Opinion
J-S05030-14 No. 1794 EDA 2013
03-27-2014
IN THE MATTER OF G.J.F., MINOR APPEAL OF N.J.M. Appellant
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
Appeal from the Order of May 20, 2013
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No: 0000213-2013
BEFORE: ALLEN, STABILE, AND STRASSBURGER, JJ. MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
Appellant, N.J.M., appeals from the May 20, 2013 order of the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas terminating her parental rights to her minor child, G.J.F. We affirm.
The record reveals the Philadelphia Department of Human Services ("DHS") became involved with Appellant's family in August 2011 because of Appellant's drug abuse. N.T., 2/28/13, at 9. In November of 2011, DHS created a Family Services Plan ("FSP"), pursuant to which Appellant was to address her drug abuse, learn parenting skills, undergo anger management treatment, obtain suitable housing for herself and her children, and attend supervised visits with G.J.F. Id. at 10.
On May 2, 2012, after G.J.F. had returned to Appellant's custody, DHS received a report that G.J.F. was fearful of abuse from Appellant and her paramour. N.T., 5/20/13, at 5-6. A caseworker met with G.J.F., and G.J.F. reported that Appellant was not giving him his medication or taking him to school. Id. DHS obtained an order of protective custody ("OPC") for G.J.F. and placed him in the care of his maternal uncle and aunt. Id. ; N.T., 2/28/13, at 24. At a May 4, 2012 shelter care hearing, the trial court ordered the temporary commitment to stand. On May 10, 2012, the trial court adjudicated G.J.F. dependent with a goal of reunification. G.J.F. never returned to Appellant's care after May 2, 2012. N.T., 5/20/13, at 6.
After G.J.F.'s adjudication of dependency, Appellant persistently failed to comply with the FSP. Specifically, she failed to appear for court-ordered drug screens. Id. at 7. She also failed to undergo anger management treatment. Id. at 8-9. Likewise, Appellant failed to notify DHS of her address or whereabouts, and therefore did not establish that she could obtain adequate housing. Id. at 8. Appellant asserts that she did in fact find suitable housing, but her assertion finds no support in the record.
Subsequent to G.J.F.'s May 2012 placement, Appellant attended only two visits with him. Id. at 9, 15, 18-19; N.T., 2/28/13, at 28-29. The record contains conflicting evidence of whether Appellant was intoxicated at the two visits. In any event, the visits were suspended by court order until Appellant could provide negative drug screens, which she never did. Id. Appellant failed to attend any parenting courses. N.T., 2/28/13, at 12. Appellant ignored DHS' repeated attempts to contact her regarding her FSP goals. N.T., 5/20/13, at 16-17.
On May 3, 2013, DHS filed a petition to terminate Appellant's parental rights ("TPR petition") and change G.J.F.'s goal to adoption. The trial court conducted a hearing on May 20, 2013, at the conclusion of which it granted DHS' petition. This timely appeal followed.
We conduct our review according to the following standard:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights, we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must accord the hearing judge's decision the same deference that it would give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive review of the record in order to determine whether the trial court's decision is supported by competent evidence.In re K.J., 936 A.2d 1128, 1131 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 951 A.2d 1165 (Pa. 2008).
Appellant argues that the trial court erred in concluding that termination of her parental rights was appropriate pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8). Appellant's Brief at 2. Appellant also argues that the trial court erred in concluding that termination of her parental rights would best serve G.J.F.'s physical and emotional needs, in accordance with § 2511(b). Id. We will address these arguments in turn.
Concerning Mother's argument under § 2511(a), we observe that we may affirm the trial court so long as the evidence satisfies any subsection. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 758 (Pa. Super. 2008). Since G.J.F. had been in placement for more than one year as of the filing of the TPR petition, we will confine our analysis to § 2511(a)(8). That section provides as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following grounds:
. . . .
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
Thus, § 2511(a)(8) requires us to analyze three elements: (1) whether the child has been in placement for at least 12 months; (2) whether the conditions that led to the placement continue to exist; and (3) whether termination best serves the child's needs and welfare. In re T.M.T. , 64 A.3d 1119, 1126-27 (Pa. Super. 2013). The party seeking termination must establish these elements by clear and convincing evidence. Id. at 1124. "The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testimony that is so 'clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.'" Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
The first element is not in dispute. As set forth above, G.J.F. has been in placement since May 2, 2012. DHS filed its TPR petition on May 3, 2013. Likewise, the record establishes that the conditions leading to placement continue to exist. As noted, Appellant has failed to comply with drug screenings or undergo anger management. She has not obtained suitable housing, and she has attended only two supervised visits with G.J.F. because the supervised visits are contingent on negative drug screens. In summary, the record reflects that Appellant has made virtually no progress toward meeting any of her FSP goals. Appellant's willingness or future ability to remedy the conditions leading to placement is not relevant under § 2511(a)(8). In re R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 511 (Pa. Super. 2006). In this regard, "the statute implicitly recognizes that a child's life cannot be held in abeyance while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume parenting responsibilities." Id. at 513. In summary, the record clearly establishes that the second element of § 2511(a)(8) is satisfied.
