Opinion
M08CP15012518A M08CP15012519A
01-25-2018
IN RE GAUGE K. In re Daniella K.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
OPINION
BURGDORFF, J.
In accordance with General Statutes § 46b-124 and Practice Book § 32a-7, the names of the parties involved in this case are not to be disclosed, and the records and papers of this case shall be open for inspection only to persons having a proper interest therein and only upon order of the Superior Court.
Before this court is the Termination of Parental Rights (TPR) petition filed by the petitioner, the Department of Children and Families (DCF), in the interests of Gauge K., (birth date: October 24, 2005), and Daniella K., (birth date: October 19, 2009). By way of procedural history, DCF filed Ex Parte Motions for Orders of Temporary Custody (OTC) as to the children on July 6, 2015 due to allegations of emotional and medical neglect of an older sibling, Riley M., and educational neglect of Gauge and Daniella due to excessive absences. The OTCs as to Gauge and Daniella were sustained on July 10, 2015 (Olear, J.). Neglect Petitions were filed in the interests of Gauge and Daniella on July 6, 2015. Said petitions alleged that the children are being denied proper care and attention and are being permitted to live under conditions, circumstances or associations injurious to their well-being. Gauge and Daniella were adjudicated as neglected children on September 3, 2015 (Olear, J.) and committed to the care and custody of DCF. The court ordered final specific steps on September 3, 2015 (Olear, J.). DCF filed TPR petitions as to Gauge and Daniella on June 22, 2017, alleging that Mother’s and Father’s parental rights should be terminated on the grounds of failure to rehabilitate. Specifically, the petitions allege that Gauge and Daniella were found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected and that Mother and Father failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that, considering the ages and needs of the children, they could assume a responsible position in the lives of their children. See C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(b)(I). Mother was served the termination of parental rights petitions by way of abode service on June 29, 2017. Father was served the termination of parental rights petition by way of abode service on October 24, 2017. The petition further alleges that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate and reunify the children with Mother and Father. The court (Olear, J.) approved a permanency plan of termination of parental rights and adoption as to the two children on April 13, 2017.
Mother’s final specific steps included the following: cooperate and keep appointments with DCF and keep the department informed of her address; undergo individual and parenting counseling and make progress for the identified treatment goals of understanding and meeting the children’s developmental needs, provide a stable home environment, stabilize mental health and substance abuse needs, and understand how substance abuse and instability impacts the children; submit to substance abuse evaluation and follow recommendations about treatment; submit to random drug testing; refrain from illegal drug use and not abuse alcohol or medicine, and refrain from involvement with the criminal justice system; cooperate with recommended service providers including Connection, Rushford or Perception for individual therapy, Perspective for counseling, Happy Families for parenting therapy and Care-Medica for substance treatment; sign releases to enable DCF to communicate with service providers and the children’s attorney to allow review of the children’s medical, psychological, psychiatric and/or medical records; get and maintain adequate housing and legal income; immediately let DCF know about any changes in the make-up of the household; cooperate with the children’s therapy as recommended; visit the children as often as DCF permits; identify in writing the contact information for any person you would like DCF to investigate as a placement resource for the children; cooperate with medication as prescribed.
The respondents are Nadine S. (Mother) and Daniel K. (Father). An Acknowledgment of Paternity was signed by the parents on November 9, 2009. There are no other custody proceedings affecting the children. Mother and Father appeared, were advised and appointed counsel. The children were appointed an attorney. The court finds that it has proper jurisdiction and there are no pending actions affecting the custody of the minor children.
On December 19, 2017, Father consented to the termination of his parental rights as to his children, Gauge and Daniella. He was represented by counsel and filed a written consent with the court. The court found that Father voluntarily and knowingly consented to the termination of his parental rights, having received the advice and assistance of competent legal counsel, and found that he understood the consequences of his actions. After he was canvassed by the court, his consent was accepted by the court (Woods, J.). DCF’s oral motion to amend the petitions as to Father to add the ground of consent was granted and DCF was allowed to withdraw the other grounds set forth in its petitions.
