Opinion
14-23-00600-CV
08-22-2024
IN THE MATTER OF G.C.-L., Appellant
On Appeal from the 313th District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 2022-02173J
Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Zimmerer, and Hassan
ABATEMENT ORDER
MEAGAN HASSAN, JUSTICE
Appellant G.C.-L. appeals a determinate-sentencing judgment committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department ("TJJD"). In the trial court, Appellant stipulated that he engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony.
In two issues on appeal, Appellant contends that (1) the trial court failed to clearly state its reasons for committing him to TJJD as required by Texas Family Code section 54.05(f), and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to TJJD because the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that he could not receive adequate supervision at home and that removal from home was in appellant's best interest.
The Family Code requires the trial court to make certain findings when committing a child to the TJJD. Section 54.04(c) provides, in relevant part: "No disposition may be made under this section unless the child is in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or the child requires that disposition be made." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(c). Section 54.04(f) requires that "[t]he court shall state specifically in the order its reasons for the disposition[.]" Id. § 54.04(f).
Section 54.04(i) provides, in relevant part, that when the trial court commits a child to the TJJD, the trial court
(1) shall include in its order its determination that:
(A) it is in the child's best interests to be placed outside the child's home;
(B) reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child's removal from the home and to make it possible for the child to return to the child's home; and
(C) the child, in the child's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation[.]Id. § 54.04(i).
Compliance with section 54.04(f)'s requirement to specifically state the reasons for the disposition is mandatory. In re W.A.M.P., No. 14-21-00105-CV, 2022 WL 2976876, at *3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). "[S]uch findings 'provide assurance that the child and his family will be advised of the reasons for [removal from the home] and . . . be in a position to challenge those reasons on appeal.'" Id. (quoting J.L.E. v. State, 571 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ)). "Merely reciting the statutory grounds for disposition is not sufficient to justify the trial court's ruling." Id. In assessing whether section 54.04(f)'s requirement has been satisfied, "we may consider the entire order" and "read it as a whole." In re K.H., 682 S.W.3d 567, 574 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (internal quotation omitted).
On July 10, 2023, the trial court signed a "Determinate Sentencing Judgment and Order of Commitment" committing Appellant to the TJJC for five years. However, the trial court's disposition order merely recited the section 54.04(i) findings necessary to commit a child to the TJJD. The disposition order does not comply with section 54.04(f)'s requirement to specifically state the reasons for the disposition. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(f), (i); see also In re W.A.M.P., 2022 WL 2976876, at *3.
Therefore, we abate this appeal and remand the case to the trial court, instructing it to correct its disposition order by including specific findings stating its reasons for the disposition in compliance with Texas Family Code section 54.04(f). See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § 54.04(f).
We order the trial court to file its corrected disposition order with the trial court clerk on or before September 22, 2024.
We further order the trial court clerk to prepare, certify, and file a supplemental clerk's record with the clerk of this court that includes the corrected disposition order within 10 days after the trial court files the corrected disposition order.
This appeal is abated, treated as a closed case, and removed from this Court's active docket. The appeal will be reinstated on this Court's active docket when the trial court's corrected disposition order is filed in this Court.
DISSENTING OPINION
Kevin Jewell, Justice
I respectfully dissent from the court's abatement order. Appellant G.C.-L. appeals a determinate-sentencing judgment committing him to the Texas Juvenile Justice Department ("TJJD") for five years. In the trial court, appellant stipulated that he engaged in delinquent conduct by committing aggravated sexual assault of a child, a first-degree felony. In two issues on appeal, appellant contends that (1) the trial court failed to clearly state its reasons for committing him to TJJD as required by Texas Family Code section 54.05(f), and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to TJJD because the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court's findings that he could not receive adequate supervision at home and that removal from home was in appellant's best interest. Whereas the court agrees with appellant's first issue and abates this appeal for additional fact findings, I would affirm the judgment.
Background
The State alleged that appellant had engaged in delinquent conduct, namely aggravated sexual assault of a child, his half-sister. At the time of the offense, appellant was sixteen, and the complainant was eleven. Appellant judicially confessed to the offense of aggravated sexual assault of a child as alleged by the State. The trial court found that appellant was a juvenile who engaged in delinquent conduct and was in need of rehabilitation, and the court set appellant's disposition at five years in the custody of TJJD.
Discussion
Appellant presents two issues. First, he requests that the appeal be abated so the trial court may "clearly state its reasons for the commitment . . . as required by Texas Family Code § 54.04(f)." Second, appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion in committing him to TJJD's custody, as there was legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the trial court's determinations pursuant to Texas Family Code subsections 54.04(i)(1)(A) and (C).
