Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Tulare County No. JJV061683A. Hugo Loza, Commissioner.
Merrill Lee Toole, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Kathleen Bales-Lange, County Counsel, John A. Rozum and Amy-Marie Costa, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
HARRIS, J.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On February 7, 2007, respondent Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency, Child Welfare Services Division (HHSA) filed a juvenile dependency petition (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 300) in juvenile court alleging minor’s parents failed to protect the minor (§ 300, subd. (b)). The county counsel set forth four allegations:
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
Paragraph b-1—mother’s failure or inability to adequately protect minor from exposure to dangerous substances placed minor at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness;
Paragraph b-2—mother’s substance abuse rendered her unable to provide minor with regular care;
Paragraph b-3—father’s failure or inability to adequately protect minor from mother’s substance abuse placed minor at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness; and
Paragraph b-4—father’s substance abuse rendered him unable to provide minor with regular care.
On the same date, HHSA filed a detention report alleging mother and minor testified positive for amphetamines at birth.
On February 8, 2007, the juvenile court conducted a detention hearing, appointed counsel to represent each parent, and each parent denied the petition. The court ordered the child detained, granted parents two visits a week for one hour, and set the matter for an adjudication hearing on March 8, 2007.
On March 2, 2007, HHSA filed a jurisdiction/disposition report recommending that child remain in out-of-home placement pending father’s successful completion of a first aid/CPR class and social worker’s receipt of father’s random drug testing results. HHSA also recommended that father receive placement of the child and that father be offered reunification services.
On March 8 and 29, 2007, the court conducted a contested jurisdiction hearing, mother’s counsel objected to drug testing results due to problems in the chain of custody, and the court denied a request for dismissal because the welfare of the child required that the matter be continued. The court granted a continuance of the jurisdiction hearing to May 3, 2007.
On April 3, 2007, HHSA filed an addendum report recommending that the child be placed with father and that mother be allowed to continue living in the family home on condition she continue to provide “clean drug tests.”
On April 30, 2007, HHSA filed another addendum report recommending that the family be considered for family maintenance services upon mother’s attendance at placement orientation. The HHSA social worker noted that mother had several appointments with prevention services but had been unable to attend an orientation as of the date of the filing of the addendum report.
On May 3, 2007, the court conducted a continued contested jurisdiction hearing, found allegations b-1 and b-2 of the juvenile dependency petition to be true, dismissed allegations b-3 and b-4, and ordered the child to remain in custody of the parents on family maintenance.
On May 18, 2007, mother filed a timely notice of appeal from the May 3, 2007 order.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Appellant Mandy J. is the mother of H.A., the subject of dependency proceedings in the Tulare County Juvenile Court. On February 7, 2007, respondent HHSA filed a petition under section 300, subdivision (b), alleging that (1) mother and child tested positive for controlled substances (methamphetamine and marijuana); (2) mother’s substance abuse rendered her unable to provide the child with regular care, placing the child at substantial risk of harm; (3) the child’s father had failed to protect the child from mother’s substance abuse when he knew or reasonably should have known of her substance abuse; and (4) father’s own history of substance abuse rendered him unable to provide regular care for the child.
In early February 2007, the child was released from the hospital and immediately placed in foster care. On February 8, 2007, the juvenile court received a detention report that indicated mother and the child had tested positive for controlled substances the day after the child’s birth. The report also noted that mother had been receiving regular prenatal care since July 27, 2006, and had last tested positive for marijuana in September 2006. Mother and father maintained mother’s positive test was the result of consumption of Drixoral and Albuterol mother’s physician had prescribed for her. Mother also indicated she had taken pills which she believed to be Tylenol given to her by a friend shortly before the child’s birth. Mother admitted having a past history of drug abuse but claimed she had stopped using drugs when she became pregnant. She admitted using drugs as a minor and having grown up in group homes and foster homes. Father admitted to a history of drug abuse from an early age but reported he had stopped smoking marijuana two to three months prior to the birth of the child. The parents indicated they had been living together for one year and four months. A hospital social worker indicated mother had presented a “placenta abrupted,” which indicated methamphetamine use. The hospital social worker also reported the child’s urine tested positive at the “second void,” which indicated the level of methamphetamine in the mother’s system at the time of birth would have been very high. The report further indicated that test results were only “presumptive positive” and confirmatory drug tests had been requested.
The detention report indicated neither parent had a past minor welfare history, except for mother’s own history as a minor. The social worker recommended that the child be detained and the parents receive two supervised visits per week. The HHSA attached drug test results for mother and the child to the detention report. These test results showed positive results for amphetamines in February 2007.
At the February 8, 2007 detention hearing, father appeared in open court but mother did not appear because she was experiencing a uterine infection and was still hospitalized. The court appointed counsel for mother and counsel requested “all confirmatory tests” be provided to the court. Mother’s parole officer had delivered a letter to the court and a copy of that letter had been provided to the County Counsel. The letter indicated mother had been doing well on parole and mother was not using drugs. Father’s counsel asked that the child be returned to the father. The court declined to do so. The court then adopted the recommended findings and orders of the HHSA and granted the parents two, one-hour monitored visits per week. The court also ordered the HHSA to provide referrals for a substance abuse evaluation, testing, parenting classes, CPR classes, classes for drug exposed infants (DEI) and granted the social worker discretion to the place the child with mother.
The court received the HHSA jurisdiction report on March 2, 2007. In that report, the social worker, Meagan Boersma, recommended the child remain placed in foster care pending father’s completion of a first aid/CPR class and pending the social worker’s receipt of father’s random drug test results. The report also recommended that mother receive reunification services. The jurisdiction report also indicated mother had denied making some of her previous statements to the social worker. Those statements included references to her alleged smoking of “weed” on an occasional basis and she had stopped smoking weed upon finding out she was pregnant. Mother admitted smoking methamphetamine at ages 15 and 16 but denied she used the substance since that time. Mother informed the social worker she was willing to move out of the family home if the child was released to father. Father indicated he had not touched methamphetamine since the age of 16, after he saw his uncle die from consumption of that drug.
The social worker reported both parents had been visiting the child regularly at the HHSA office and both parents were appropriate with the child. The social worker indicated they were loving in their interactions with the child and attentive to the child’s needs. According to the social worker, the parents took turns feeding the child and rarely took their eyes off the child. According to the social worker, father would talk softly to the child and would rub the child’s head, face, arms, and feet. The social worker reported the child was developing well and feeding normally and that the child would turn toward the mother when the latter spoke to the child. According to the social worker, the parents appeared to be a “bit awkward” at the beginning but sought out instruction and quickly learned parenting skills with coaching. The social worker also reported the parents were anxious for father to receive custody of the child and father was excited about completing his courses so he could receive placement of the child. According to the social worker both parents completed DEI training and had been randomly tested for drug use. They were scheduled to complete the first aid/CPR class in early March. Both parents had been extremely cooperative with the social worker and had been pleasant and polite when asking questions of the social worker.
On February 21, 2007, the social worker received confirmatory drug tests for mother and the child. The social worker discussed these results with a lab technician who indicated mother’s drug test results could not have been the result of cold medication or Albuterol. Additionally, a nurse indicated only very high levels of methamphetamine would have caused the positive drug tests and that they were not the result of taking prescription medications.
In contrast, mother’s parole officer indicated mother had been “‘doing a great job’ with her parole requirements and has not had one violation since 12/18/2005.” The officer indicated mother was seeing her parole officer two to three times a month and was required to submit to random drug testing every month. She had not tested positive during her entire period of parole. Further, she had tested negative on January 16, 2007. The parole agent had never seen mother under the influence of a controlled substance. Had mother tested positive for drugs her parole would have been revoked and she would have been sent back to jail. The parole agent had confirmed mother was unusually cooperative and she was “an exception” to the standard parolee.
A pediatrician who saw the child indicated the child was doing well. The pediatrician reported the child was developing normally and had exhibited none of the symptoms of a child suffering from drug exposure or withdrawal. In the same report, the social worker indicated mother and father had family members who were willing to give the child’s parents emotional support and to allow mother to live in their home during a period of reunification. The social worker recommended the child not live in the same home with mother during reunification and mother complete her case plan before the child was returned to her custody. The social worker also recommended mother’s visits continue to be supervised at the HHSA office two times per week until it was determined whether father was capable of supervising mother’s visits to the family home.
At a contested hearing held March 8, 2007, counsel for the respective parents set the matter for contest, requested a “chain of custody” of the drug test results, and requested an opportunity to speak to the toxicologist who conducted the tests. The court granted the social worker discretion to place the child with her father in the interim. The court permitted mother to remain in the home, but directed mother would have to move out if any subsequent drug tests were missed or dirty.
