Opinion
No. 3-378 / 02-0926
Filed July 10, 2003
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Scott County, James E. Kelley, Judge.
The respondent appeals a district court judgment, following a jury trial, finding that he was a violent sexual predator pursuant to Iowa Code chapter 229A. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Mark Smith, First Assistant State Public Defender, and Steven Addington, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Denise Timmins and Roxann Ryan, Assistant Attorneys General, for appellee.
Considered by Zimmer, P.J., and Hecht and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Rolander Giles appeals from a jury's finding that he is a violent sexual predator as defined in Iowa Code section 229A.2(3) (2001). Giles contends he was denied his due process right to a fair trial when the district court refused to adopt his proposed jury instruction concerning the definition of mental abnormality. We reverse and remand for new trial.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings. On September 21, 2001, the State filed a petition alleging Giles is a violent sexual predator under Iowa Code chapter 229A. A jury trial was held in May 2002. At the close of trial, Giles moved for a directed verdict alleging the State failed to show that Giles had serious difficulty in controlling his behavior to engage in sexually predatory acts in accordance with Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 122 S.Ct. 867, 151 L.Ed.2d 856 (2002). The district court overruled the motion stating, "Iowa's definition of likely to re-offend is such that it would withstand a Crane attack."
In Jury Instruction No. 9. the district court instructed the jury as follows:
To prove the Respondent, Rolander Giles, is a sexually violent predator, the State must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt:
1. The Respondent has been convicted of, or charged with, a sexually violent offense.
2. The Respondent suffers from a mental abnormality.
3. That mental abnormality makes the Respondent likely to engage in predatory acts constituting sexually violent offenses if Respondent is not confined in a secure facility.
If you find from the evidence that the State has proved each of these elements, then the Respondent is a sexually violent predator. If, however, the State has failed to prove any one of the elements, the Respondent is not a sexually violent predator.
Giles objected to this instruction on the basis that Crane requires proof of a serious difficulty in controlling behavior. Giles argues that this element should be listed between elements two and three of Instruction No. 9. Giles' counsel stated to the court,
But it should definitely be added as an element, and if I could I would like to read into the record what that additional element is. Because of Respondent's mental abnormality, the respondent has a serious difficulty in controlling his sexually-violent behavior. I believe that is mandated to make the Iowa law constitutional under the United States and Iowa constitutions. It has to be an explicit finding from the jury that the respondent has difficulty — serious difficulty in controlling his sexually-violent behavior.
The court overruled Giles's objection and request on the basis that the definition of mental abnormality was adequately given in Instruction No. 12.
Jury Instruction No. 12 reads:
As used in element 2 of Instruction No. 9, the term "mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition which impairs a person's ability to control emotions or act voluntarily and which predisposes that person to commit sexually violent offenses. The predisposition must be so substantial as to constitute a menace to the health and safety of others.
Giles's counsel again argued for an instruction compliant with the Supreme Court's decision in Crane.
I understand, your Honor, that the court has ruled that Crane is not applicable to this particular case. I disagree with that ruling. I feel that if the Court made the correct decision, the following instruction would also have to be given and I would ask that it be put between Instruction 12 and 13, call it Instruction 12A, "Before you may find the respondent suffers from a mental abnormality, you must find the mental abnormality suffered by the respondent causes him to have serious difficulty in controlling his future sexually-violent behavior."
The district court declined to give the requested Instruction 12A.
On May 8, 2002, the jury returned a verdict finding Giles a sexually violent predator. Giles filed a motion for new trial based on the court's denial of his proposed instruction. The district court denied the motion.
II. Analysis. Giles contends the district court erred in denying his proposed instruction regarding "serious difficulty in controlling his future sexually-violent behavior." Because this action was tried at law, our scope of review would ordinarily be for the correction of errors at law. In re Detention of Williams, 628 N.W.2d 447, 451 (Iowa 2001). To the extent Giles arguments rest on constitutional principles, we review them de novo in light of the totality of the circumstances. In re Detention of Morrow, 616 N.W.2d 544, 547 (Iowa 2000).
In In re Detention of Barnes, 658 N.W.2d 98, 101 (Iowa 2003), our supreme court ruled that in chapter 229A cases, a serious-difficulty-in-controlling-behavior requirement must be included in the jury instructions to safeguard an accuser's due process rights. The court suggested the following instruction be used:
As used in this instruction, "mental abnormality" means a congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional capacity that predisposes the person to commit sexually violent offenses in a degree that causes the individual serious difficulty in controlling his behavior.
Barnes, 658 N.W.2d at 101.
The district court's jury instruction in the present case did not reflect this concept. Based on the holding in Barnes, we reverse and remand this case for a new trial.