In re Gornostayoff

3 Citing cases

  1. People ex Rel. Goshern v. Babb

    122 N.E.2d 239 (Ill. 1954)   Cited 3 times

    The general rule in Illinois, and of the majority of other States when their statutes were similar to that of this State, is that if the accused can show he was not physically present in the demanding State on or about the date of the alleged criminal offense, he is not a "fugitive from justice" and may secure his release through habeas corpus. ( People ex rel. Gansler v. Meyering, 352 Ill. 314; People ex rel. Randolph v. Meyering, 348 Ill. 17.) Of the many decisions of other jurisdictions which we have examined, we have found but one instance where it was held in a case like this that extradition could be had even though the relator was not physically present in the demanding State. ( Ex parte Gornostayoff, 113 Cal.App. 255.) The court did not give any reasons for its decision, and California later adopted the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act.

  2. People v. Jones

    257 Cal.App.2d 235 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967)   Cited 16 times

    " (It will be noted that this is not a venue case in the usual sense, i.e., the place of trial was not involved; the proceeding was one in habeas corpus and the issue was whether or not the defendant had committed the offense in San Benito County.) Another decision in point is In re Gornostayoff, 113 Cal.App. 255 [ 298 P. 55], in which the court denied a writ of habeas corpus sought by a father who was detained in California pursuant to a warrant of extradition to Ohio on a nonsupport charge. The petitioner claimed that he was not physically in the State of Ohio on the dates alleged in the criminal complaint.

  3. In re Brewer

    61 Cal.App.2d 388 (Cal. Ct. App. 1943)   Cited 7 times

    He cites article IV, section 2, of the Constitution of the United States, Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 [23 S.Ct. 456, 47 L.Ed. 657], and sections 1548.2 and 1549.1 of the California Penal Code. Respondent satisfies himself by citing but one case, In re Gornostayoff, 113 Cal.App. 255 [ 298 P. 55], and section 1549.1 of the Penal Code above mentioned. He argues from the Gornostayoff case that it was not necessary for petitioner to be in the demanding state at the time of the alleged offense in order for him to commit same, and, apparently, assumes that petitioner comes within the provisions of section 1549.1, supra, and that it is unnecessary to allege or show that he was in the demanding state or that he fled from the justice thereof. The matter is not, however, so simple as respondent assumes it to be.