) Thus, courts do not have to wait until someone is harmed before ordering the hospitalization of a respondent. In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120, 398 N.E.2d 121. • 2 In the instant case, the respondent acknowledged that if he were released he would not take his medicine.

) Thus, courts do not have to wait until someone is harmed before ordering the hospitalization of a respondent. ( In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120, 398 N.E.2d 121.) Further, a reviewing court will uphold a commitment order where there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent will engage in dangerous conduct.

) Therefore, courts do not have to wait until someone is harmed before ordering hospitalization of a respondent. ( In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120.) Thus, the standard is not one of certainty but rather one of reasonableness.

• 8 The evidence was sufficient, medically and legally, to involuntarily admit the respondent to DMHDD; therefore, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in so ruling. It is not necessary that someone harm herself or another before being subject to involuntary admission. ( In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120, 398 N.E.2d 121.) In other words, the threat of harm is sufficient to involuntarily admit one legitimately believed to suffer from a serious mental health disability.

( In re Williams (1987), 151 Ill. App.3d 911, 921, 503 N.E.2d 816; see also In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill.2d 544, 563-64, 367 N.E.2d 1273.) Such an order must be based upon an explicit medical opinion regarding the individual's future conduct ( People v. Czyz (1980), 92 Ill. App.3d 21, 25, 416 N.E.2d 1; People v. Smith (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 5, 9, 466 N.E.2d 1226; but see In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120, 1122, 398 N.E.2d 121), as well as a "fresh evaluation of an individual's conduct and state of mind" ( People v. Bradley (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 1076, 1084, 318 N.E.2d 267, 273; see also People v. Sanchez (1984), 126 Ill. App.3d 746, 750, 467 N.E.2d 1085; People v. Butler (1979), 69 Ill. App.3d 556, 559, 387 N.E.2d 908). Evidence of prior hospitalization, together with the underlying facts of that hospitalization, may also be considered as relevant factors in determining a person's dangerousness. People v. Bradley (1974), 22 Ill. App.3d 1076, 1085, 318 N.E.2d 267.

The order will be affirmed where there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent will engage in dangerous conduct. In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120; In re Powell (1980), 85 Ill. App.3d 877. Gerald Lee, a clinical psychologist, diagnosed the appellant as a paranoid schizophrenic.

) The People assert that the courts accordingly are not required to wait until someone is harmed before ordering hospitalization for the person who might cause such harm. In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120, 1123, 398 N.E.2d 121, 123. • 3 On appeal, the trial court's determination will not be reversed unless it is manifestly erroneous. It should also be noted that in civil commitment cases, the medical science of predicting the future is inexact, so that a reviewing court will normally uphold a commitment order where there is a reasonable expectation that the respondent might engage in dangerous conduct.

This court affirmed the finding and order. See In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120, 398 N.E.2d 121. Sarah Moran testified during this proceeding. On January 24, 1979, Sarah Moran filed a petition alleging that she had received threatening communications from Mary Haber and a threatening telephone call from an unidentified man.

However, this requirement has been somewhat relaxed in subsequent cases especially when there is clear evidence of prior dangerous conduct or strong lay evidence. ( In re Graham; In re Chapman; In re Haber (1979), 78 Ill. App.3d 1120, 398 N.E.2d 121; cf., the testimony in In re Stephenson (1977), 67 Ill.2d 544, 562-63.) This court has upheld commitment orders under resembling circumstances in which there was no explicit medical opinion regarding the patient's future dangerous conduct, but where there was evidence of actual prior dangerous conduct and other evidence such as lay opinion.