Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County No. DL027343 Ronald P. Kreber, Judge.
Siri Shetty, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney General, Gary W. Schons, Assistant Attorney General, Peter Quon, Jr., and Marvin E. Mizell, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
ARONSON, J.
The juvenile court found 13-year-old Gabriel M. committed carjacking and attempted robbery and declared him a ward of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. He contends the trial court erred by permitting an officer to testify to the complaining witness’s translated pretrial statements and also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the findings. For the reasons expressed below, we affirm the judgment.
I
Facts and Procedural Background
Duc La testified through a Vietnamese interpreter that on March 27, 2007, around 2:00 p.m., he was opening the trunk of his daughter’s Honda Civic outside his doctor’s office in Westminster when three boys approached within a foot and crowded around him, touching and pushing him “lightly.” They reached into the trunk, which contained snacks and miscellaneous items, and asked for food and money. La rejected their demands. Two of the boys walked away, but the third pointed at La’s pocket, which contained his wallet and said, “the money is in there” or, “give me some money.” La brushed aside the boy’s hand and said, “there’s no money.” The boy pointed and asked for a bottle of water, which La provided. La closed the trunk, but could not find his keys. The boy claimed one of his cohorts had taken them, but La accused the boy, who put his hand in his pocket, boasted he had the keys and invited La to follow him. La chased him around a corner, grabbed the boy by his shirt and searched for the keys. The second boy, who had been running with the third in the opposite direction, yelled “he already took your car.” When La returned to the parking lot, both the car and the boys were gone.
La testified the young boys did not frighten or threaten him, and did not resort to force. He explained that even though the boys cornered and pushed against him, he thought they merely were trying to distract him. He did not try to move away from the trunk because he thought the boys might take something. He did not remember telling a police officer he feared for his safety because the boys had cornered him. La claimed he could have moved away from the car if he wanted to and did not recall telling a police officer he could not leave because the boys had him surrounded.
Officers located the car approximately two hours after the incident less than a quarter mile away. They placed the car under surveillance and later observed a group of 8 to 10 people approach the rear of the vehicle. Someone opened the trunk and several people removed bottles of water. The group closed the trunk and departed, with one of the minors wiping down the trunk area. One or two hours later, Manuel P., a member of the original group that took La’s car, approached the vehicle and got in the driver’s seat. Officers apprehended him when the brake lights came on. Investigators recovered La’s jacket, handicap placard, and a bag containing CD’s in a nearby cul-de-sac.
Officer Cynthia Sawyer responded to the scene and interviewed La outside the medical office. La understood some English, but Sawyer primarily relied on a medical office employee to translate because she was fluent in English and Vietnamese. Sawyer also had La’s 36-year-old daughter assist with the translation. La told her all three boys had surrounded him when the smaller, shorter of the trio demanded money and pointed at La’s wallet in his back pocket. La felt he could not leave because the boys had him surrounded. He feared for his safety when they pushed him back against the vehicle and when one of the boys demanded money while the other two continued to surround him. The first boy told him the other two had absconded with La’s keys, and La yelled for them to return. The second and third boy walked towards him, but then the first boy and one of the others walked off while the third boy drove off in La’s car. Sawyer interviewed La a second time with Tony Nguyen, a Garden Grove community service officer and certified Vietnamese translator. According to Sawyer, La told her nothing that varied significantly from his previous statement “relating to the elements of the crime.”
Investigating officers apprehended Gabriel M., and Garden Grove Police Officer Mark Lord interviewed him about the crime. Gabriel admitted he and his two companions spotted the elderly La in the parking lot and discussed “jack[ing]” La’s car. They approached and stood about two feet from La to intimidate him. Devin, one of his accomplices, asked for money. Gabriel reached up and took the keys from the trunk lock while his companions distracted La. He gave the keys to Manuel, his other accomplice, as they walked away. La demanded the keys from Devin, but Devin pushed La away and fled the scene with Gabriel, while Manuel drove off in La’s car. Gabriel admitted he and Manuel dumped La’s property in a cul-de-sac, and clamed they would have used Manuel’s BB gun to steal the car if they could not pilfer the car keys.
Following an adjudication hearing in April 2007, the juvenile court sustained the attempted robbery and carjacking counts. The court found La’s pretrial statements to the officer more credible than his testimony, in part because they occurred shortly after the incident. The court stated, “It is true that the victim . . . did testify . . . denying at the trial that he had . . . fear of minors and that no force was used. . . . [¶] One could say that he stated there was no fear as he doesn’t want any trouble, but I don’t think that was the reason. I think the court could find that the victim just does not want to hurt these young people and he seems to have empathy for the minors.” The court placed Gabriel on probation on various terms and conditions, including a period of confinement.