On March 29, 2007, the court conducted a contested jurisdiction hearing and continued the matter to receive “chain of custody” information that had been requested at the previous hearing. The court denied the parents’ request to dismiss the juvenile dependency petition. On April 3, 2007, the social worker filed a report indicating the child was living with father, and mother was allowed to live in the family home, on the condition she continued to provide “clean drug tests.” The social worker indicated she had received the chain of custody documents on April 2, 2007, and attached those documents to her report.
On May 3, 2007, the social worker submitted an addendum report and recommended mother receive family maintenance services upon completing a placement orientation. Mother had been unable to attend the orientation up to that point because she did not drive and father worked every day and could not drive her. The social worker further indicated she wanted to provide family maintenance services “due to the parents’ rapid progress with their case plan.” The social worker believed a placement orientation for mother was necessary, so a professional opinion on the extent of her substance abuse could be obtained. The social worker indicated mother had never tested positive for her parole officer or for HHSA. However, the social worker thought it necessary to determine whether mother was permanently drug free because that would be in the best interest of the child. The social worker also indicated it was necessary for mother and father to obtain a telephone so that they could be contacted by HHSA when necessary.
On May 3, 2007, the court conducted a continued jurisdiction hearing and received the reports of the social worker dated March 8, March 29, and May 3, 2007. Mother’s counsel objected to the chain of custody. The court ultimately found sufficient evidence to sustain the petition under section 300, subdivision (b). The court based its finding on the fact mother and the child tested positive for marijuana and amphetamines at the time of the child’s birth. The court also noted mother had a history of substance abuse rendering her unable to provide adequate care for the child, thus placing the child at risk. The court ordered the child remain in the custody of the parents under family maintenance. The court also adopted the findings and orders submitted by the social worker, based upon (1) the confirmatory drug test results; (2) the letter from mother’s parole agent; and (3) a risk assessment prepared by the Tulare County High Risk Infant Team initial assessment.
With respect to disposition, the court received in evidence the same documents it had received for purposes of jurisdiction. The court found jurisdiction was necessary under section 366, further found that the extent of progress made by the parents was substantial, and declared the child a dependent of the juvenile court under section 360, subdivision (d). The court set a hearing for family maintenance review on October 18, 2007 (§ 364).
On May 18, 2007, mother filed a timely notice of appeal of the May 3, 2007 orders establishing jurisdiction of the juvenile court and ordering juvenile court intervention.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends circumstances at the time of the May 3, 2007 jurisdictional/dispositional hearing did not justify juvenile court jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (b).
Mother specifically first contends there is no current evidence to show she posed a risk to the child or that the child was suffering from the effects of drug exposure at the time of the jurisdiction hearing. She secondly contends that even if the court had found the child to be a person described under section 300, subdivision (b) it could have fashioned orders under that subdivision rather than under section 360, subdivision (d), as it did in this case.
As to her first point, mother argues: “[H.A.] was successfully living at home with her non-offending father and her mother under family maintenance, and mother had continued to test negatively for drugs since detention. The parents were exceptionally cooperative and had made substantial progress with the class plan. The baby was healthy, the parents had exhibited appropriate parenting skills, and the social worker indicated that due to the parents’ exceptional progress, she believed that the child could be safe under family maintenance services with both parents in the home. But for the aberration of the positive toxicology of mother and baby at the time of the baby’s birth—the results of which were disputed by mother and by the evidence of months of clean drug tests reported by mother’s parole officer—the juvenile court would never have become involved in this case at all.”
Appellant further contends substantial evidence rebutted the presumption that minor was a person described under section 300, subdivision (b). Appellant
“Here, [H.A.] was born [in early February 2007] at approximately 6:30 a.m. Mother suffered ‘Abruptio Placentae’ which precipitated emergency intervention, including a caesarian section delivery of the baby, who weighed six pounds, five ounces, and was full term. Anesthesia was administered to mother during the delivery. One day later … at 7:25 a.m., the baby tested positive for amphetamines. On … at 5:30 a.m., apparently at the time of her admission to the hospital, mother tested positive for amphetamines.
“Mother did not appear for the detention hearing held on February 8, 2007, because she was still hospitalized with an infection of the uterus. However, the baby, originally placed in the NICU, had already been released from the hospital and placed in a foster home.
“The petition filed on February 7, 2007, alleged that mother and child had both tested positive for controlled substances, and that mother was incapable of caring for the baby, due to her substance abuse and history of substance abuse.
