Opinion
2021-69
04-23-2021
In the Matter of the Guardianship of M.H., Pursuant to SCPA Article 17-A.
For Petitioner Mohawk Valley Health System: Getnick, Livingston, Atkinson & Priore, LLP, By: Janet M. Richmond, Esq. For Respondent M.H.: Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Fourth Department, Elizabeth S. Fortino, Esq., Acting Director, By: Caroline L. Levitt, Esq.
For Petitioner Mohawk Valley Health System: Getnick, Livingston, Atkinson & Priore, LLP, By: Janet M. Richmond, Esq. For Respondent M.H.: Mental Hygiene Legal Service, Fourth Department, Elizabeth S. Fortino, Esq., Acting Director, By: Caroline L. Levitt, Esq. Louis P. Gigliotti, J.
Procedural Background
Pending before the Court is a guardianship petition filed by the Mohawk Valley Health System ("Health System"), seeking the appointment of a guardian for Respondent M.H. ("Respondent") pursuant to Article 17-A of the Surrogate's Court Procedure Act ("SCPA"). On February 5, 2021, this Court signed an order appointing Mental Hygiene Legal Service ("MHLS") to represent Respondent. MHLS filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the grounds that the Health System lacks standing to bring such a proceeding. In the alternative, MHLS asked to strike the physician affirmations that were filed with the petition, on the grounds that they were obtained in contravention of the physician-patient privilege set forth in CPLR 4504, as well as the disclosure procedures set forth under Mental Hygiene Law ("MHL") § 33.13(c).
In response, the Health System cross-moved to amend the petition to name its subsidiary entity St. Elizabeth Medical Center ("Hospital") as the Petitioner. The Hospital then argued that it has standing. The Hospital further asked for an order permitting the physician affirmations to remain part of the record and to permit the physicians to testify, as well as to seal the record. On behalf of Respondent, MHLS indicated that it did not object to the substitution of the Hospital as Petitioner, maintained that the Hospital also lacks standing, and reiterated reasons as to why the physician certifications should be stricken. Counsel for the Hospital submitted reply papers to support the cross-motion. This Court took the pending motions on submission, without oral argument.
Discussion
I. Cross-Motion to Substitute Hospital as Petitioner
Given the absence of any objection by MHLS to this portion of Petitioner's cross-motion, the request to substitute St. Elizabeth Medical Center as the Petitioner in this action is granted.
II. Motion to Dismiss the Petition for Lack of Standing
SCPA § 1751 identifies who may bring a petition under SCPA Article 17-A. Those parties include the following: "a parent, any interested person eighteen years of age or older on behalf of [the ward] including a corporation authorized to serve as a guardian as provided for by this article, or by [the ward]" [emphasis added]. SCPA § 1760 provides that such an authorized corporation is "a non-profit corporation organized and existing under the laws of the state of New York and having the corporate power to act as guardian of a [ward]." Reading these statutes together, MHLS argues—and the Court agrees—that only a non-profit corporation meeting the eligibility requirements of SCPA § 1760 has standing to bring a guardianship petition under SCPA Article 17-A.
The Hospital disputes such an interpretation by drawing attention to the word "any" in SCPA § 1751, which precedes the phrase "interested person." By doing so, the Hospital reasons that any corporation can bring a petition. The Hospital refuses to acknowledge the relevance of SCPA § 1760, and instead discounts it since the Hospital is not seeking to become the appointed guardian. The Court however, cannot simply overlook the interplay between the two statutory sections. "A statute or legislative act is to be construed as a whole, and all parts of an act are to be read and construed together to determine the legislative intent." (Frank v. Meadowlakes Dev. Corp., 6 NY3d 687, 691 [2006] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]). Although neither section makes specific mention of the other, by necessity the terms of SCPA § 1760 are incorporated by reference in SCPA §1751, which permits a petition to be filed by a corporation authorized to serve as a guardian "as provided for by this article." The Court's confidence in this interpretation is bolstered by the Second Circuit's cite to SCPA § 1760 when noting that the category of any "interested person" as defined in SCPA § 1751 includes "certain non-profit organizations," as opposed to all. (Disability Rights NY v. New York, 916 F.3d 129, 131 [2d Cir. 2019] [emphasis added]). Furthermore, while perhaps not authoritative, the Court finds noteworthy the straightforward observation in the commentary to SCPA § 1760 that "[n]o other corporation [than one that meets the qualifications under SCPA § 1760] may apply for guardianship." (Margaret Valentine Turano, 2011 Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons Laws of NY, SCPA §1760) [Note: online version]).