A. Reasons for Commitment
The Family Code requires the trial court to make certain findings when committing a child to the TJJD. Section 54.04 provides, in relevant part: "No disposition may be made under this section unless the child is in need of rehabilitation or the protection of the public or the child requires that disposition be made." Tex. Fam. Code § 54.04(c). The statute further provides, in relevant part, that when the trial court commits a child to the TJJD, the trial court "(1) shall include in its order its determination that: (A) it is in the child's best interests to be placed outside the child's home; (B) reasonable efforts were made to prevent or eliminate the need for the child's removal from the home and to make it possible for the child to return to the child's home; and (C) the child, in the child's home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that the child needs to meet the conditions of probation[.]" Id. § 54.04(i).
Section 54.04(f) states: "The court shall state specifically in the order its reasons for the disposition and shall furnish a copy of the order to the child." Id. § 54.04(f). Compliance with this requirement is mandatory, for such findings "provide assurance that the child and his family will be advised of the reasons for [removal from the home] and . . . be in a position to challenge those reasons on appeal." J.L.E. v. State, 571 S.W.2d 556, 557 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ). Merely reciting the statutory grounds for disposition is not sufficient to justify the trial court's ruling. In re K.E., 316 S.W.3d 776, 781 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2010, no pet.). However, reciting the statutory language and supplementing that language with additional specific findings may be sufficient to meet the requirements of section 54.04(f). Id.
In assessing whether section 54.04(f)'s requirement has been satisfied, "we may consider the entire order" and "read it as a whole." In re K.H., 682 S.W.3d 567, 574 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (internal quotation omitted). "We need not simply restrict ourselves to perusing the items which the court denominated 'reasons.'" Id. Texas courts have considered a variety of findings in determining that an order satisfied section 54.04(f), such as findings identifying the offense or describing the crime involved, or findings that detention was warranted due to public safety concerns. See, e.g., id. (collecting cases).
Reading the order in its entirety, I determine that the trial court included sufficient findings or reasons for its commitment order. The trial court found that appellant committed the first-degree felony offense of aggravated sexual assault, finding "beyond a reasonable doubt that the allegations [against appellant] are supported by the evidence." The trial court's disposition order referenced and was accompanied by the stipulation of evidence that appellant entered prior to the final disposition hearing. In that stipulation, appellant judicially confessed that he unlawfully, intentionally, and knowingly caused the penetration of the sexual organ of the complainant, a person younger than fourteen years of age, by placing his sexual organ in the complainant's sexual organ. The trial court further found that appellant was "in need of rehabilitation" and that its disposition was made "for [appellant's] protection and for the protection of the public." In fact, the trial court ordered that appellant submit a blood sample for the purpose of creating a DNA record for the "Deferred Sex Offender Registration." The trial court further found that its "[d]isposition is in the best interest of [appellant's] health, safely, morals and education."
While the order recited certain statutory language, the order as a whole included additional findings, such as the nature and description of the offense, that appellant was in need of rehabilitation, and that the interest of public safety would be served by his TJJD commitment. Thus, the order sufficiently complied with section 54.04(f), and I believe the majority errs in holding otherwise. See id. at 574-75 (reciting statutory language plus additional findings from stipulation of evidence sufficient to satisfy section 54.04(f)).
Appellant argues, and the court agrees, that this appeal is controlled by In re W.A.M.P., in which a panel of this court held that a trial court's disposition findings, which merely recited the Family Code's mandatory findings, were insufficiently specific to meet the requirements of section 54.04(f). In re W.A.M.P., No. 14-21-00105-CV, 2022 WL 2976876, at *4-5 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] July 28, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.). Our court abated that case and remanded for more specific findings. Id. That case is distinguishable, however, because the opinion does not reference any additional findings from a stipulation of evidence. In my view, In re K.H., an opinion from our sister court, is more analogous to the present case, as the court there held that the disposition findings, including those from the stipulation of evidence, were sufficient. See In re K.H., 682 S.W.3d at 574-75.
I would overrule appellant's first issue.
B. Evidentiary Sufficiency
In his second issue, appellant argues that there is legally and factually insufficient evidence to support the trial court's findings that it is in appellant's best interest to be placed outside the home and appellant, in his home, cannot be provided the quality of care and level of support and supervision that he needs to meet the conditions of probation.
A juvenile court has broad discretion to determine a suitable disposition for a juvenile who has been adjudicated as having engaged in delinquent behavior. In re D.W.A., No. 14-00-01327-CV, 2001 WL 1590166, at *1 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 13, 2001, no pet.) (not designated for publication); see also In re W.J.P., No. 01-19-00988-CV, 2021 WL 2931437, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] July 13, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re E.D., 127 S.W.3d 860, 862-63 (Tex. App.-Austin 2004, no pet.). An abuse of discretion occurs when the juvenile court acts unreasonably or arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. In re D.W.A., 2001 WL 1590166, at *1; see also In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *2; In re J.O., 247 S.W.3d 422, 424 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2008, no pet.). "Under an abuse-of-discretion standard, the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant in evaluating whether the juvenile court abused its discretion." In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *2; see also In re D.W.A., 2001 WL 1590166, at *1.
When we review the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile court's disposition, we consider the evidence and inferences tending to support the trial court's findings and set aside the judgment only if there is no evidence of probative force to support the findings. In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *2 (citing In re C.G., 162 S.W.3d 448, 452 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2005, no pet.); In re H.R.C., 153 S.W.3d 266, 269 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.)); see also In re M.B., No. 14-23-00969-CV, 2024 WL 3041398, at *4 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] June 18, 2024, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (legal sufficiency of findings supporting juvenile court's transfer order). We consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment and indulge every reasonable inference that would support it, and anything more than a scintilla of evidence is legally sufficient to support the finding. In re M.B., 2024 WL 3041398, at *4; In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *2 When we review the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting a juvenile court's disposition, we consider and weigh all the evidence and set aside the judgment only if the finding is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly unjust. In re M.B., 2024 WL 3041398, at *4 (factual sufficiency of findings supporting juvenile court's transfer order); In re W.J.P., 2021 WL 2931437, at *2 (citing In re A.T.M., 281 S.W.3d 67, 71 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2008, no pet.); In re C.G., 162 S.W.3d at 452; In re H.R.C., 153 S.W.3d at 269)).
Appellant contends that the evidence established that: he lived with his mother; his mother appropriately supervised him; appellant had been employed for nearly two years; appellant had no known substance abuse history; appellant attended church regularly; and appellant had not violated any terms or conditions while on supervision prior to the disposition hearing. Appellant also points to the fact that both the probation department and the psychologist recommended that appellant remain in his mother's custody.
All of the evidence relied upon by appellant could support a trial court's discretionary decision to remand him to his mother's custody instead of placing appellant in TJJD's custody. However, there is also evidence in the record that supports the trial court's decision to remove appellant from his home.
First, the trial court was not required to follow the recommendations from the probation department or the psychiatrist. See Tex. Fam. Code § 54.04(b) (stating that the trial court "may consider" written reports from probation officers); In re C.M.G., No. 04-99-00044-CV, 1999 WL 1125423, at *2 (Tex. App.-San Antonio Dec. 8, 1999, no pet.) (not designated for publication) ("The trial court is not bound to follow the recommendations of the probation officer."). Appellant stipulated to the facts establishing the offense while acknowledging he was doing so without an agreed recommendation of disposition and that the court's ruling on disposition could include placement in the TJJD. More significantly, the evidence showed that appellant sexually assaulted the complainant, his eleven-year-old half-sister, which resulted in the complainant's pregnancy. This sexual assault to which appellant stipulated was merely one of many similar assaults, which occurred over several months and took place in appellant's mother's house, and yet his mother never noticed that appellant had been sexually abusing his half-sister who was living under the same roof. Mother reported that the siblings "appeared to have an ok relationship," although she admitted that appellant was "easily annoyed" by his siblings, including the complainant.
The complainant later gave birth; since then, neither appellant nor his mother have had any contact with the complainant or the child.
Appellant stopped sexually assaulting the complainant when she moved to her father's house and thus stopped living with appellant and their mother. The probation officer reported that appellant "feels like his mother's supervision is inconsistent."
Appellant told the psychiatrist that his first sexual experiences were with the complainant and that, since those events, whenever he experiences sexual feelings or thoughts, he prays until they go away. The psychiatrist found that appellant "seems to deny problems or feelings that are typically expected of teenagers his age," which "suggests that he is underreporting problems and may be repressing negative feelings and thoughts."
The egregiousness of the offense, together with the other evidence the trial court reasonably could have credited, including the fact that the assault occurred in appellant's mother's house and under her supervision, are sufficient to support the trial court's findings that appellant could not receive the requisite level of supervision at home and that it was in appellant's best interest to be removed from his mother's home. See In re R.D.R., No. 11-12-00287-CV, 2014 WL 4348061, at *8 (Tex. App.-Eastland Aug. 29, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("Although several witnesses testified that Appellant's behavior had improved, the trial court, as the trier of fact, was permitted to determine that this testimony was insufficient to overcome Appellant's earlier actions."); In re J.E.Z., No. 01-05-00116-CV, 2006 WL 1655208, at *2 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] June 15, 2006, no pet.) (mem. op.) ("The record indicates a lack of the requisite quality of care and level of supervision in the home.").
Taking into consideration all of the evidence before us, I conclude that the disposition made by the trial court in this case fell within the zone of reasonable disagreement and was supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. Accordingly, I would overrule appellant's second issue and affirm the judgment.