“On May 3, 2007, the juvenile court had evidence that although mother tested positive for marijuana in September 2006, she had had regular prenatal care throughout her pregnancy. She stopped using marijuana, when she realized she was pregnant. She had taken several different medications the day before the baby was born, including Drixoral, Albuterol, and pills given to her by a friend which she thought were Tylenol. She had used methamphetamine only two times, when she was fifteen or sixteen years old.
“The court received in evidence on May 3[rd] the letter from mother’s parole agent, who indicated that mother had produced fourteen months of negative tests and that the agent had never seen mother under the influence of controlled substances. Mother had last tested negative for drugs on January 16, 2007, and on that date was eagerly looking forward to the birth of the baby. Mother had been tested randomly for drugs one or two times per month, and if she had tested positive, she would have gone back to jail. Mother was ‘an exception’ to the standard parolee.
“On May 3[rd], the court also had evidence that by February 15, 2007, baby [H.A.] was feeding every three hours, her lungs were clear, she had a regular heart rhythm and a soft abdomen with active bowel sounds, and she was able to move all her extremities equally. She had been checked out by a CHDP pediatrician, and she was not on any medications or exhibiting any symptoms of a drug exposed infant.
“The court had additional evidence on May 3[rd] that between the time the petition was filed on February 8, 2007, and the jurisdictional hearing, mother had been testing regularly and had not had a single positive drug test. Mother had … also been visiting the baby regularly and appropriately. The social worker indicated that she wanted to provide family maintenance services, ‘due to the parents’ rapid progress with their case plan.’ Moreover, nothing in the social worker’s report for May 3, 2007, showed a current risk to the child. In fact, at the time of the May 3[rd] hearing, the baby was living in the home of both parents, and mother continued to test negatively for drugs.
“By the time of the jurisdictional hearing held on May 3, 2007, the juvenile court had evidence clearly showing that there was no longer such a substantial threat to the baby’s welfare that jurisdiction was necessary.…” (Fn. omitted.)
The three elements for a section 300, subdivision (b), finding are (1) neglectful conduct by the parent in one of the specified forms; (2) causation; and (3) serious physical harm or illness to the child or substantial risk of such harm or illness. (In re Rocco M. (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 814, 820.) The third element affectively requires a showing that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the child is at substantial risk of serious physical harm in the future, i.e., evidence showing substantial risk that past physical harm will reoccur. (Id. at p. 824.)
After hearing the evidence at the jurisdictional hearing pursuant to sections 300 and 355, the juvenile court shall make a finding, noted in the minutes of the court, whether or not the child is described by section 300 and the specific subdivision of section 300 under which the petition is sustained. If it finds the child is not such a person, the court shall order the petition dismissed and the child be discharged from any detention or restriction previously ordered. If the court finds the child is such a person, it shall make and enter its findings and order accordingly. The purpose of a dependency proceeding is to protect the child, rather than prosecute or punish the parent. (In re Savannah M. (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 1387, 1395.)
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. Substantial evidence is evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid value. In making this determination, all conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences from the evidence are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party. Issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. In dependency proceedings, a trial court’s determination will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. However, substantial evidence is not synonymous with any evidence. A decision supported by a mere scintilla of evidence need not be affirmed on appeal. Further, while substantial evidence may consist of inferences, such inferences must be a product of logic and reason and must rest on the evidence. Inferences that are the result of mere speculation or conjecture cannot support a finding. The ultimate test is whether it is reasonable for a trier of fact to make the ruling in question in light of the whole record. (In re Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1393-1394.)
At the jurisdictional hearing, the juvenile court shall first consider only the question of whether the minor is a person described by section 300. Any legally admissible evidence that is relevant to the circumstances or acts that are alleged to bring the minor within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and may be received in evidence. Proof by a preponderance of evidence must be adduced to support a finding that the minor is a person described by section 300. While evidence of past conduct may be probative of current conditions, the question under section 300 is whether circumstances at the time of the hearing subject the child to the defined risk of harm. Thus, previous acts of neglect, standing alone, do not establish a substantial risk of harm. Under California law, there must be some reason beyond mere speculation to believe they will reoccur. (In re Savannah M., supra, 131 Cal.App.4th at p. 1394.)
The juvenile court stated at the May 3, 2007, hearing:
“Well, yes, the issue of chain of custody [of drug testing results] doesn’t necessarily go to the admissibility, but to the weight that would be appropriate, the weight of the evidence that would be appropriate under the circumstances, and I think there is some circumstantial evidence in the records to indicate a past history. Hopefully, it is true that the mom, by her comments, that she had used when she was much younger, denies that she has used recently, but the lab results indicate that both the mom and the child had tested positive. There is some circumstantial evidence, according to [the social worker], that the mother presented with her placenta abrupted, which according to the medical interpretation of that is indication of methamphetamine use, and also further, the baby’s urine was tested at second void, was determined that the child’s second urination was tested and also there is an indication of use of -- the Court does find that based on the totality of the circumstances that there is a sufficient basis to sustain that the b-1 and b-2 as set forth [in the petition] are true.
