Therefore, the Court agrees with Defendants that Devins' “personal representative has the authority to bring causes of action that were viable at the time of [her] death, [but] not claims that arose after . . . her death.” Lucker v. Bayside Cemetery, 979 N.Y.S.2d 8, 15 (1st Dep't 2013) (citing N.Y. Est. Pow. & Trst. Law § 11-3.1; Matter of Estate of Gandolfo, 655 N.Y.S.2d 341 [1st Dep't 1997]). Here, Plaintiff's first and second claims were not viable at the time of Devins' death for the following three reasons: (1) they have not been asserted against Clark; (2) they do not arise from Defendants' conduct occurring before Devins' death; and (3) they have not been asserted by Kimberly Devins in her representative capacity as the administratrix of the Estate of Bianca Devins (but rather were asserted expressly by the Estate itself).
Such claims would amount to an impermissible extension of the legislative scheme for the survival of actions. A decedent's personal representative has the authority to bring causes of action that were viable at the time of the decedent's death, not claims that arose after his or her death (EPTL 11–3.1; Estate of Gandolfo, 237 A.D.2d 115, 655 N.Y.S.2d 341 [1st Dept.1997] ). The causes of action here arose after those decedents' deaths. John Lucker's belated application for, and receipt of, appointment in Connecticut to serve as the legal representative of the estate of his grandmother, Ruth Lucker, is therefore unavailing.