This matter was tried to the court on January 17, 2018. Mother was present with her counsel for trial. Mother was advised pursuant to In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773, 795, reconsideration denied, 319 Conn. 921 (2015). The children’s attorney was present for trial. DCF was represented by an assistant attorney general who was present for the trial.
The court heard testimony from the DCF social worker and Mother. Seven exhibits were entered into evidence as full exhibits. These included Mother’s specific steps, the social studies in support of the neglect petition, the permanency plans and the termination of parental rights petition as well as the addendum to the termination of parental rights social study and a motion for judgment by stipulation. The representations in the exhibits will be considered for dispositional purposes. A motion for judicial notice was filed by DCF on January 16, 2018, seeking the court to take judicial notice of the specific steps, dates of pleadings and judgments, and a printout of two housing cases involving Mother. Said motion was with the exception of the printout regarding the housing cases. The court also takes judicial notice of the entire court record including the chronology of the proceedings, the filings or submissions of pleadings, petitions, social studies, statements of facts, affidavits, status reports, court hearing memoranda and the court’s findings, orders, rulings and judgments.
All counsel participated in the examination of the witnesses and closing arguments.
The court has carefully considered the petition, the criteria set forth in the relevant statutes, the applicable case law as well as all of the evidence and testimony presented, the demeanor of Mother, the demeanor and credibility of the witness, the evaluation of their testimony with all other testimony and documentary evidence, and the arguments of counsel, according to the standards required by law. The court was able to clearly listen to and observe the witness and Mother, and determine the validity, cohesion, and the credibility of their testimony. The court thoroughly reviewed the documentary evidence. On the basis of the evidence presented and for the reasons stated below, the court finds in favor of the petitions and hereby terminates the parental rights of the respondent Mother as to her children Gauge K. and Daniella K. The court finds the following facts by clear and convincing evidence.
FACTS
Mother
Mother, Nadine S., was born on April 16, 1982. Mother reported that her father was verbally and physically abusive to her during her childhood.
Mother’s presenting problems at the commencement of DCF’s involvement were her lack of stability in housing, unaddressed mental health needs, unaddressed substance abuse, financial issues and her poor insight as to child development.
Mother has a significant mental health history. She has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome (PTSD), depression and anxiety. She has been prescribed with Suboxone and Metople. She was referred to Community Health Center in December 2015 for individual therapy and Community Health Center (CHC) for trauma therapy. She was discharged by CHC due to lack of attendance. She began weekly individual therapy at Enchanted Therapies on April 28, 2016 to address her past trauma, parenting skills and learn coping skills to maintain her sobriety. She reported engaging in counseling at Perspective Counseling. She was unsuccessfully discharged from Enchanted Therapies in 2016. She engaged in services at Happy Families along with her older daughter, Riley, where she worked on parenting skills, coping skills, vocational skills and ways to manage her anxiety and triggers. However, she was unsuccessfully discharged from Happy Families due to noncompliance in November 2016. Mother was referred for parenting services but testified that she did not have any issues with regard to her parenting and did not need to engage in services. Most recently, Mother has reported engaging in counseling and medication management at Community Mental Health Affiliates (CMHA). Mother signed the necessary release of information and it was confirmed to DCF that Mother has been compliant with her services there as of August 2017. Mother testified that she continues to engage in services at CMHA at the present time.
Mother has a significant substance abuse history including the use of cocaine, heroin and alcohol. Mother has engaged in treatment services including relapse prevention groups at The Connection. She is receiving Suboxone treatment at CareMedica. She has been compliant with medication management services. Most recently, she has been submitting clean urines and has maintained her sobriety.
Mother has a chronic history of homelessness. In 2015, DCF was informed that Mother’s housing case had been closed and she was being discharged from housing services due to unpaid rent, unpaid utilities and issues regarding cleanliness of the home. Mother failed to appear at housing court and judgment was entered against her in June 2015 resulting in her eviction. Mother obtained housing in March 2016. She was evicted for non-payment of rent in September 2016. She was referred to Supportive Housing but failed to demonstrate progress with her treatment providers which placed her at the bottom of the list. She has been homeless since September 2016 and presently resides in a shelter.
Mother testified that she has had difficulty in obtaining employment. She recently obtained employment at Progressive Eye Care and Lowes.