The b-1 allegations stated in relevant part: “The mother’s failure or inability to adequately protect [H.A.] from exposure to dangerous substances places the child at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. [In February 2007] the mother and child tested positive for controlled substances. Further, the mother’s use of controlled substances has caused the child to suffer from exposure to controlled substances absorption in utero. The mother knew or reasonably should have known she was pregnant and continued to use controlled substances.”
“I think, though, that given all the other circumstances that there is some indication that leaving the child with the parents under family maintenance would be appropriate. I think that’s a good resolution to this matter.”
On appeal, the ultimate determination is whether a reasonable trier of fact could have found for the respondent based on the entirety of the record. (Kuhn v. Department of General Services (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1627, 1633.) A review of the whole record supports the findings of the juvenile court in the instant case. In February 2007, appellant gave birth to minor despite an abrupted placenta, a condition commonly found among women who have consumed methamphetamine. At 5:30 a.m., the day after giving birth, hospital staff members collected a urine sample from appellant and it tested presumptive positive for methamphetamine. The test was confirmed for amphetamines at 645 ng/ml and methamphetamine at 3420 ng/ml. Two hours after taking the urine sample from appellant, hospital staff members obtained a second void sample from the child. That sample test presumptive positive for methamphetamine. The sample was confirmed positive for amphetamine at 740 ng/ml and methamphetamine at 2330 ng/ml.
Mother told the social worker that she took several different medications on February 3, 2007. Father showed the social worker a box of Drixoral, a medication containing dexbrompheniramine and pseudoephederine. Father also showed the social worker a plastic tube that mother used for an inhaler. Mother stated she took three puffs off the inhaler and claimed the inhaler contained Albuterol. Mother explained she was walking with a friend and became out of breath. The friend suggested to mother that she take the Albuterol. Mother told the social worker she did not think the inhaler could affect the baby and she denied using methamphetamine. Father claimed that mother’s friend threw the Albuterol container away because it was empty.
The social worker made contact with Ms. Savage-Weeks, a social worker at Kaweah Delta District Hospital. Ms. Savage-Weeks told the social worker that minor’s urine was tested at the “second void,” meaning the minor’s second urination was tested. According to Ms. Savage-Weeks, mother would have had to ingest a “high” quantity of methamphetamine for the minor’s “second void” to test positive for methamphetamine. Ms. Savage-Weeks indicated to the social worker that mother tested positive for marijuana during a visit in September 2006. With respect to mother’s positive test for methamphetamine at the time of minor’s birth, Ms. Savage-Weeks said mother claimed a friend had given her some Tylenol. Mother explained the friend gave her some pills and she assumed they were Tylenol, but told Ms. Savage-Weeks she could not be sure of that fact.
On February 21, 2007, Kaweah Delta District Hospital provided confirmatory drug test results to social worker Boersma. Boersma asked registered nurse Gross to review the results and explain their meaning. Gross contacted the lab the same day and discussed the confirmatory drug tests with lab technician Comstock. After speaking with Comstock, Gross told Ms. Boersma that no pseudoephederine was present in the mother’s test results. According to Gross this indicated that mother did not ingest any cold medications. Gross explained that the use of pseudoephederine, contained in cold medications, could cause a positive initial drug screen result. Gross ruled out medicinal methamphetamine as the cause for the positive initial drug screen. According to Gross, lab technician Comstock stated that medicinal methamphetamine (found in inhalers) does not cause amphetamine to appear in confirmatory drug screens. According to Comstock, the only substance that will cause both methamphetamine and amphetamine is the illegally manufactured form of methamphetamine. Comstock also told Gross that high levels of methamphetamine in the mother’s drug screen were sufficient to prove that prescription medications were not the cause of the positive presumptive drug screen.
