Opinion
NO. COA11-186
08-02-2011
IN THE MATTER OF: G.H., Jr.
J. Hal Kinlaw, Jr., for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of Social Services. Pamela Newell for appellee Guardian Ad Litem. Robin E. Strickland for respondent-appellant mother.
An unpublished opinion of the North Carolina Court of Appeals does not constitute controlling legal authority. Citation is disfavored, but may be permitted in accordance with the provisions of Rule 30(e)(3) of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Robeson County No. 07 JT 408
Appeal by respondent from order entered 1 December 2010 by Judge Herbert L. Richardson in Robeson County District Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 19 July 2011.
J. Hal Kinlaw, Jr., for petitioner-appellee Robeson County Department of Social Services.
Pamela Newell for appellee Guardian Ad Litem.
Robin E. Strickland for respondent-appellant mother.
HUNTER, Robert C, Judge.
Respondent-mother appeals from the district court's order terminating her parental rights to her son, G.H., Jr. ("George"). After careful review, we affirm.
On 9 November 2007, the Robeson County Department of Social Services ("DSS") filed a juvenile petition alleging that George was a neglected juvenile. DSS alleged that when respondent gave birth to George, they both tested positive for cocaine, and that respondent had domestic violence issues with George's father. DSS took nonsecure custody of George by order filed 13 November 2007.
After holding adjudication and dispositional hearings on 6 February 2008, the trial court adjudicated George a neglected juvenile and awarded DSS legal custody of George. The trial court ordered respondent to continue substance abuse treatment, maintain adequate housing, complete a parenting assessment, and follow all recommendations from the domestic violence assessment. Respondent began intensive out-patient treatment in July 2008 and moved into Grace Court Residential Treatment Facility on 15 August 2008.
By review order filed 28 August 2008, the trial court continued legal custody of George with DSS and continued the plan of reunification with respondent. The trial court found that if a home study was favorable, the court would allow George to be placed in the home of respondent at Grace Court. George was placed with respondent on trial home placement on 5 September 2008.
In March 2009, the trial court continued legal custody of George with DSS and continued the plan of reunification with respondent. The trial court also allowed respondent and George to move out of Grace Court on the condition that respondent comply with the Family Drug Treatment Court and she not allow George's father to be around George until he contacted DSS. Police, however, responded to the home of respondent on 17 and 23 March and 4 April 2009 for domestic violence involving George's father. In addition, respondent admitted to her social worker that she had relapsed and respondent did not appear for Family Drug Treatment Court on 24 April 2009.
Respondent voluntarily placed George with his previous foster home on 25 April 2009. DSS filed another juvenile petition alleging neglect on 27 April 2009 based upon respondent's relapse and altercations with George's father. DSS took nonsecure custody of George.
After holding a hearing on 2 September 2009, the trial court adjudicated George to be a neglected juvenile. The trial court ordered George to remain in the legal custody of DSS and continued the plan for reunification with respondent.
After holding a hearing on 19 November 2009, the trial court changed the permanent plan from reunification with respondent to adoption. On 19 January 2010, DSS filed a termination petition, alleging that grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of respondent under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) (2009) (failure to make reasonable progress), and N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(3) (failure to pay reasonable child cost).
A termination hearing was held on 3 November 2010. The trial court concluded that grounds existed to terminate the parental rights of respondent under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) and (a)(3). The trial court further concluded that it was in the best interest of George to terminate respondent's parental rights. Respondent appeals.
Respondent contends the trial court erred by finding and concluding that sufficient grounds existed to terminate her parental rights. Preliminarily we note that although the trial court concluded that grounds existed pursuant to sections 7B-1111(a)(2) and (a)(3), we find it dispositive that the evidence is sufficient to support termination of respondent's parental rights under section 7B-1111(a)(2). See In re Pierce, 67 N.C. App. 257, 261, 312 S.E.2d 900, 903 (1984) (holding that a finding of one statutory ground is sufficient to support the termination of parental rights).
"The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases is whether the findings of fact are supported by clear, cogent and convincing evidence and whether these findings, in turn, support the conclusions of law. We then consider, based on the grounds found for termination, whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding termination to be in the best interest of the child." In re Shepard, 162 N.C. App. 215, 22122, 591 S.E.2d 1, 6 (citation and quotation marks omitted), disc, review denied (2 004). Respondent does not challenge any of the findings of fact and they are therefore binding on appeal. In re Humphrey, 156 N.C. App. 533, 540, 577 S.E.2d 421, 426 (2003).
Respondent makes no argument regarding her lack of reasonable progress. Rather, respondent contends George had not been "removed" from her home for the requisite period of time before DSS filed the petition to terminate parental rights. To support her argument, respondent points to the trial placement period. Respondent asserts that the "first removal is not the relevant removal for purposes of [Section] 7B-1111(a)(2)[,]" and therefore, George had only been removed from her home and placed in foster care for eight months at the time of the termination hearing.
Under section 7B-1111(a)(2), a court may terminate parental rights on the ground that " [t]he parent has willfully left the juvenile in foster care or placement outside the home for more than 12 months without showing to the satisfaction of the court that reasonable progress under the circumstances has been made in correcting those conditions which led to the removal of the juvenile." N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111 (a) (2) . We have previously held that the term "for more than 12 months" in this provision refers to the duration of time beginning with the child's removal from the home pursuant to a court order and ending with the termination petition or motion. In re A.C.F., 176 N.C. App. 520, 526, 626 S.E.2d 729, 734 (2006).
Our review discloses that George was "removed" from respondent's home for the requisite period because there is no requirement that the twelve months be continuous. In re Taylor, 97 N.C. App. 57, 62, 387 S.E.2d 230, 232 (1990) . George was removed from respondent's custody by the nonsecure order filed 13 November 2007 and placed into foster care until 5 September 2008, a period of approximately ten months. After the trial placement with respondent, George was again removed and placed in foster care on 27 April 2009, and he remained in foster care through the filing of the termination petition on 19 January 2 010, a period of approximately eight months. Therefore, George was in foster care for a total of approximately eighteen months, a duration which satisfies the requirement that the juvenile be "in foster care or placement outside the home" for a least twelve months prior to the termination filing. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2).
The uncontested findings of fact show that as of the date of the termination hearing, respondent was unable to remain drug and alcohol free, maintain stable housing, and continued to be involved with George's father, with whom she engaged in domestic violence. We hold that the findings of fact made by the trial court provide ample support for the trial court's conclusion of law that grounds existed under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7B-1111(a)(2) supporting termination of respondent's parental rights.
Affirmed.
Judges STEELMAN and McCULLOUGH concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).