Opinion
No. COA12–515.
2012-10-2
In the Matter of G.J.M.
John F. Campbell for petitioner-appellee Cumberland County Department of Social Services. Beth A. Hall for appellee Guardian ad litem.
Appeal by respondent-father from order entered 1 February 2012 by Judge John W. Dickson in Cumberland County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 4 September 2012. John F. Campbell for petitioner-appellee Cumberland County Department of Social Services. Beth A. Hall for appellee Guardian ad litem.
Windy H. Rose for respondent-appellant father.
BRYANT, Judge.
Respondent-father appeals from an order granting guardianship of his son, G.J.M., to the child's maternal great-aunt and great-uncle. For the following reasons, we affirm the 1 February 2012 permanency planning order entered in the trial court.
On 2 September 2010, the Cumberland County Department of Social Services (“DSS”) filed a juvenile petition alleging that one-week-old G.J.M. was a neglected and dependent juvenile. DSS assumed non-secure custody of G.J.M. After an adjudication and non-secure custody hearing in October 2010, the trial court adjudicated G.J.M. a dependent juvenile based upon the stipulation of respondent-father and the mother that the mother had substance abuse issues and that she lacked an appropriate alternative child care plan. In its adjudication and disposition order, the trial court found that a home study of G.J.M.'s maternal great-aunt and uncle had favorable results. The court ordered that custody of G.J.M. be continued with DSS for placement in foster care, with suitable relatives and with other Court approved caretakers, including the great-aunt. G.J.M. was placed with his great-aunt and uncle in November 2010.
On 20 January 2011, the trial court conducted a review hearing in this matter. In its order, the court found that respondent-father had been participating in the ACTS Program and had indicated that he wanted to be considered for placement of G.J.M. The trial court noted that the permanent plan was reunification with a concurrent plan of guardianship with relatives. The court continued custody of the juvenile with DSS and placement of G.J.M. with his great-aunt and uncle. A permanency planning hearing was conducted in June 2011, after which the court ordered that the permanent plan for G.J.M. was guardianship with relatives with a concurrent plan of reunification with respondent-father. The legal and physical custody of G.J.M. was to remain with DSS for placement in foster care, with suitable relatives, including the current placement with G.J.M.'s maternal great-aunt.
In November 2011, the trial court conducted a permanency planning review hearing. By order filed 1 February 2012, the court found that the return of the juvenile to the custody of respondent-father was not in the juvenile's best interests and that the permanent plan for G.J.M. of guardianship had been achieved. G.J.M.'s great-aunt and uncle were granted legal and physical custody of G.J.M. and were appointed his guardians. The court ordered that counsel for respondent-father be withdrawn and that DSS and the Guardian ad Litem were allowed to close their respective cases. The court ordered that further review hearings were waived. Respondent-father appeals.
On appeal, respondent-father raises two issues: whether the trial court committed reversible error in (I) failing to verify that the guardians understood the legal significance of their appointment; and (II) failing to provide for further permanency planning and review hearings.
Standard of Review
“Appellate review of a permanency planning order is limited to whether there is competent evidence in the record to support the findings and the findings support the conclusions of law. If the trial court's findings of fact are supported by any competent evidence, they are conclusive on appeal.” In re J.C.S., 164 N .C.App. 96, 106, 595 S.E.2d 155, 161 (2004) (citations omitted).
I
Respondent-father first contends the 1 February 2012 permanency planning order must be reversed because the court failed to verify that the maternal great-aunt and uncle understood the full implications of being named guardians and had adequate resources to care for G.J.M. We disagree.
North Carolina General Statutes, section 7B–907(f) provides:
If the court determines that the juvenile shall be placed in the custody of an individual other than the parents or appoints an individual guardian of the person pursuant to G.S. 7B–600, the court shall verify that the person receiving custody or being appointed as guardian of the juvenile understands the legal significance of the placement or appointment and will have adequate resources to care appropriately for the juvenile.
N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907(f) (2011). See alsoN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–600(c) (2011) (requiring the same). The trial court, however, is not required to “make any specific findings in order to make the verification.” In re J.E., 182 N.C.App. 612, 616–17, 643 S.E.2d 70, 73 (2007).
