In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d 151, 154 (1st Cir. 1987). See accord Weston v. Mann (In re Weston), 18 F.3d 860, 863 (10th Cir. 1994); Fondiller v. Robertson (In re Fondiller), 707 F.2d 441, 443 (9th Cir. 1983); Norway Nat'l Bank v. Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc. (In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc.), 16 B.R. 885, 887 (1st Cir. BAP 1982); Troy Plastics v. North Hills II, L.P., 129 B.R. 473, 474 (E.D.Mich. 1991). The doctrine of appellate standing under the Bankruptcy Code is derived from the appellate standing doctrine developed under the Bankruptcy Act.

See, e.g., In re Fondiller, supra, at 443; In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc., 16 B.R. 885, 888-89 (Bkrtcy.App. 1st Cir. 1982); In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 763 F.2d 507, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, sub nom. Rothman v. New York State Dept. of Transp., ___ U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed.2d 573 (1985).

And there is no evidence that Congress intended to alter the right to appellate review by leaving undefined in the Code the requisites for standing. In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc., 16 B.R. 885, 888 (Bkrtcy. 1st Cir. 1982); see 1 Collier on Bankruptcy, ¶ 3.03[6][b] (15th ed. 1982).

However, there is no basis to conclude that Congress intended to alter the right to appellate review." In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc. , 16 B.R. 885, 888 (1st Cir. BAP 1982). This conclusion, of course, ignores that Congress excised the standard from the statute authorizing appeals to district courts, see 28 U.S.C. § 158(a), and fails to adequately contend with the fact that it no longer exists as part of the text in federal law.

On several occasions, the Panel has explained that only a “person aggrieved” has standing to pursue an appeal and that a “person aggrieved” is one whose property is diminished, burdens are increased, or rights are impaired by order on appeal. See Great Road Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Golden (In re Great Road Serv. Ctr., Inc.), 304 B.R. 547, 551 (1st Cir. BAP 2004); In re Kehoe, 221 B.R. at 287–88; Norway Nat'l Bank v. Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc. (In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc.), 16 B.R. 885, 887 (1st Cir. BAP 1982). Generally, an insolvent chapter 7 debtor does not have standing to appeal.

Although pro se litigants "are held to a less stringent procedural standard that others . . .," Nunnally v. MacCausland, 996 F.2d 1, 6 n. 8 (1st Cir. 1993), the Panel does not understand that Nunnally granted immunity to pro se litigants from compliance with federal and local rules of practice, and applicable substantive law. On several occasions, the Panel has explained that only a "person aggrieved" has standing to pursue an appeal and that a "person aggrieved" is one whose property is diminished, burdens are increased, or rights are impaired by order on appeal. See Great Road Serv. Ctr., Inc. v. Golden (In re Great Road Serv. Ctr., Inc.), 304 B.R. 547, 551 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2004); In re Kehoe, 221 B.R. at 287-88; Norway Nat'l Bank v. Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc. (In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc.), 16 B.R. 885, 887 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 1982). Generally, an insolvent chapter 7 debtor does not have standing to appeal.

Only those persons directly and adversely affected pecuniarily by an order of the Bankruptcy Court have been held to have standing to appeal an order. In Re Fondiller, 707 F.2d 441, 442 (9th Cir. 1983); In Re J.M. Wells, Inc., 575 F.2d 329 (1st Cir. 1978); Hartman Corp. of America v. United States, 304 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1962); In Re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc., 16 B.R. 885 (Bkrtcy.App. 1st Cir. 1982). This rule of appellate standing, the so-called "person aggrieved" test, derives from Sec. 39c of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. 11 U.S.C. § 67(c) (1976), (repealed 1978).

There are two exceptions: (1) if the debtor can show that a successful appeal would generate assets in excess of liabilities, entitling the debtor to a distribution of surplus under Bankruptcy Code § 726(a)(6), 11 U.S.C. § 726(a)(6), or (2) the order appealed from affects the terms of the debtor's discharge in bankruptcy. In re Thompson, 965 F.2d 1136, 1144 (1st Cir. 1992); see also In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc., 16 B.R. 885, 887-88 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982). In this case, an estate surplus is neither suggested by the Debtor nor by the record, as the chapter 7 estate was hopelessly insolvent.

We cannot hold that the Andreuccettis' contentions with respect to the bankruptcy court's treatment of these state counterclaims are so unmeritorious as to justify terminating the appeal without reaching the merits.See In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc., 16 B.R. 885, 888 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (Debtor would have standing on appeal if "the order appealed from would directly and adversely affect the possibility of residual assets being available to the Debtor."); see also Kapp v. Naturelle, Inc., 611 F.2d 703, 706-07 (8th Cir. 1979) ("[W]hen it appears that, if the contested claims are disallowed, there may be a surplus of assets to be returned to the bankrupt, the bankrupt is considered to have standing to contest the claims.") (emphasis supplied); Willemain v. Kivitz, 764 F.2d 1019, 1022 (4th Cir. 1985) (quoting Kapp and applying the quoted language to question of whether a debtor had standing to bring an appeal). We note that, upon reaching the merits of this appeal, we shall be confronted with the distinct issue of whether the Andreuccettis had standing before the bankruptcy court to object to the administrative claims.

The term "person aggrieved" delimits appellate standing to "those persons whose rights or interests are 'directly and adversely affected pecuniarily' by the order or decree. . . ." In re El San Juan Hotel, 809 F.2d at 154 (quoting In re Fondiller, 707 F.2d at 442-43); see also In re Dein Host, 835 F.2d at 403; In re Cosmopolitan Aviation Corp., 763 F.2d 507, 513 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1032, 106 S.Ct. 593, 88 L.Ed.2d 573 (1985); In re Goodwin's Discount Furniture, Inc., 16 B.R. 885, 888 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982). The "person aggrieved" standard substantially replicates the procedural requisites for intervention under Bankruptcy Rules 2018 and 7024, with a view to determining whether a nonparty appellant, whose interests were likely not represented by existing parties, and who may not have been afforded prior notice, could have demonstrated so significant an unrepresented interest as to require intervention.