Mother and father had a history of drug usage. Mother told the social worker she used marijuana for the first time when she was 15 years old and she stopped using it when she became pregnant. Mother also said she tried using methamphetamine when she was about 15 or 16 years of age but claimed she used the substance only two times. The social worker advised mother that a child welfare services history indicated she tested positive for methamphetamine on two occasions when she was on probation. Mother told the social worker those were the only two times she ever used the substance. Father told the social worker he began using marijuana at the age of 14 and tried methamphetamine at the age of 15. He denied current use of methamphetamine but admitted he used marijuana “off and on” but quit using marijuana altogether approximately two or three months before the birth of minor. Both mother and father informed the social worker they had used marijuana together in the past but had not done so “for ‘a long time.’” Despite these claims, mother tested positive for marijuana during a prenatal visit in September 2006.
In view of these inconsistencies, the credibility of mother and father was clearly questionable to a reasonable trier of fact. Although appellant heavily relies upon the February 8, 2007 letter and statement of her parole officer, that officer failed to address appellant’s positive marijuana test in September 2006 and her positive methamphetamine test in February 2007. On February 8, 2007, her parole agent wrote the court, indicated appellant was on CDC parole since December 18, 2005, and noted: “I see Mandy 2-3 times per month and she is randomly drug tested each month. Mandy has never tested positive for any drug use.” Once again a reasonable trier of fact could conclude the parole agent’s letter was insufficiently credible because it failed to account for or address appellant’s positive drug tests in 2006 and 2007.
As noted above, when the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or an order is challenged on appeal, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence, i.e., evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. In making this determination, all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. In dependency proceedings, a trial court’s determination will not be disturbed unless it exceeds the bounds of reason. (In re Ricardo L. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 552, 564.) Based on the record in the instant case, the juvenile court could reasonably find, by the preponderance of the evidence, that appellant knew she was pregnant and used controlled substances, which in turn subjected minor to absorption of controlled substances in utero as alleged in paragraphs b-1 and b-2 of the section 300 petition.
Substantial evidence supported the jurisdictional findings and reversal is not required.
Appellant next contends if the juvenile court found minor to be a person described under section 300, subdivision (b) it could have made a variety of orders under that subdivision. Appellant specifically argues:
“Under section 360, the juvenile court has various options, if it finds that the child is a person described under one of the subdivisions of section 300 at the hearing held under section 356. The court was not required to proceed under section 360(d) as it did in this case.
“The court could have fashioned orders under section 360(b), which provides that the court, ‘without adjudicating the child a dependent child of the court, order that services be provided to keep the family together and place the child and the child’s parent or guardian under the supervision of the social worker for a time period consistent with section 301.’ If the parents then fail to cooperate, section 360(c) provides that the social worker may file a petition pursuant to section 332 ‘alleging that a previous petition has been sustained and that disposition pursuant to subdivision (b) has been ineffective in ameliorating the situation requiring the child welfare services. Upon hearing the petition, the court shall order either that the petition be dismissed or that a new disposition hearing shall be held pursuant to subdivision (d).’ Either of these solutions would have adequately protected the child. There was no need to declare the child a dependent under section 360(d).” (Fns. omitted.)
The dependency statutes embody three primary goals for children adjudged dependents of the juvenile court: (1) to protect the child; (2) to preserve the family and safeguard parents’ fundamental right to raise their child, as long as these can be accomplished with safety to the child; and (3) to provide a stable, permanent home for the child in a timely manner. (In re Santos Y. (2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 1274, 1317.) The juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest and to fashion a dispositional order in accordance with that discretion. The court’s determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Jose M. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1098, 1103-1104.)
Here, the court reasonably balanced the interests of the minor, the parents, and society by “leaving the child with the parents under the family maintenance.” The court demonstrated legitimate concern for the minor’s ongoing physical well-being and justifiably recognized the parents’ clear commitment to the child and demonstrated improvement in their childrearing skills. The court reasonably left the child with the parents to facilitate their familial bonding and at the same time ordered family maintenance services to assure the court would have oversight of the situation. Under these facts and circumstances, the court did not abuse its discretion by concluding that the child would be better protected by granting the petition and ordering family maintenance services rather than by dismissing the petition and ordering voluntary services.
DISPOSITION
The judgment (the jurisdictional and dispositional findings and orders made May 3, 2007) is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: VARTABEDIAN, Acting P.J., WISEMAN, J.
The b-2 allegation provided: “The mother’s substance abuse renders her unable to provide [H.A.] with regular care, thereby placing the child at substantial risk of suffering serious physical harm or illness. The facts stated in [allegation] b-1 are incorporated herein. The mother used controlled substances, including but not limited to, methamphetamine and marijuana, while pregnant with the child. Additionally, the mother has a history of using controlled substances since age fifteen.”