Opinion
04-23-00821-CV
02-07-2024
IN THE INTEREST OF G.T., a Child
From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas Trial Court No. 2022-PA-00027 Honorable Kimberly Burley, Judge Presiding
Sitting: Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice Beth Watkins, Justice Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lori I. Valenzuela, Justice
Father appeals the trial court's order terminating his parental rights to his child, G.T. (born 2021). In two issues, Father challenges the trial court's order terminating his parental rights under Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(O) and (P). We affirm.
To protect the privacy of the minor child, we use initials to refer to the child. Tex. Fam. Code § 109.002(d); Tex.R.App.P. 9.8(b)(2).
Background
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (the "Department") initially received a report for allegations of drug use by both Mother and Father. G.T. was placed in the Department's care, and a family service plan was generated for each parent. In addition to several other court-ordered services, Father was required to complete a substance abuse assessment and follow all recommendations. Although Father completed many of the services listed in his plan, including substance abuse treatment, he tested positive for a controlled substance after treatment, and the Department ultimately pursued termination of his parental rights.
On June 9, 2023 and July 6, 2023, the trial court held a two-day bench trial at which several witnesses testified, including: Department caseworker Kisha Mitchell-Dinkins; G.T.'s foster mother; the CASA volunteer; and Father. Following the trial, the trial court signed an order terminating Father's parental rights and naming the Department permanent managing conservator of G.T.
Mother's parental rights were also terminated; however, she is not a party to this appeal.
In its order, the trial court terminated Father's rights pursuant to Texas Family Code section 161.001(b)(O) and (P), finding Father failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions necessary for him to obtain the return of his child, continued to use a controlled substance in a manner that endangered G.T. after completing substance abuse treatment, and that termination of Father's parental rights to G.T. was in G.T.'s best interest.
On appeal, Father challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court's order terminating his rights pursuant to subsections (O) and (P).
Standard of Review
To terminate parental rights pursuant to Family Code section 161.001, the Department has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence: (1) one of the predicate grounds in subsection 161.001(b)(1); and (2) that termination is in the best interest of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code §§ 161.001(b), 161.206(a).
When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we apply well-established standards of review. See id. §§ 101.007, 161.206(a); In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006) (per curiam) (factual sufficiency); In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (legal sufficiency). The trier of fact is the sole judge of the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d at 573. In a bench trial, such as here, "the trial judge is best able to observe and assess the witnesses' demeanor and credibility, and to sense the 'forces, powers, and influences' that may not be apparent from merely reading the record on appeal." In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 427 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). We therefore defer to the trial court's judgment regarding credibility determinations. See id. While we must detail the evidence relevant to the issue of parental termination when reversing a finding based upon insufficient evidence, we need not do so when affirming a verdict of termination. In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014).
As Father does not challenge the trial court's finding that termination was in the best interest of G.T., if either of the predicate grounds for termination found in the trial court's order is supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence, we will affirm the trial court's order. See In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d 257, 263 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2022, pet. denied) ("Where, as here, the trial court terminates a parent's rights on multiple predicate grounds, we may generally affirm on any one ground.").
Applicable Law and Analysis
We first examine Father's challenge to the trial court's finding under subsection (P). See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(P). Under this subsection, a trial court may terminate the parent-child relationship if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent has "used a controlled substance . . . in a manner that endangered the health or safety of the child, and:
(i) failed to complete a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program; or
(ii) after completion of a court-ordered substance abuse treatment program, continued to abuse a controlled substance."Id. In reviewing whether a parent's use of a controlled substance rose to a level that endangered the health and safety of a child, courts may consider a parent's conduct occurring outside the presence of the child. See In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) ("Although 'endanger' means more than a threat of metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.") (quoting Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987)); In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d 790, 798 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2004, no pet.) (opining the court could consider parent's continued drug use outside the presence of the child). Likewise, "evidence that the parent continued to use illegal drugs even though the parent knew [his] parental rights were in jeopardy is conduct showing a voluntary, deliberate, and conscious course of conduct, which by its nature, endangers a child's well-being." See In re S.A., 665 S.W.3d 59, 70 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2022, pet. denied) (discussing and analyzing endangerment and drug use under subsection (E)).
Here, Father's family plan outlines his lengthy and recent history of drug use-including cocaine and methamphetamines. As a result, the trial court ordered Father to complete a substance abuse treatment program, which he did. However, after successfully completing the initial treatment program, Father failed two subsequent drug tests-at least one of which was positive for methamphetamines. See In re K.P.M., No. 01-17-00327-CV, 2017 WL 5353244, at *7 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] Nov. 10, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (noting "there was ample evidence that Mother used cocaine after completing in-patient drug treatment, which would support termination under Subsection P"). Father testified the failed drug test occurred after he "drank something" and that when he drinks, he "just black[s] out sometimes." Additionally, following the failed drug tests, Father didn't take the necessary steps to re-engage in a substance abuse treatment program as directed by his caseworker. After the caseworker helped schedule appointments, Father failed to appear for three separate substance abuse assessments to address his relapse.
Father testified that he could not attend the most recent assessment due to lack of transportation funds.
Father does not dispute that he used drugs or that he missed the scheduled assessments. Rather, Father argues that there is insufficient evidence to support termination pursuant to subsection (P) because G.T. had previously been placed in a foster home when the failed drug tests had occurred. Therefore, according to Father, G.T. was not endangered. Although G.T. was not physically present during Father's drug use, the trial court could have considered Father's conduct in determining whether Father's continued use of a controlled substance after completing the court-ordered treatment endangered the health or safety of G.T. See In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d at 269; In re L.C., 145 S.W.3d at 798. The trial court could have considered Father's criminal history and Father's pending criminal allegation for possession of a controlled substance. "An environment which routinely subjects a child to the probability that she will be left alone because her parents are once again jailed . . . endangers both the physical and emotional well-being of a child." In re S.D., 980 S.W.2d 758, 763 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) (discussing and analyzing criminal history and substance abuse under subsection (E)).
We hold the evidence presented permits a reasonable factfinder to conclude that there was clear and convincing evidence to terminate Father's parental rights to G.T. on the grounds that Father continued to use a controlled substance in a manner that endangered G.T. after Father completed court-ordered treatment. Because we hold there is sufficient evidence supporting the trial court's order terminating Father's rights pursuant to subsection (P), we need not address Father's argument relating to subsection (O). See In re A.L.S., 660 S.W.3d at 263; Tex.R.App.P. 47.1.
Conclusion
We affirm the trial court's Order of Termination.