the debtors' interest in a complete fresh start").

  9. Pereira v. Prompt Mortg. Providers of N. Am., LLC (In re Heavey)

    608 B.R. 341 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2019)   Cited 4 times

    The Court's task is "to determine whether a genuine issue as to any material fact exists, not to resolve any factual issues." In re Hanna , 163 B.R. 918, 922 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (citing Celotex , 477 U.S. at 330, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). A fact is material if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law," and a dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable [finder of fact] could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. DISCUSSION

  10. Marini v. Adamo (In re Adamo)

    560 B.R. 642 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2016)   Cited 8 times

    Because the Second Circuit Court has determined that "entry of a...judgment, grounded in a finding of actual fraud...resolve[s] all issues necessary to establish nondischargeability under § 523(a)(2), Evans , 469 F.3d at 283, there is no doubt that plaintiffs have met their burden of satisfying the first prong of the collateral estoppel test. See alsoIn re Pulver , 327 B.R. 125, 133 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 2005) (giving preclusive effect to an underlying fraud judgment and granting summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff in an action under § 523(a)(2)(A) ); In re Hanna , 163 B.R. 918, 925–26 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1994) (discussing cases providing same relief).In opposition to the Motion, defendant presents several arguments, each of which lacks merit.