II
Discussion
A. Admission of La’s Translated Statements
Gabriel first argues the juvenile court erred by permitting Officer Sawyer to testify to La’s statements that were translated by the medical office employee and La’s daughter. He argues “[s]ince those statements were not translated by certified interpreters or neutral citizens, and [La] denied making those statements, they could not fairly be attributed to him. As such, they amounted to hearsay statements of those translators, and the prosecution was required to make [the employee and La’s daughter] available for testimony and cross-examination. Since [minor] was not provided an opportunity to cross-examine those declarants, the admission of that testimony violated his confrontation clause rights.” We do not find the contention persuasive.
In Correa v. Superior Court (2002) 27 Cal.4th 444 (Correa), the California Supreme Court rejected the notion an officer testifying to a declarant’s out of court statement obtained through a translator automatically constituted multiple hearsay. “Rather, a generally unbiased and adequately skilled translator simply serves as a ‘language conduit,’ so that the translated statement is considered to be the statement of the original declarant, and not that of the translator.” (Id. at p. 448.) The translator must testify only where the particular facts of a case cast significant doubt upon the accuracy of a translated statement. (Id. at p. 459.) In making this determination, a “court should consider ‘a number of factors . . . such as which party supplied the interpreter, whether the interpreter had any motive to mislead or distort, the interpreter’s qualifications and language skill, and whether actions taken subsequent to the conversation were consistent with the statements as translated.’” (Id. at p. 458.) We review the trial court’s determination for an abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 467.)
Here, the police did not “provide” the translators, but employed bystanders who “just happened to be on the scene.” (Correa, supra, 27 Cal.4th at p. 466.) True, one of the translators was La’s daughter, but neither she nor the medical office employee had a motive to mislead or distort the facts. Because the crime had just occurred, the trial court could reasonably infer the translators had an interest in accurately conveying La’s account of the crime so the police could act quickly to recover the car and apprehend the culprits. The investigating officer testified she used the medical employee to do most of the interpreting because she was fluent in Vietnamese and English, and no evidence suggested the officer’s observation was inaccurate. Finally, the subsequent investigation corroborated the translated statements. Indeed, La himself corroborated his earlier statements when Sawyer reinterviewed him with a certified Vietnamese interpreter at the scene.
On review, we must draw all legitimate inferences in favor of the trial court’s implicit determination the translators exercised sufficient skill and objectivity so that the translated statements could fairly be attributed to La, the declarant. Because the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting the translated statements, we conclude Gabriel’s hearsay and confrontation clause claims are without merit.
B. Sufficient Evidence of Carjacking
Gabriel also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the elements of force or fear necessary to show a carjacking occurred. He acknowledges La informed investigators that he feared for his safety when the minors surrounded and jostled him, but argues “this evidence does not demonstrate that his fear (or any force) permitted the crime to be accomplished, given that the keys were removed from the trunk rather than his person. . . . Indeed, Mr. La was not aware how or when the keys were taken . . . .” We disagree.
A reviewing court must affirm the juvenile court’s finding if supported by substantial evidence. (In re Jerry M. (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 289, 297-298.) In applying the substantial evidence test, it is not this court’s task to reweigh the evidence. (In re Jasmine C. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 71, 75.) Rather, our duty is solely to ascertain whether there is reasonable, credible evidence of solid value to support the conclusion of the juvenile court. (In re Angelia P. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 908, 924.) All conflicts are resolved in favor of the judgment and the issues of fact and credibility are questions for the court below. (Ibid.) The trier of fact, not the appellate court, must be convinced of the minor’s guilt; hence, if the circumstances and reasonable inferences justify the trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the circumstances also might reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant reversal. (In re Jerry M., at p. 298.)
“‘Carjacking’ is the felonious taking of a motor vehicle in the possession of another, from his or her person or immediate presence . . . against his or her will and with the intent to either permanently or temporarily deprive the person in possession of the motor vehicle of his or her possession, accomplished by means of force or fear.” (Pen. Code, § 215, subd. (a).) The Legislature intended to treat robbery and carjacking alike, with two exceptions: “‘(1) carjackings require an intent to either temporarily or permanently deprive the owner of the property whereas robbery always requires an intent to permanently deprive, and (2) carjackings only involve vehicles whereas robbery may involve any type of property.’” (People v. Vargas (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 456, 462.) Consequently, in addressing defendant’s argument on the element of force or fear for carjacking, we may consider cases interpreting the force or fear element for robbery.