Mother has consistently engaged in visitation with Gauge and Daniella primarily at paternal grandmother’s home. She is appropriate and engaged in the visitations. No concerns have been reported. She and the children are bonded. Mother reported to DCF that she is happy that the children are residing in the paternal grandmother’s home and that they are attending school in Clinton.
The Children
Gauge
Gauge K. was born on October 24, 2005. He has been in DCF’s care since July 6, 2015. He has been diagnosed with allergic rhinitis, psoriasis, estropia and hyperhidrosis for which he has received medical treatment. He has a history of Lyme Disease and bilateral clubfoot. He presently has no other health issues, and is up to date with his vision and dental appointments.
Gauge is presently in the 7th grade. He is classified as a special education student due to a learning disability and receives support for reading and mathematics. He is below grade average in some areas but overall is doing well. He has greatly improved in reading fluency, and has mastered his reading objective and writing goal. He is hard working, well-behaved and has a wonderful personality. He is actively involved in several school sports which he greatly enjoys.
Gauge resides with his paternal grandmother and is doing very well in her home. He is very bonded with his grandmother and her paramour, David M., as well as with his sister, Daniella, who also resides in the home. He has responded positively to the structure provided in the home. He enjoys residing with his grandmother, her paramour and his sister. Gauge has expressed the desire to be adopted by his paternal grandmother and David M. Gauge is able to visit with his mother on a regular basis. The visits go well.
Daniella
Daniella K. was born on October 19, 2009. She has been in DCF’s care since July 6, 2015. She is presently in the 2nd grade as a regular education student who is on grade level with no academic issues or concerns. She is involved with gymnastics. She is medically up to date with no concerns or issues.
Daniella is residing with paternal grandmother and her paramour, David M. She is bonded with them as well as with her older brother, Gauge, who also resides in the home. She has regular visits with Mother. Paternal grandmother has expressed her desire to adopt Daniella. Daniella has expressed her desire to be with paternal grandmother. Most recently, Daniella expressed the desire to return to her mother.
Daniella visits regularly with Mother and they are bonded with one another.
ADJUDICATION
The court must first determine whether DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that the parental rights of Mother should be terminated. " A hearing on a petition to terminate parental rights consists of two phases, adjudication and disposition ... In the adjudicatory phase, the trial court determines whether one of the statutory grounds for termination of parental rights exists by clear and convincing evidence. If the trial court determines that a statutory ground for termination exists, it proceeds to the dispositional phase. In the dispositional phase, the trial court determines whether termination is in the best interest of the child." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Destiny R., 134 Conn.App. 625, 627, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 932 (2012); In re Shaun B., 97 Conn.App. 203, 206, 903 A.2d 246 (2006).
Reasonable Efforts to Locate and Reunify
Section 17a-112(j) provides in relevant part: " The Superior Court ... may grant a petition [to terminate parental rights] ... if it finds by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the [department] has made reasonable efforts to locate the parents and to reunify the child with the parent in accordance with subsection (a) of Section 17a-111b, unless the court finds in this proceeding that the parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts ..." (Emphasis added.) " [T]he department may meet its burden concerning reunification in one of three ways: (1) by showing that it has made such efforts, (2) by showing that the parent was unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts or (3) by a previous judicial determination that such efforts were not appropriate ..." In re Gabriella A., AC 36632 (2014). " Thus, the department must prove [by clear and convincing evidence] either that it has made reasonable efforts to reunify or, alternatively, that the parent is unwilling or unable to benefit from reunification efforts. Section 17a-112(j) clearly provides that the department is not required to prove both circumstances. Rather, either showing is sufficient to satisfy this statutory element." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., 153 Conn.App. 584 (2014), citing In re Anvahnay S., 128 Conn.App. 186, 191 (2011); see also In re Jermaine S., 86 Conn.App. 819, 837, 863 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 273 Conn. 938, 875 A.2d 43 (2005). " [I]n determining whether the department has made reasonable efforts to reunify a parent and a child or whether there is sufficient evidence that a parent is unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts, the court is required in the adjudicatory phase to make its assessment on the basis of the events preceding the date on which the termination was filed ... [T]he court, when making its reasonable efforts determination ... is limited to considering only those facts preceding the filing of the termination petition or the most recent amendment to the petition ..." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kylik A., id., citing In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 870-71, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923 (2014). See also Practice Book § 35a-7.
" [T]he statute imposes on the department the duty ... to make reasonable efforts to unite the child or children with the parents. The word reasonable is the linchpin on which the department’s efforts in a particular set of circumstances are to be adjudged, using the clear and convincing standard of proof. Neither the word reasonable nor the word efforts is, however, defined by our legislature or by the federal act by which the requirement was drawn ... [R]easonable efforts means doing everything reasonable, not everything possible ..." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Daniel C., 63 Conn.App. 339, 361 (2001); In re Tabitha T., 51 Conn.App. 595 (1999). " [R]easonableness is an objective standard ... and whether reasonable efforts have been proven depends on the careful consideration of the circumstances of each individual case." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H., 147 Conn.App. 855, 872-73, cert. denied, 311 Conn. 923 (2014). See also In re Vincent B., 73 Conn.App. 637, 641 (2002), cert. denied, 262 Conn. 934 (2003). " The department has a continuing duty to make reasonable efforts." Id., 644. But " [t]he department is required only to make ‘reasonable efforts.’ It is axiomatic that this does not require a useless and futile act." In re Antony B., 54 Conn.App. 463, 476 (1999). In addition, " making no efforts to reunify a parent and his or her child may be reasonable in certain circumstances ..." In re Vincent B., supra, 73 Conn.App. 645. The court may also determine that the respondent parents were either unable or unwilling to benefit from reunification efforts. See In re Alexander T., 81 Conn.App. 668, 676, cert. denied, 268 Conn. 924 (2004).
DCF has proven by clear and convincing evidence that it used reasonable efforts to locate Mother as contemplated by C.G.S. § 17a-112(j)(I). The evidence clearly establishes that Mother was properly served. Mother was present in court for the trial of this matter.
DCF has also proven by clear and convincing evidence that it made reasonable efforts to reunify Gauge and Daniella with Mother. Mother was offered appropriate services to facilitate reunification with her children. As discussed in detail above, Mother was offered a multitude of services which included counseling, mental health treatment and evaluation, substance abuse services, parenting services, supervised visits, transportation services and case management services. Unfortunately, Mother garnered very little success or progression in a timely manner from the services in which she did engage. She has made minimal compliance and improvement in addressing her needs as well as the needs of Gauge and Daniella. Of note, Mother consistently failed to sign releases of information for DCF which prevented DCF from making appropriate and timely referrals for services, which resulted in long delays in Mother engaging in services. Of concern is Mother’s failure to remain consistent in her individual counseling to address her trauma and triggers dating back to childhood or to gain the necessary understanding of the consequences of her mental health on the well-being of the children. She has demonstrated a clear pattern of not following through with her treatment and appointments. Most troubling is her failure to consistently keep DCF apprised as to her services and the names of her therapists. Further, Mother’s long history of homelessness continues to be a chronic problem. Indeed, Mother’s failure to timely engage in services and cooperate with DCF as required by her specific steps impacted her ability to engage with Supportive Housing.
Accordingly, the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF made reasonable efforts to locate Mother and to reunify her with Gauge and Daniella, and further, that she is unable or unwilling to benefit from the reunification efforts.
Failure to Rehabilitate
In the adjudicatory phase, the court must next determine whether DCF has proved the statutory ground for termination of parental rights-failure to rehabilitate. " The ... [grounds] alleged in this petition [are] that ... [t]he [children] or youth [have] been found in a prior proceeding to have been neglected, abused or uncared for and the [mother] has failed to achieve the degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that within in reasonable period of time, considering the age and needs of the [children or youths], she could assume a responsible position in the [lives] of the [children or youths]. In re Leilah W., 166 Conn.App. 48 (2016), citing In re G.Q., 158 Conn.App. 24, 25, cert. denied, 317 Conn. 918 (2015). " Personal rehabilitation ... refers to the restoration of the parent to his or her former constructive and useful role as a parent ... [and] requires the trial court to analyze the [parent’s] rehabilitative status as it relates to the needs of the particular child, and further, that such rehabilitation must be foreseeable within a reasonable time ... the statute does not require [the parents] to prove precisely when they will be able to assume a responsible position in [their children’s] life. Nor does it require [them] to prove that [they] will be able to assume full responsibility for [their children], unaided by available support systems. In re Shane M., 318 Conn. 569, 585 (2015). It requires the court, to find by clear and convincing evidence, that the level of rehabilitation [she has] achieved, if any, falls short of that which would reasonably encourage a belief that at some future date [she] can assume a responsible position in [her children’s] life." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Samantha C., 268 Conn. 614, 628, 847 A.2d 883 (2004); In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 94 (2009); In re Halle T., 96 Conn.App. 815, 835, cert. denied, 280 Conn. 924 (2006); In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706 (1999). " The critical issue is not whether the parent has improved [their] ability to manage [her] own life, but rather whether [she has] gained the ability to care for the particular needs of the [children] at issue." Id. at 835. The ultimate question is whether the parent at the time of the filing of the termination petition is more able to resume the responsibilities of a parent than he or she was at the time of the making of the commitment. In re Michael M., 29 Conn.App. 112 (1992). In making this determination, the court may properly rely upon events occurring after the date of the petition when considering whether the degree of rehabilitation is sufficient to foresee that the parent may resume a useful role in the children’s life within a reasonable time. In re Stanley D., 61 Conn.App. 224, 230 (2000); In re Latifa K., 67 Conn.App. 742, 748 (2002). See also In re Emerald C., 108 Conn.App. 839, 858-59, cert. denied, 289 Conn. 923 (2008). " An inquiry regarding personal rehabilitation requires a historical perspective of the respondent’s child caring and parenting." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Kyara H, 147 Conn.App. 855, 867 (2014). " Terminating a parent’s rights is not ordered to punish a parent who has not tried to rehabilitate; it is ordered so as not to punish a child by denying the child a safe and permanent home with proven competent caretakers because [the biological parent] ... continues to be incapable of providing such a home for the child. In re Samantha B., 45 Conn.Supp. 468, 477 (1997), aff’d 51 Conn.App. 376 (1998), cert. denied, 248 Conn. 902 (1999). In light of the statutory elements of this ground as well as the case law interpreting it, this court finds by clear and convincing evidence that DCF has met its burden as to Mother.
The evidence here, as discussed in detail above, proves clearly and convincingly the first element under the statute that Gauge and Daniella have been previously found to have been neglected. As noted above, they were adjudicated neglected on September 3, 2015. Specific steps were ordered as to Mother on September 3, 2015. DCF assisted and attempted to assist Mother by referring her to appropriate services. As also previously discussed in this decision, Mother was unable to successfully complete her steps. Her limited and inconsistent engagement with services were not sufficient to achieve rehabilitation. Mother has failed to engage and remain in consistent therapy with regard to her on-going mental health issues. She failed to keep DCF apprised of her treatment. She failed to provide the names of her clinicians. While Mother reported that she was in counseling services, she failed to provide, until recently, any information or provide DCF with a signed release of information which was required under her specific steps. Her recent engagement in services at CMHA is too little, too late. She has found employment but is still not able to secure adequate housing. She continues to reside in a shelter. Mother has clearly and convincingly not achieved a degree of personal rehabilitation that would encourage the belief that, within a reasonable period of time, considering the ages and needs of the children, she could assume a responsible position in their lives. The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrated that she cannot adequately meet the children’s developmental, emotional and medical needs. Mother has failed to gain the necessary insight and ability to care for her children given their ages and needs within a reasonable period of time. See In re Eden F., 250 Conn. 674, 706, reargument denied, 251 Conn. 924 (1999). She has not sufficiently and successfully engaged in rehabilitation nor has she made adequate progress to make it safe for the children to safely return to her care. Mother has not rehabilitated to the extent that she could care for Gauge and Daniella within a reasonable period of time given their ages and need for permanency. Further, giving Mother additional time to do so is neither in the children’s best interest nor in their need for permanency. The court is mindful that they have been in DCF’s care for over thirty months. While Mother clearly loves her children, her attempts to reunify with them have failed. " Motivation to parent is not enough; ability is required." In re Paul M., Jr., id., citing In re G.S., 117 Conn.App. 710, 718, cert. denied, 294 Conn. 919 (2009). See also In re Ashley S., 61 Conn.App. 658, 667, cert. denied, 255 Conn. 950 (2001); In re Christina M., 90 Conn.App. 565, 575 (2007). Further, the legal obligation of a parent necessarily encompasses that fundamental right of a child to be safe physically, psychologically and emotionally. General Statutes § § 46b-120(8) and (9) and 17a-112(j). See also In re Nelmarie O., 97 Conn.App. 624, 629 (2006). Of paramount consideration to the court is the issue of stability and permanency for Gauge and Daniella. See In re Katia M., 124 Conn.App. 650, 666-67 (2010). Our laws recognize that a child is legally entitled to some minimum standard of safety which should include a parent’s desire to protect and keep their children safe in all ways including physically and emotionally. Gauge and Daniella’s need for permanence far outweighs any remote chance that Mother may rehabilitate in the far distant future which she clearly has not done since the children’s removal. Mother has either, because of lack of ability or lack of desire, failed to successfully accomplish what was needed to consider reunification as an appropriate conclusion. She has failed to put the needs of her children ahead of her own. Gauge and Daniella cannot afford to wait for their mother to rehabilitate. DCF has presented compelling evidence that they need permanency and stability now.
Accordingly, the court finds that, based upon the credible testimony and documentary evidence presented, DCF has met its burden of proof by the rigorous standard of clear and convincing evidence, that Mother has failed to achieve the degree of rehabilitation which would reasonably encourage the belief that at some future date she can assume a responsible position in her children’s lives. Accordingly, the court finds that Mother’s failure to rehabilitate, as it has been statutorily defined, has been proven by clear and convincing evidence.
DISPOSITION
For all of the above reasons, the court, having found by clear and convincing evidence that the necessary statutory grounds alleged by the petitioner for the termination of Mother’s parental rights have been proven, the court must now consider and make findings on each of the seven criteria set forth in General Statutes § 17a-112(k). In re Romance M., 229 Conn. 345 (1994). " In the dispositional phase of a termination of parental rights hearing, the emphasis appropriately shifts from the conduct of the parent to the interest of the child ... [T]he trial court must determine whether it is established by clear and convincing evidence that the continuation of the [respondent’s] parental rights is not in the best interest of the children." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted). In re Janazia S., 112 Conn.App. 69, 97-98 (2009). " The best interests of the children includes the children’s interest in sustained growth, development, well-being and continuity and stability in their environment ... In arriving at this decision, the court is mandated to consider and make written findings delineated in [§ 17a-112(k) ]." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Trevon G., 109 Conn.App. 782, 794-5 (2008). " [These factors] serve simply as guidelines for the court and are not statutory prerequisites that need to be determined before termination can be ordered ... There is no requirement that each factor be proved by clear and convincing evidence." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) In re Davonta V., 98 Conn.App. 42, 47, aff’d 285 Conn. 483 (2008).
The seven statutory findings, which have been established by clear and convincing evidence, are as follows.
1. The timeliness, nature and extent of services offered, provided and made available to the parent and the child by an agency to facilitate the reunion of the child with the parent .
As discussed above, DCF offered timely and appropriate services to Mother all in an effort to facilitate reunion with Gauge and Daniella. Mother was offered case management services, counseling services, psychiatric assessments, mental health services, parenting education, individual therapy and counseling, supervised visitation services and relative foster care placement. All of the recommended services were reasonable and appropriate, and offered on a consistent, timely and sufficient basis.
2. Whether the Department of Children and Families has made reasonable efforts to reunite the family pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, as amended .
As discussed in detail above, reasonable efforts to reunify Gauge and Daniella with their Mother and were made by DCF pursuant to the Federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980 as amended. The services offered, as detailed above, were appropriate and timely to address the issues that led to the children’s removal. The services were offered on a consistent and timely basis, and tailored to address Mother’s specific individual needs. Mother failed to sufficiently benefit from the services offered and provided. She failed to adjust her circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of the children to return to her care. Mother did not consistently avail herself of her services in order to improve her circumstances to the extent she can assume a responsible role in her children’s lives. Mother has clearly failed to demonstrate her ability to appropriately and safely parent Gauge and Daniella. DCF has clearly made reasonable efforts toward family reunification.
3. The terms of any applicable court order entered into and agreed upon by any individual or agency and the parent, and the extent to which all parties have fulfilled their obligations under such order .
Mother has not fulfilled her obligations pursuant to the specific steps ordered by the court September 3, 2015. As discussed in detail above, Mother’s inaction in seeking mental health services, her failure to advise DCF of her mental health treatment and failure to sign the appropriate releases, continue to demonstrate her ongoing mental health and parenting issues which have negatively impacted the reunification process. In addition, Mother continues to remain homeless and continues to reside in a shelter. These ongoing issues clearly demonstrate that she has not gained sufficient insight into her issues.
4. The feelings and emotional ties of the child with respect to the child’s parents, any guardian of such child’s person, and any person who has exercised physical care, custody or control for at least one year and with whom the child has developed significant emotional ties .
Mother visits Gauge and Daniella on a regular basis. They appear to have a loving bond with each other. Mother acts appropriately with the children and engages well with them. The children are very comfortable and bonded with their foster mother and her paramour. Their foster family provides continued support, structure, stability and a sense of safety. They both have significant emotional ties with their foster family and are clearly bonded with them. All of the children’s medical, dental, emotional and educational needs are being met. They are thriving in their foster family’s care.
5. The age of the children .
Gauge was born on October 24, 2005. He is presently 12 years old.
Daniella was born on October 19, 2009. She is presently eight years old.
6. The efforts the parent has made to adjust such parent’s circumstances, conduct, or conditions to make it in the best interest of the child to return such child’s home in the foreseeable future, including, but not limited to (A) the extent to which the parent has maintained contact with the child as part of an effort to reunite the child with the parent, provided the court may give weight to incidental visitations, communications or contributions, and (B) the maintenance of regular contact or communication with the guardian or other custodian of the child .
Mother has not made sufficient efforts or adjustment to her individual circumstances, conduct or conditions to make it in the best interests of Gauge or Daniella to return safely to her care in the foreseeable future. She has failed to put her children’s needs ahead of her own. She continues to remain homeless and has failed to sufficiently comply with her specific steps as discussed in detail above. Mother has consistently visited and maintains regular contact with them. Mother has maintained regular contact and communication with the children’s foster mother and visits the foster home on a regular basis.
7. The extent to which a parent has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with the child by the unreasonable act or conduct of the other parent of the child, or the unreasonable act of any other person or by the economic circumstances of the parent .
There is no credible evidence that Mother has been prevented from maintaining a meaningful relationship with Gauge and Daniella. DCF has encouraged her to do so. No unreasonable act or conduct of Father, or any other person, has prevented Mother from having a meaningful relationship with Gauge and Daniella. The economic circumstances of Mother have not prevented her from having a relationship or visits with the children. Mother was offered and provided programs and services, at no cost, to assist her with her issues. There has been no claim that Mother was unable to obtain services due to lack of financial resources. Legal counsel was appointed for her at no cost.
The court also finds that there is no disposition less restrictive than termination of parental rights that would serve Gauge’s and Daniella’s best interests. To the contrary, in deciding the best interest in this case, the court has considered the adjudicatory and dispositional evidence in its entirety and has concluded, by the clear and convincing evidence presented, that there is no permanency plan that could have secured the best interests of Gauge and Daniella that is less restrictive than the termination of parental rights at issue. See In re Azareon Y. et al., 309 Conn. 626 (2013).
Best Interests of the Child
Once the court finds that the allegations of the petition have been proven by clear and convincing evidence, the court must find, also by clear and convincing evidence, that the termination is in the best interests of the child. In re Roshawn R., 51 Conn.App. 44, 52 (1998). " [T]he determination of the child’s best interests comes into play only after statutory grounds for termination of parental rights has been established by clear and convincing evidence." In re Zion R., 116 Conn.App. 723, 738 (2009). The best interest standard is inherently flexible and fact-specific to each child, giving the court broad discretion to consider all the different and individualized factors that might affect a specific child’s welfare. In determining whether terminating the Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interests of Gauge and Daniella, the court has considered various factors, including their interests in sustained growth, developed well-being, and in the continuity and stability of their environments; Capetta v. Capetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16 (1985); In re Jason R., 129 Conn.App. 746, 766 n.15 (2011); their ages and needs; the length and nature of their stages of foster care; the contact with their mother or lack thereof; the potential benefits or detriments of retaining connections with their mother; their genetic bond with their birth parents; In re Savanna M., 55 Conn.App. 807, 816 (1999); and the seven statutory factors and the court’s findings thereon. It is clear that Gauge and Daniella cannot be returned to their Mother. The court has balanced each child’s intrinsic need for stability, sustained growth, development, well-being and permanency against the potential benefits of maintaining a connection with their biological parents. See Pamela B. v. Ment, 244 Conn. 296, 314 (1998) (child’s physical and emotional well-being must be weighed against the interest in preserving family integrity). In consideration of all these factors and after weighing all of the evidence, the court finds that the clear and convincing evidence has established that it is in the best interests of Gauge and Daniella to terminate the parental rights of the respondent Mother to ensure that they each have a secure and safe placement so they can grow and mature to become productive children and adults. They need the permanency and stability that their foster parents will continue to provide for them. As our courts have long observed, the deleterious effects of prolonged temporary care is well known. In re Juvenile Appeal (84-CD), 189 Conn. 276, 292, 455 A.2d 1313 (1983). " It is undisputed that children require secure, stable, long-term, continuous relationships with their parents or foster parents. There is little that can be as detrimental to a child’s sound development as uncertainty ..." Lehman v. Lycoming Country Children’s Services Agency, 458 U.S. 502, 513, 102 S.Ct. 3231, 73 L.Ed.2d 928 (1982). Gauge and Daniella need this closure of the uncertainty in their lives and the removal of the possibility of returning home to their Mother. Mother cannot offer any reasonable prospect of providing any form of the stability, safety and permanency that these two children need in the foreseeable future. The evidence clearly and convincingly establishes that Mother is not a stable and competent caretaker for Gauge and Daniella. Mother has failed to sufficiently and timely address her mental health and housing issues, and has not sufficiently progressed to safely parent the children in the foreseeable future.
Accordingly, after considering the children’s ages and the totality of the circumstances, the court finds that termination of Mother’s parental rights is in the best interests of Gauge K. and Daniella K. The convincing and clear evidence has established that Mother is in no better position today to provide for her children than she was at the time of their removal. The problems that led to the children’s removal have not been rectified and the prospects of improvement are bleak at best. This conclusion is supported by the testimony of the witnesses as well as the information contained in the exhibits presented at the time of trial. The children’s attorney is in support of the termination of the parental rights of Mother in light of her failure to rehabilitate.
It is hereby ORDERED that the parental rights of respondent Mother, Nadine S., are hereby TERMINATED as to her children, Gauge K. and Daniella K.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing findings and having considered all of the evidence after due consideration of the children’s needs for a secure, permanent placements, the totality of the circumstances, having considered all statutory criteria, having found by clear and convincing evidence that reasonable efforts to locate Mother were made, that efforts at reunification with Mother were made, that Mother was and continues to be unable or unwilling to benefit from those efforts, and that further efforts are no longer required, the court finds that grounds exist to terminate Mother’s parental rights as alleged, and that it is in the children’s best interests to do so. It is accordingly ordered:
That the parental rights of the respondent Mother, Nadine S., and the respondent Father, Daniel K. pursuant to his consent, are terminated;
That the Commissioner of the Department of Children and Families is appointed statutory parent of Gauge K. and Daniella K. for the purpose of securing their adoption as expeditiously as possible;
That a written report of the plan as to the status of each of the children shall be submitted to the court within thirty days, and such further reports shall be timely filed and presented to the court as required by law.
Judgment shall enter accordingly.