Instead, the court has discretion not only to formulate an advisement that explains the possibilities of deportation, denial of *380 citizenship, or denial of admission to the country, but also to determine that the defendant understands this advisement. See In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590 , 595, 469 A.2d 756 , 758 (1983) (“The precise form of the Rule 11 colloquy engaged in by the court may vary from case to case . . . depending, among other things, on the competence of the defendant and the complexity of the legal issues involved.” (citations omitted)); see also Mutwale, 2013 VT 61 , ¶ 9 (“It was within the trial judge’s discretion to formulate phrasing that explained to defendant the possibilities of deportation or denial of U.S. citizenship.”).

In a post-conviction relief proceeding, the burden of proving the alleged violation or defect rests on the petitioner. In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 595, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983); In re Battick, 137 Vt. 408, 410, 406 A.2d 381, 382 (1979); In re Clark, 127 Vt. 555, 558, 255 A.2d 178, 180 (1969). Defendant here has the burden of proving that he never entered pleas of nolo contendere to the two charges against him. He has merely proven, however, that he never said the words, "I plead nolo contendere."

In accepting a plea agreement, a defendant waives important constitutional rights, including the right to a jury trial and the right to confront adverse witnesses. In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 594, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243 (1969). As such, before the trial court may accept a plea of guilty or nolo contendere, it must assure itself that the defendant has "a full understanding of what the plea connotes and of its consequence."

Because a defendant waives important constitutional rights when pleading guilty, the court must review with the defendant the circumstances surrounding the plea to satisfy itself that the plea is voluntarily made with an understanding of its consequences. Boykin, 395 U.S. at 242; In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 594, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983). Rule 11(c) requires the court to address the defendant, explaining to him and determining that he understands: the nature of the charge to which the plea is offered; the minimum and maximum penalty; that he has the right to plead not guilty; and that he is waiving his rights against self-incrimination and to a jury trial.

In such cases, we have held that the petitioner has the burden of showing that the court's failure to comply strictly with Rule 11 prejudiced him. See In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 595, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983) (burden of proving that procedural shortcoming hampered or frustrated exercise of accused's rights rests squarely on petitioner in PCR cases); In re Bentley, 144 Vt. 404, 410, 477 A.2d 980, 983 (1984) (to show prejudice, petitioner must demonstrate that he was unaware of nature of charges and consequences of plea, and that his lack of understanding caused him to plead no contest); see also In re Cohen, 161 Vt. 432, 434, 640 A.2d 34, 36 (1994) (in PCR hearing, ultimate focus is on fundamental fairness of proceedings); State v. Bristol, 159 Vt. 334, 337, 618 A.2d 1290, 1291 (1992) (to obtain post-conviction relief, petitioner must establish by preponderance of evidence that fundamental errors rendered his conviction defective). PCR petitioners cannot prevail by merely claiming technical or formal violations of Rule 11. If the record of the plea hearing, including the trial court's colloquy with the defendant, establishes that the defendant made a knowing and voluntary plea with full un

We recognize that, in the comparable situation presented by Rule 11, we have required only substantial compliance with the colloquy requirements before the court accepts a guilty plea. See In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 596, 469 A.2d 756, 759 (1983). Although Rule 11 requires the court to advise defendant of specific rights and consequences of a plea of guilty, it does not require that "the plea hearing judge read verbatim the enumerated rights."

A guilty plea is not voluntary unless the defendant knows and understands the consequences that attach to the plea. In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 595, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983). Through our rulemaking power, we have set forth the advice the court must give the defendant in Rule 11(c) of the Vermont Rules of Criminal Procedure.

In such cases the burden of proving the alleged error and prejudice resulting therefrom is on the petitioner. In re Bentley, 144 Vt. 404, 409, 477 A.2d 980, 982 (1984); In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 595, 469 A.2d 756, 758 (1983). This Court has held that:

Even so, the Boykin direct appeal standard for a valid change-of-plea record includes an “affirmative showing” of voluntariness, 395 U.S. at 242, 89 S.Ct. 1709, but does not require any “set ritual ... of the trial court in its determination of whether a guilty plea is made voluntarily and knowingly.” In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 597, 469 A.2d 756, 759 (1983); see United States v. Ward, 518 F.3d 75, 83 (1st Cir.2008) (explaining that a “specific script, a set of magic words, or even certain types of inquiries are not required” by Boykin ).By contrast, PCR litigation can, as here, turn on evidence and burdens of proof in addition to the record of the challenged proceeding.

¶ 10. That the superior court even mentioned possible prejudice to petitioner may be due to confusion based on its recollection of In re Hall and In re Bentley — cases in which we held that a petitioner collaterally attacking a guilty plea must show prejudice when alleging only a technical violation of the Rule 11 procedures. In re Hall, 143 Vt. 590, 596, 469 A.2d 756, 759 (1983); In re Bentley, 144 Vt. 404, 410, 477 A.2d 980, 983 (1984); see also In re Dunham, 144 Vt. at 451, 479 A.2d at 148 (recognizing origin of rule). In Hall — in which a defendant sought to attack his guilty plea on the basis of technical Rule 11(c) violations — we observed that the defendant "[did] not allege that he was not in fact aware of the maximum and minimum penalties, and of his waiver of a jury trial . . . [or] assert that," if he was aware, "he would have chosen an alternative to a plea of guilty."