The Hospital's reliance on the definition of "person interested" in SCPA § 103(39) also fails. A "person interested" is one who is "entitled or allegedly entitled to share as beneficiary in the estate or the trustee in bankruptcy or receiver of such person." (SCPA § 103(39)). Given the specific reference to concepts uniquely involved in estate and trust administration, the term "person interested" is not synonymous with the term "interested person" as used in SCPA Article 17-A. (See Skerritt v. Bach, 23 AD3d 1080, 1081 [4th Dept 2005] [noting that courts are to presume the legislature means what it says in a statute and are not to look beyond statutory text absent ambiguity] [citing BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 US 176, 183 [2004]).
To the extent the Hospital suggests other cases previously filed in Oneida County Surrogate's Court set a precedent permitting the Hospital to file guardianship petitions under SCPA Article 17-A, the Court accepts and adopts the distinctions noted by MHLS in its reply papers. First, several of these cases involved a petitioning "residential health care facility" legally distinct from a hospital facility. (See Matter of Olczyk, Sur Ct, Oneida County, Oct. 28, 2008, Murad, J., File No. 2008-719; Matter of Albro, Sur Ct, Oneida County, Apr. 11, 2005, Ringrose, J., File No. 12232; Matter of Seuffert, Sur Ct, Oneida County, 2005, Ringrose, J., File No. 12237; Matter of Sterling, Sur Ct, Oneida County, July 26, 2004, Ringrose, J., File No. 12187). Furthermore, the issue of standing was not raised in any of these files. As for one cited case in Surrogate's Court involving a hospital, the Court has reviewed the records and represents that no party raised a question as to standing in that matter either. (See Matter of Lynch, Sur Ct, Oneida County, Aug. 26, 2003, Ringrose, J., File No. 12147). Having never affirmatively decided that a hospital facility automatically qualifies for standing under SCPA Article 17-A, this Court is not bound by the aforementioned precedent.
The final case cited by the Hospital was brought in Supreme Court pursuant to MHL Article 81. (See Matter of Alvarez, Sup Ct, Oneida County, 2008, Clark, J., Index No. CA001846). MHL Article 81 permits a guardianship petition to be filed by the chief executive officer or designee of a "facility" where an alleged incapacitated person is a patient or resident (see MHL § 81.06(7)), and the term "facility" is defined to include a hospital. (See MHL § 81.03(k)). Given the significantly different statutory language, the standing provisions in MHL Article 81 are not relevant to an interpretation of the standing provisions in SCPA Article 17-A. If anything, the more expansive language within MHL Article 81 suggests pursuit of a guardianship in Supreme Court may be the more appropriate vehicle for petitioners like the Hospital.
In sum, the Court finds the Hospital would have standing to bring the current petition only if it can establish that it has corporate power to act as guardian of a person with intellectual or developmental disabilities. With the Hospital having made no attempt at such a showing, the petition will be dismissed without prejudice to renew, as long as the Hospital can establish that it meets the criteria articulated in SCPA § 1760. III. Physician-Patient Privilege
Given the Court's conclusion as to standing, the question of whether the Hospital's medical certifications should be stricken from the record is now moot. Anticipating however, that the Hospital will either re-file a guardianship petition in Surrogate's Court or file a new guardianship petition in Supreme Court pursuant to MHL Article 81, the Court simply recommends that Hospital counsel review the following cases before deciding whether to submit the same medical affirmations in support of any request for relief: Matter of BM, 50 Misc 3d 367 [Sur Ct, Rensselaer County 2015] [SCPA Article 17-A]; Matter of Bess Z., 27 AD3d 568 [2d Dept 2006] [MHL Article 81].
To protect Respondent's privacy in the pending matter, the Court will grant the Hospital's request to seal the file from public view.
For the reasons stated within this Decision, it is hereby
ORDERED that the cross-motion by Petitioner to substitute St. Elizabeth Medical Center for Mohawk Valley Health System as the petitioning entity is GRANTED; and it is further
ORDERED that the motion by Respondent to dismiss the petition for lack of standing on the part of St. Elizabeth Medical Center is GRANTED and the petition is DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE; and it is further
ORDERED that the Oneida County Surrogate's Court Clerk's Office is to seal this file from public view, permitting only Petitioner, its counsel, Respondent, and his counsel access to the records contained therein; and it is further
ORDERED that all remaining requests for relief are DENIED as moot.
This constitutes the Decision and Order of the Court. Dated: April 23, 2021 Hon. Louis P. Gigliotti, Surrogate