A New Jersey court was more succinct in stating that "co-executors and co-administrators must sue and be sued jointly." In re Garey's Estate, 65 N.J. Super. 585, 168 A.2d 273, 275 (1961). Although this state has no cases directly on this question, our case law has suggested the answer.
In New Jersey acts done by one co-executor are deemed acts of all, inasmuch as they have joint and entire authority. In ReGreims Will, 140 N.J. Eq. 183 (1947) and Re Garey's Estate, 65 N.J. Super. 585 (1961). Pennsylvania law is to the same effect: Fesmire v.Shannon, 143 Pa. 201, 208.
Morton, supra, 127 N.J. at 233, 603 A.2d 946. Here, contrary to the philosophy of Morton, plaintiff seeks to bar the individual defendants from each other's deposition, and contends he is supported by In re Garey's Estate; 65 N.J. Super. 585, 168 A.2d 273 (Co.Ct. 1961) and In re General Election of Maplewood, 255 N.J. Super. 690, 605 A.2d 1164 (Law Div. 1992). In the former, the court sequestered co-executors during a trial questioning their accounting and, in the latter, contestants in an election were sequestered.
We also hold that the remainderpersons' amended exceptions set forth claims against the trustee with sufficient particularity with respect to its handling of the trust assets during the final accounting period to entitle them to at least pursue discovery. See In re Garey, 65 N.J. Super. 585, 590, 168 A.2d 273 (Union County Ct. 1961) (quoting In re Perrone's Estate, 5 N.J. 514, 525, 76 A.2d 518 (1950) ("Whenever the fiduciary relationship exists sound public policy calls for the most searching inquiry into the conduct of the fiduciary and he should not be shielded from such an inquiry by the rules applicable to ordinary actions at law")); see also In re Estate of Mary Skvir, 170 N.J. Super. 559, 562, 407 A.2d 836 (App.Div. 1979). Accordingly, we reverse the order dated January 2, 1997 striking the amended exceptions and dismissing the remainderpersons' pleadings with respect to the sixth and final accounting.
It is agreed, as urged by K.L.F., that the word "party" is generally understood to have a broad meaning. See, e.g., Kasharian v. Wilentz, 93 N.J. Super. 479, 482, 226 A.2d 437 (App.Div. 1967) (a party is "the person or entity beneficially interested or personally sought to be held liable"); In re Garey's Estate, 65 N.J. Super. 585, 588, 168 A.2d 273 (Cty.Ct. 1961) (a party is "`ordinarily one who has or claims an interest in the subject of an action or proceeding instituted to afford some relief to the one who sets the law in motion against another person or persons'") (quoting Hughes v. Jones, 116 N.Y. 67, 22 N.E. 446, 448 (1889)); Black's Law Dictionary 1122 (6th ed. 1990) (parties are persons "by or against whom a legal suit is brought, whether in law or in equity"). However, the Legislature further narrowed the class of parties against whom sanctions may be awarded by ultimately referring to them as "non-prevailing person[s]."