The terms “force” and “fear” as used in the definition of robbery and carjacking have no special meaning peculiar to the law. (People v. Anderson (1966) 64 Cal.2d 633, 640.) No case has precisely defined the amount of force necessary, but “something more is required than just that quantum of force which is necessary to accomplish the mere seizing of the property.” (People v. Morales (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 134, 139.) The force required for robbery or carjacking is not synonymous with a physical assault, however. (People v. Mungia (1991) 234 Cal.App.4th 488, 494.) Rather, the requisite force necessary to commit the crime is that which is actually sufficient to overcome the victim’s resistance. (People v. Lescallett (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 487, 491, overruled on another ground in People v. Allison (1989) 48 Cal.3d, 879, 895.) “Most robberies involve actual or threatened force, resulting in fear on the part of the victim, at the time the property is taken. [Citation.] However, the requisite fear need not be the result of an express threat.” (People v. Flynn (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 766, 771.)
Here, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding on the elements of force or fear. La told the investigating officer he became frightened for his safety when the trio of minors surrounded him and pushed him against the back of his car, while one of them demanded money. Gabriel corroborated La’s account, admitting to an investigating officer the boys deliberately stood close to their elderly victim to intimidate him. Gabriel also conceded Devin, his accomplice, pushed La away when La demanded Devin return the car keys. The foregoing constitutes substantial evidence supporting the trial court’s determination.
The above facts also lead us to reject Gabriel’s alternative argument that any force or fear shown played no part in the taking. A clear causal connection exists between the theft of La’s car and the use of force and fear by Gabriel and his fellow brigands. Nor do we accept Gabriel’s argument a carjacking did not occur because La was unaware his keys had been taken while he retrieved a bottle of water from the trunk of his car. There simply is no legal requirement a robbery victim must know his or her property is being stolen when confronted by an assailant. (People v. Jackson (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1326, 1330-1331 [“There is no requirement that the victim be aware that his property is being taken from his presence by force or fear”].)
C. Sufficient Evidence of Attempted Robbery
Gabriel challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support the finding he aided and abetted an attempted robbery. Specifically, he argues the underlying crime never occurred because Devin, the boy who demanded money from La, took no other action when La refused to comply. Assuming Devin’s actions constituted attempted robbery, Gabriel contends there was no substantial evidence he intended to aid Devin’s criminal act. We disagree.
Liability for aiding and abetting “requires proof in three distinct areas: (a) the direct perpetrator’s actus reus — a crime committed by the direct perpetrator, (b) the aider and abettor’s mens rea — knowledge of the direct perpetrator’s unlawful intent and an intent to assist in achieving those unlawful ends, and (c) the aider and abettor’s actus reus — conduct by the aider and abettor that in fact assists the achievement of the crime.” (People v. Perez (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1219, 1225.) Aiding and abetting liability attaches even if the direct perpetrator is unable to complete the crime. “If a direct perpetrator is thwarted and guilty only of an attempt, an aider and abettor may still be guilty of aiding and abetting the attempt.” (Id. at p. 1226.)
Substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding that Devin attempted to rob La. All three boys surrounded La, pushing him up against the back of his car when Devin demanded La give him the money in La’s wallet. As Devin made his demand, he reached toward La’s pocket containing the wallet. La brushed Devin’s hand aside, explaining that he had no money. Devin’s efforts to obtain La’s wallet constitute an attempted robbery. Gabriel admitted he, Devin, and Manuel surrounded La to intimidate him into complying with their demands or stealing his keys, and used force when they jostled him up against his car and prevented him from leaving. Devin’s demand for money as he moved his hand toward La’s wallet constituted a direct but ineffectual act toward robbery of La’s wallet. (See People v. Marshall (1997) 15 Cal.4th 1, 36 [attempt occurs when perpetrator, with specific intent to commit the crime, performs direct but ineffectual act toward its commission].)
Substantial evidence also shows Gabriel intended to assist Devin in his criminal endeavors. Gabriel admitted he and his companions planned the carjacking and deliberately surrounded their elderly victim to intimidate him. Under these circumstances, Devin’s attempted robbery was reasonably foreseeable and therefore a natural and probable consequence of the carjacking. (See People v. Mendoza (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1114, 1133 [issue is not whether aider and abettor actually foresaw the additional crime, but whether it was reasonably foreseeable].)
Finally, substantial evidence demonstrates that Gabriel’s actions assisted the attempted robbery. Gabriel lent his support by helping his cohorts to surround the victim, forcing him against the car, and preventing him from leaving the scene. This constitutes active involvement and satisfies the actus reus requirement for aider and abettor liability. (See People v. Campbell (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 402, 409 [presence at the scene of the crime, companionship and conduct before and after the offense are factors the court may consider in determining aiding and abetting].) Based on the foregoing, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s finding Gabriel aided and abetted an attempted robbery.
III
Disposition
The judgment is affirmed.
WE CONCUR: SILLS, P. J., IKOLA, J.