And if a plea is unfairly obtained through ignorance, fear or misunderstanding, it is open to collateral attack. Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473, 478; In re Newton, 125 Vt. 453, 459, 218 A.2d 394; see also, In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 187, 212 A.2d 633. We see no occasion here to analyze in depth the complex consideration involved in the practice of plea discussions and concessions.

The law is abundantly clear that a guilty plea must not be induced in any manner that deprives it from being the voluntary act of the accused, otherwise the plea will be vacated to permit the accused to stand trial on the merits. In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 188, 212 A.2d 633; Marchibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473, 478; Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 224, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009, 1010, 1012. If the plea is unfairly obtained through fear or misunderstanding, the court, "on timely application," will vacate the plea and permit the accused to stand trial. In re Garceau, supra, at 187, 212 A.2d 633.

If so, he is bound by his plea. State v. Battick, 133 Vt. 558, 349 A.2d 221 (1975); In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 212 A.2d 633 (1965). This Court will inquire into the circumstances surrounding a guilty plea to determine that the trial court discharged its responsibility to assure itself, before accepting the plea, that it was offered voluntarily, after proper advice, and with full understanding of its consequences.

We have many times noted that a plea of guilty is a solemn undertaking. In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 188, 212 A.2d 633, 635 (1965). As such, it is critical that it be knowing and voluntary.

Likewise it is clear that in a similar situation a successor State's Attorney in the same office would be free to initiate a prosecution that his or her predecessor had declined to bring. Cf. In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 187, 212 A.2d 633, 635 (1965) (successor State's Attorney discontinued prosecution instituted by his predecessor). These results follow since the sovereign power of the State to punish an individual for violating its criminal laws has not been set in motion in the first instance by an agency of the State authorized to do so.

If properly exercised, he did have authority to discontinue or withhold prosecution. See, In re Tomassi, 104 Vt. 34, 36, 156 A. 533; In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 187, 212 A.2d 633. "In any event, the assurance affected the credibility of these witnesses rather than their competency.

A plea of guilty is conclusive and binding if voluntarily made after proper advice with a full understanding of its consequences. State v. Kalis, 127 Vt. 311, 248 A.2d 721 (1968); In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 212 A.2d 633 (1965). We find no error on the part of the trial court in connection with the sentencing of the defendant.

The formal shortcomings in the informations, also claimed by the respondent, if they are such, come within the rule of In re DeCelle, 125 Vt. 467, 468-69, 218 A.2d 714 (1966), and the pleas of guilty are a barrier to post-conviction relief in such cases. See In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 188, 212 A.2d 633 (1965). Judgment affirmed.

Since this conclusion is sustained by the record and the subordinate findings, the petitioner is bound by his plea and his application for release was correctly denied. Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 71 L.Ed. 1009, 1012; Petition of Dusablon, 126 Vt. 362, 365, 230 A.2d 797 (1967); In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 188, 212 A.2d 633 (1965). Order of the Chittenden County Court, dismissing the petition, is affirmed.

In that case the validity of the clause "without just cause" was in contention it being claimed it was so vague as to void the statute under the United States and New Jersey Constitutions. The court held that the statute proscribing the sale of contraceptives "without just cause" was valid and that the statute prevented the promiscuous and indiscriminate sale of contraceptives through vending machines in public places. The petitioner stands convicted on his counseled admission in open court that he committed the crime charged against him. He is bound by his plea and his conviction unless he can allege and prove serious derelictions on the part of counsel sufficient to show his plea was not, after all, a knowing and intelligent act. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 90 S.Ct. 1441; In re Garceau, 125 Vt. 185, 188, 212 A.2d 633; In re James J. Mahoney, 128 Vt. 462, 266 A.2d 444. By his plea the petitioner admitted that the abortion was performed for a purpose other than to save the mother's life which established the necessary criminal intent to support his conviction.