Section 2511(a)(8) also requires us to consider G.J.F.'s needs and welfare, which this Court has addressed as follows:
We note that, initially, the focus in terminating parental rights is on the parent, under Section 2511(a), whereas the focus in Section 2511(b) is on the child. However, Section 2511(a)(8) explicitly requires an evaluation of the 'needs and welfare of the child' prior to proceeding to Section 2511(b), which focuses on the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. Thus, the analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) accounts for the needs of the child in addition to the behavior of the parent. Moreover, only if a court determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his or her parental rights, pursuant to Section 2511(a), does a court engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests of the child. Accordingly, while both Section 2511(a)(8) and Section 2511(b) direct us to evaluate the 'needs and welfare of the child, we are required to resolve the analysis relative to Section 2511(a)(8), prior to addressing the 'needs and welfare' . . . as [prescribed] by Section 2511(b); as such, they are distinct in that we must address Section 2511(a) before reaching Section 2511(b).In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008-09 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
The C.L.G. Court concluded the third element was satisfied based on the lack of repetitive contact between mother and child and the absence of any evidence that the child looked to the mother for nurturing, security and safety. Id. at 1009. The same considerations apply here. Appellant has attended only two visits with G.J.F. since his placement. Likewise, the trial court adjudicated G.J.F. dependent based in part upon evidence that G.J.F. is afraid of Appellant and her paramour. The trial court did not err in finding that the evidence of record satisfies the third element of § 2511(a)(8). We therefore need not analyze any other subsection of § 2511(a). K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 758.
Next, we consider whether the trial court erred in finding the evidence of record satisfies § 2511(b). That section provides as follows:
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).
"Intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved when inquiring about the needs and welfare of the child." C.L.G. , 956 A.2d at 1009. "The court must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying close attention to the effect on the child of permanently severing the bond." Id. We pay particular attention to the parent-child bond because severing a beneficial bond would be "extremely painful" to the child. Id. A sufficient bond results from, among other things, a parent's willingness to learn proper parenting skills, avoiding drug abuse, and undergo any necessary treatment, such as anger management counseling. In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 534 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Subsequent to his placement with his maternal uncle and aunt, G.J.F. began to attend school regularly. N.T., 5/20/13, at 12. Likewise, he has been compliant with his medication. Id. G.J.F.'s maternal aunt and uncle have ensured that his educational and medical needs are met. Id. at 21. A DHS caseworker testified that she believed G.J.F. would not suffer any irreparable harm resulting from termination of Appellant's rights. Id. at 13.The caseworker observed no evidence that G.J.F. formed any attachment to Appellant. Id. at 18. G.J.F., who was six years old at the time of the termination hearing, continued to fear Appellant, and he had observed her using drugs in their home. Id. at 13, 17. G.J.F. has formed a good bond with his maternal aunt and uncle, who are his pre-adoptive parents. Id. at 20. G.J.F. has expressed his love for them and his desire to stay with them. Id.
Appellant argues that DHS did not produce sufficient evidence of the absence of a parent-child bond because DHS did not offer expert testimony. Appellant's argument is contrary to binding precedent that provides otherwise. K.K.R.S. , 958 A.2d at 533 ("In analyzing the parent-child bond, the [...] court is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation be performed by an expert.").
In summary, the evidence of record supports the trial court's finding that termination of Appellant's parental rights will best serve G.J.F.'s needs and welfare. The record contains no evidence of any bond between G.J.F. and Appellant, and thus no evidence to support a conclusion that termination of Appellant's parental rights will result in irreparable harm. The record indicates that G.J.F.'s foster parents are providing for his comfort, security, and stability, and that G.J.F. enjoys a loving relationship with them. The record also indicates that Appellant has repeatedly failed to undertake any course of action that would nurture a meaningful bond with G.J.F.
In light of all of the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not err in terminating Appellant's parental rights. We therefore affirm the trial court's order.
Order affirmed. Judgment Entered. ____________ Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary