Opinion
C043346.
11-13-2003
In re GARY A., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. SHASTA COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JEANNA B., Defendant and Appellant.
Jeanna B., mother of the minor, appeals from orders of the juvenile court denying her services. (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10), 395 [further undesignated statutory references are to this code].) Appellant contends the juvenile court should have ordered services for her because she demonstrated she had made a reasonable effort to treat the problems which led to the removal of her other children. We affirm.
FACTS
Gary, appellants ninth child, was born prematurely in August 2002 with methamphetamine in his system. Appellant also tested positive for methamphetamine and admitted she had used the drug within 24 hours of the minors birth. The drug use probably caused the minors premature birth. The court ordered the minor and his sibling, Christopher, removed from appellants care.[] The court found the allegations of the petition true and set a dispositional hearing.
The dispositional hearing report filed in late November 2002 recommended that no services be provided to appellant because she had a history of chronic substance abuse and she had lost custody of all seven of her older children. The report further stated appellant had been in multiple substance abuse treatment programs beginning in 1997 with a three-month incarceration at the California Rehabilitation Center (CRC) followed by a second program in 1997 which she was asked to leave after a month; a third program from October 1997 to January 1998; a fourth program in March 1998, which she attended for two weeks before testing positive and never returning; and a fifth program consisting of 45 days at Right Roads which she completed in April 2001, prior to the birth of Christopher, Garys half-sibling. Appellant also completed a family maintenance program with Christopher. His dependency case was dismissed in June 2002, two months before appellant again used methamphetamine. From the detention hearing to the time of the report, appellant had tested regularly and all tests were negative, however, appellant admitted to the social worker that she had used methamphetamine in early November. Appellant was remorseful about the relapse but seemed to be unable to stay clean. Further, appellant was unable to appreciate that her substance abuse affected her ability to parent her children and put them at risk. The social worker noted that, over the years, appellant had periods of sobriety but was never able to parent any of her nine children for an extended period of time. The social worker concluded it would be detrimental to the minor to return him to appellant then have to remove him again as appellant repeated the pattern she had been unable to break of relapse into substance abuse.
At the dispositional hearing in February 2003, appellant testified in accordance with the information in the reports, indicating she made a decision in 1999 to stay clean and remained that way until Gary was born in August 2002. She testified she had participated in several programs and cooperated with a Family Maintenance plan from October 2001 until June 2002 after Christopher was born. She said that after the minors removal, she started an outpatient program in September 2002, attended AA meetings and parenting classes and regularly visited the minors, but acknowledged she did use methamphetamine again in November after a combination of stressful events occurred. Appellant testified all her drug tests were negative.
In denying services to appellant, the court recognized her efforts but noted that, despite extensive therapy, appellant still did not seek help from the resources available to her. Both when she was pregnant with the minor and again two months later she did not seek help to avoid the choice of substance abuse although she knew she risked losing her children.
DISCUSSION
Appellant contends the court abused its discretion in denying her services to reunify with the minor because there was substantial evidence that she had made a reasonable effort to treat the problems which led to the removal of the minors siblings. She argues she had been clean since 1999 except for two relapses, had completed a treatment program and a family maintenance plan, had tested clean on all random drug tests and was currently doing well in the day treatment program and attending a 12-step program. Appellant further argues that it was not necessary to demonstrate she was "cured," only that she made reasonable efforts to treat her substance abuse.
When the sufficiency of the evidence to support a finding or order is challenged on appeal, even where the standard of proof in the trial court is clear and convincing, the reviewing court must determine if there is any substantial evidence — that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible and of solid value — to support the conclusion of the trier of fact. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924; In re Jason L. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1206, 1214.) In making this determination we recognize that all conflicts are to be resolved in favor of the prevailing party and that issues of fact and credibility are questions for the trier of fact. (In re Jason L., supra, 222 Cal.App.3d at p. 1214; In re Steve W. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 10, 16.) The reviewing court may not reweigh the evidence when assessing the sufficiency of the evidence. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318-319.)
"Reunification services need not be provided to a parent . . . described in this subdivision when the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence, any of the following: . . . . [¶] (10) That the court ordered termination of reunification services for any siblings or half-siblings of the child because the parent . . . failed to reunify with the sibling or half-sibling after the sibling or half-sibling had been removed from that parent . . . pursuant to Section 361 and that parent . . . is the same parent . . . described in subdivision (a) and that, according to the findings of the court, this parent . . . has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal of the sibling or half-sibling of that child from that parent . . . ." (§ 361.5, subd. (b)(10).)
The mere fact that the problems are not fully resolved does not mean the juvenile court cannot consider ordering reunification services. (In re Renee J. (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1450, 1464.) By enacting section 361.5, subdivision (b), the Legislature has recognized that it may be fruitless to provide services under certain circumstances and an ongoing lack of benefit from services is some evidence parental efforts were not reasonable and further efforts would be futile. (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 78; In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 467; Randi R. v. Superior Court (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 67, 70.)
Here, appellant has a long-standing substance abuse problem which resulted in the removal of her seven oldest children. In 1999 she evidently recognized the seriousness of her problem and began inpatient treatment and secured prenatal care while pregnant with Christopher. When he was born she participated in family maintenance services, and evidently remained drug free. However, she did not seek prenatal care when she became pregnant with Gary and, shortly after family maintenance supervision was removed, she again used methamphetamine, triggering Garys birth. She understood why Gary was removed from her custody but, in spite of years of services and therapy, did not recognize that renewed drug use also impacted her ability to meet Christophers needs. Further, after her children were removed and she was attending yet another treatment program, she found herself in stressful circumstances. Knowing the risk she took of permanently losing her children, appellant made the choice to seek out and use methamphetamine rather than seek out support to help her deal with her problems without resorting to drugs.
Appellants pattern is substance abuse followed by varying periods of sobriety. Eight of her other children have been subjected to the uncertain care and instability this pattern produces. Appellant has had extensive services over several years to no avail. Eventually the question must be: "`how many children does a parent get to harm before we say, as a matter of law, enough is enough." (Randi R. v. Superior Court, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 72.) Under the circumstances, the evidence of appellants efforts to treat the problems of drug abuse and neglect could not be considered reasonable. The court did not abuse its discretion in denying services.
DISPOSITION
The orders of the juvenile court are affirmed.
We concur: DAVIS, J. and RAYE, J. --------------- Notes: Christopher is not a subject of this appeal. His case is in a different posture and issues relating to him were resolved in a writ proceeding pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 39.1B. Respondent requests the court take judicial notice of the documents in our case No. C043346, the extraordinary writ proceeding filed by appellant with respect to her son, Christopher. We deny the request as the documents are not of material assistance in determining the issues in this appeal.