Where we impose disbarment as reciprocal discipline, we may dismiss a criminal conviction matter as moot and forego the moral turpitude inquiry. See In re Gailliard, 944 A.2d 1109, 1111-12 (D.C. 2008) (citing In re Novick, 619 A.2d 514 (D.C. 1993)) (holding that where a discipline proceeding involves both a criminal conviction and a reciprocal discipline matter, the court may impose reciprocal discipline without engaging in a moral turpitude inquiry on the criminal conviction if the resulting discipline would be the same if a moral turpitude inquiry had been conducted). Bar Counsel recommended to the Board that we adopt this approach here.
The Board also recommends that the pending referral for a moral turpitude determination should be dismissed as moot. See In re Gailliard, 944 A.2d 1109, 1112 (D.C. 2008); In re Rostoker, 918 A.2d 425, 426 (D.C. 2007). For these reasons, and since nothing in the record indicates that such discipline is inappropriate, see D.C. Bar R. XI, § 11(c), we hereby adopt the Board's Report and Recommendation. Accordingly, it is, Respondent has filed notices purporting to show that his felony conviction was reduced to a misdemeanor and that he later was allowed to withdraw his plea of nolo contendere and to enter a plea of not guilty. He also represents that the court dismissed the case against him and released him from all penalties and disabilities pursuant to California Penal Code § 1203.4(a).
In a recent reciprocal discipline case involving a father who struck his teenage son with a truck, we imposed a three-year suspension with a readmission requirement that the respondent prove his fitness to resume the practice of law. In re Gailliard, 944 A.2d 1109, 1111 (D.C. 2008). Mr. Jacoby and Bar Counsel did not raise the issue of mitigation under In re Kersey, 520 A.2d 321 (D.C. 1987), in their briefs.