“Because [G.S.] challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,” “[o]ur task is to review the record to determine whether it supports the probate court's finding that the guardian proved these statutory components beyond a reasonable doubt.” In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, 296, 911 A.2d 35 (2006). During this assessment, “we examine whether the probate court's actual or implicit factual findings on the statutory components required for guardianship are reasonably supported by competent evidence.

The findings of fact of the probate court are final unless they are so plainly erroneous that they could not be reasonably made. In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, 296, 911 A.2d 35 (2006); RSA 567-A:4 (2007). Because the respondent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, our task is to review the record to determine whether it supports the probate court's finding that the petitioner proved the statutory components required for guardianship beyond a reasonable doubt.

We first examine the language found in the statute, and where possible, we ascribe the plain and ordinary meanings to the words used. In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, 300, 911 A.2d 35 (2006). However, we will not interpret statutory language in a literal manner when such a reading would lead to an absurd result.

SeeWeare Land Use Assoc. v. Town of Weare, 153 N.H. 510, 511-12, 899 A.2d 255 (2006) (legislature will not be presumed to enact legislation "nullifying, to an appreciable extent, the purpose of the statute"); cf. In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, , 911 A.2d 35, 43 (2006) (requiring guardian to prove continued incapacity of ward solely upon acts, occurrences or statements within six months of termination motion would lead to absurd result). Thus, we hold that there is no additional "specific act requirement" for the renewal of an involuntary admission for the purpose of continuing a conditional discharge under RSA 135-C:45, III, or, to use the terms respondent employs in his argument, the statute does not require proof of "current dangerousness" in the sense of a recent dangerous act.

Thus, we do not reweigh the evidence to determine whether we would have ruled differently. In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, 296, 911 A.2d 35 (2006). Instead, we review the record to determine if the trial court's findings could be reasonably made given the evidence before it.

The trial court was not compelled on the record before it to credit those assertions. See In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, 296, 911 A.2d 35 (2006) (observing that we defer to the judgment of the probate division to "resolve conflicts in testimony, measure the credibility of witnesses, and determine the weight to be given to testimony, recognizing that as the trier of fact, it is in the best position to measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evidence" (quotations, brackets, and citation omitted)). The 2004 trust instruments vest managerial control over HDC with the Committee of Business Advisors.

She argues that our task is not to reweigh the evidence presented to the trial court, and she asserts that, because the trial court's finding is supported by the documentary evidence that she submitted, we should defer to the trial court's finding. SeeIn re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, 296, 911 A.2d 35 (2006) (explaining that "we do not reweigh the evidence to determine whether we would have ruled differently," and recognizing that the trier of fact "is in the best position to measure the persuasiveness and credibility of evidence" and that it "lies within the province of the trial court to accept or reject, in whole or in part, whatever evidence was presented" (quotations omitted)). As a threshold matter, the parties dispute the applicable standard of review.

We defer to the judgment of the trial court in these matters because a trial court is in the best position to assign weight to evidence and to assess the credibility of witnesses. In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. 292, 296, 911 A.2d 35 (2006).          Based upon our review of the record, we cannot say that the trial court unsustainably exercised its discretion in finding that it would not be in the children's best interests to relocate to Florida.

It is for the trial court to make that determination. In re Guardianship of E.L., 154 N.H. ___, ___, 154 N.H. 292, 911 A.2d 35 (decided November 1, 2006).Nor do we conclude that the trial court committed an unsustainable exercise of discretion by crediting a report that, in the father's view, was unfairly biased against him due to the GAL's decisions not to contact any of the references he submitted to her and not to view videotapes and other materials that resulted from the DCYF investigation. At the time of the GAL's appointment, the only pending request for a change of custody was the one filed by the father, in which he made serious allegations against the mother and her boyfriend.