Opinion
Motion No. 2023-00966 Attorney Registration No. 4379236
04-05-2024
In the Matter of Julia Greenberg, an attorney and counselor-at-law. Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts, petitioner; Julia Greenberg, respondent.
Unpublished Opinion
MOTION DECISION
M294613
HECTOR D. LASALLE, P.J., MARK C. DILLON, COLLEEN D. DUFFY, BETSY BARROS, FRANCESCA E. CONNOLLY, JJ.
DECISION & ORDER ON MOTION
Motion by the Grievance Committee for the Second, Eleventh, and Thirteenth Judicial Districts pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f) and 22 NYCRR 1240.12(b)(2) to suspend the respondent from the practice of law based upon her conviction of a serious crime and to direct the respondent to immediately apprise this Court upon being sentenced for her criminal conviction and file with the Court a certified record of the judgment of conviction. The respondent was admitted to the Bar at a term of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Second Judicial Department on May 3, 2006.
On December 19, 2022, the respondent was convicted, following a jury trial, in United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, before the Honorable J. Paul Oetken, of one count of conspiracy to commit immigration fraud, in violation of 18 USC § 371, a federal felony. On or about September 11, 2023, the respondent submitted to this Court the judgment of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, rendered September 7, 2023, sentencing the respondent to a period of incarceration of three months, to be followed by one year postrelease supervision, and a $7,500 fine.
Upon the papers filed in support of the motion and the papers filed in opposition thereto, it is
ORDERED that the motion is granted to the extent that the respondent, Julia Greenberg, is immediately suspended from the practice of law pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90(4)(f) and 22 NYCRR 1240.12(c)(2)(ii) as a result of her conviction of a serious crime, continuing until further order of this Court, and the motion is otherwise denied as academic; and it is further, ORDERED that the respondent, Julia Greenberg, shall promptly comply with this Court's rules governing the conduct of disbarred or suspended attorneys (see 22 NYCRR 1240.15); and it is further, ORDERED that pursuant to Judiciary Law § 90, during the period of suspension and until further order of this Court, the respondent, Julia Greenberg, is commanded to desist and refrain from (1) practicing law in any form, either as principal or agent, clerk, or employee of another, (2) appearing as an attorney or counselor-at-law before any court, Judge, Justice, board commission, or other public authority, (3) giving to another an opinion as to the law or its application or any advice in relation thereto, and (4) holding herself out in any way as an attorney and counselor-at-law; and it is further, ORDERED that if the respondent, Julia Greenberg, has been issued a secure pass by the Office of Court Administration, it shall be returned forthwith to the issuing agency, and the respondent shall certify to the same in her affidavit of compliance pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.15(f); and it is further, ORDERED that pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.12(c)(2)(i), the respondent, Julia Greenberg, is directed to show cause at a hearing pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.12(c)(2)(iii) before the Special Referee, appointed herein, why a final order of suspension, censure, or disbarment should not be made based on her conviction of a serious crime as defined in Judiciary Law § 90(4)(d); and it is further, ORDERED that pursuant to 22 NYCRR 1240.12(c)(2)(iii), this matter is referred to the Honorable Charles J. Thomas, 50 East 89th Street, Apt. 10-F, New York, NY 10128, as Special Referee, to hear and report, with the hearing to be completed within 60 days of the date of this decision and order on motion, or as soon as practicable, and to submit a report, which contains the Special Referee's findings on any mitigating or aggravating factors, and a recommendation as to whether the respondent has demonstrated why a final order of public discipline should not be made, within 60 days after the conclusion of the hearing or the submission of post-hearing memoranda.
LASALLE P.J., DILLON, DUFFY, BARROS, and CONNOLLY, JJ., concur