Here, the trial court made the following unchallenged findings of fact:
That the Cumberland County Department of Social Services has had the necessary guardianship conference with [ ] the juvenile's maternal great aunt and uncle. That during this conference, [great-aunt and uncle] were explained the legal significance of the appointment of guardianship, the nature of guardianship, and what it would require to care appropriately for the juvenile. That the Social Worker has testified on this date that the [great-aunt and uncle] are aware of the duties and responsibilities associated with guardianship. That the [great-aunt and uncle] have provided a stable environment for the juvenile and have adequate and sufficient resources to continue to provide for the juvenile. That the juvenile is in need of permanence and the Court finds that the appointment of guardianship of the juvenile to the [great-aunt and uncle] is consistent with the best interests of the juvenile.
These findings of fact are supported by the DSS court report filed 1 November 2011 which was received without objection. The report indicates that the DSS social worker “completed [the] guardianship conference” with the maternal great-aunt and uncle on 29 August 2011; that they understood the “legal significance of the placement[;]” that they understood “the nature of guardianship[,]” and that they had “adequate and sufficient resources to care appropriately for the juvenile[.]” Further, social worker Eddie Cordeiro testified at the 9 November 2011 permanency planning review hearing that he prepared the DSS court report and that the court report was true, accurate, and complete. Based upon the consideration of the evidence presented at the hearing and the unchallenged findings of fact, we hold that the trial court complied with N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 7B–600(c) and –907(f). Accordingly, respondent-father's argument is overruled.
II
Respondent-father also contends the trial court erred in failing to provide for further permanency planning and review hearings as required by N.C. Gen.Stat. §§ 7B–907(a) and 7B–906(b). We disagree.
Pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907, where custody is removed from a parent, the trial court must conduct “a permanency planning hearing within 12 months after the date of the initial order removing custody,” and must conduct subsequent permanency planning hearings “at least every six months thereafter, or earlier as set by the court, to review the progress made in finalizing the permanent plan for the juvenile, or if necessary, to make a new permanent plan for the juvenile.” N.C.G.S. § 7B–907(a). Pursuant to N.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–906, a trial court may dispense with further permanency planning hearings if the court returns custody to the parent or finds the following by clear, cogent, and convincing evidence:
(1) The juvenile has resided with a relative or has been in the custody of another suitable person for a period of at least one year;
(2) The placement is stable and continuation of the placement is in the juvenile's best interests;
(3) Neither the juvenile's best interests nor the rights of any party require that review hearings be held every six months;
(4) All parties are aware that the matter may be brought before the court for review at any time by the filing of a motion for review or on the court's own motion; and
(5) The court order has designated the relative or other suitable person as the juvenile's permanent caretaker or guardian of the person.
N.C. Gen.Stat. 7B–906 (b)(1)-(5) (2011); see alsoN.C. Gen.Stat. § 7B–907(b) (“At any permanency planning review, the court shall consider information from ... the custodian or agency with custody, the guardian ad litem, and any other person or agency which will aid it in the court's review. The court may consider any evidence, including hearsay evidence as defined in G.S. 8C–1, Rule 801, that the court finds to be relevant, reliable, and necessary to determine the needs of the juvenile and the most appropriate disposition.”); In re Shue, 63 N.C.App. 76, 79, 303 S.E.2d 636, 638 (1983) ( “The written reports of social workers and psychiatrists, and other written material in the court's file are competent evidence in a dispositional or review hearing in juvenile cases.”).
Respondent-father concedes that the trial court made the findings of fact in support of each criteria listed under § 7B–906(b)(1)—(5) but argues that the court's finding of fact in satisfaction of section 7B–906(b)(4) (“[a]ll parties are aware that the matter may be brought before the court for review at any time by the filing of a motion for review or on the court's own motion”) was not supported by competent evidence.
In its 1 February 2011 permanency planning order, the trial court accepted and incorporated into evidence the court report submitted by DSS on 1 November 2011. The court further found “the contents to be true based on the sworn testimony of the Social Worker ....“ The social worker's report indicates that “all parties [are] aware that this matter may be brought before the Court for review at any time by the filing of a Motion for Review or on the Court's own [motion]” and social worker Cordeiro testified that the report is accurate. Therefore, there is some competent evidence in support of the trial court's finding of fact in compliance with section 7B–906(b)(4). Accordingly, respondent-father's argument is overruled.
Affirmed. Judges HUNTER, JR., Robert N., and BEASLEY concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).