Opinion
No. 40, 1999.
Submitted: February 2, 1999.
Decided: February 9, 1999.
APPEAL DISMISSED.
Before VEASEY, Chief Justice , HARTNETT and BERGER, Justices.
ORDER
This 9th day of February 1999, upon consideration of the petition of Edward Gibbs ("Gibbs") for a writ of prohibition, it appears to the Court that:
(1) On December 14, 1998, Gibbs was indicted on one count of Rape in the Second Degree, a violation of 11 Del. C. § 772(a)(1). State v. Edward Gibbs, Del. Super. Ct., Cr. A. No. IS98-12-0044. An Assistant Public Defender is representing Gibbs in the Superior Court. On January 25, 1999, the Superior Court denied Gibbs' motion to disqualify the Office of Public Defender from representing him. In his pro se petition in this Court, Gibbs requests that this Court compel the Superior Court to "appoint the petitioner an attorney that is not connected with the Public Defender's Office."
(2) The purpose of a writ of prohibition is to restrain a lower court from exceeding the limits of its jurisdiction. In re Hovey, Del. Supr., 545 A.2d 626, 628 (1988). Here, there is no allegation or suggestion that the Superior Court lacks jurisdiction over Gibbs' trial. The record reflects that Gibbs was indicted by a State grand jury for a felony offense over which the Superior Court has jurisdiction. See Del. Const. art. IV, § 7; see also 11 Del. C. § 2701(c). Thus, there is no apparent basis for the issuance of a writ of prohibition in this case. See In re Hovey, 545 A.2d at 629.
(3) Moreover, this Court lacks jurisdiction to review interlocutory orders in criminal cases. See Del. Const. art IV, § 11( 1)(b); State v. Cooley, Del. Supr., 430 A.2d 789, 791 n. 2 (1981); Rash v. State, Del. Supr., 318 A.2d 603, 604 (1974). Although labeled as a petition for a writ of prohibition, Gibbs' petition seeks appellate review of the Superior Court order denying Gibbs' motion to disqualify the Office of Public Defender. That order is an interlocutory order and is not a final judgment. "We may not permit the use of the writ of prohibition to accomplish indirectly that which may not be done directly." Hodsdon v. Superior Court, Del. Supr., 239 A.2d 222, 224-225 (1968). This Court has limited jurisdiction to consider only those criminal matters that have reached final judgment. Id.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that Gibbs' petition for a writ of prohibition is DISMISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Carolyn Berger, Justice