Opinion
F055428
1-6-2009
In re F.Y., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. FRESNO COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. N.R., Defendant and Appellant.
Maureen L. Keaney, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant. Janelle E. Kelley, Interim County Counsel, and William G. Smith, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Not to be Published in the Official Reports
OPINION
THE COURT
Before Vartabedian, Acting P.J., Cornell, J. and Gomes, J.
INTRODUCTION
Appellant N.R.s son was taken into protective custody because she left the child with a relative who was using cocaine. Appellant had already lost custody of several older children because of her own cocaine addiction. The juvenile court denied reunification services and terminated parental rights.
On appeal, appellant contends the courts finding that the child was adoptable is not supported by substantial evidence because of the possibility the child could be HIV positive. Appellant also contends the court should have found that termination of parental rights would be detrimental because there was evidence of a strong parent-child bond. We will affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant is the mother of F.Y. (born Sept. 2005). In January 2006, the Fresno Police Department found the child at a known substance abuse residence with several parolees. None of the residents knew appellant, who dropped off the child and said she would be right back but was gone for over an hour. When the police finally located appellant, she admitted that she had been using cocaine. Thereafter, appellant participated in voluntary family maintenance services in Fresno County, completed a drug treatment program in August or September 2006, and retained custody of F.Y.
In September 2006, appellant left F.Y. with the childs aunt in Sacramento, and appellant returned to live in Fresno. In November 2006, F.Y. was removed from the aunts custody and detained by Childrens Protective Services of Sacramento County (CPS), because the aunt tested positive for cocaine and admitted cocaine use. The aunt said appellant left the child with her because appellant was ill with an "Immune Compromising Disease" and could not care for the child.
At the time of F.Y.s detention, appellant was 34 years old and living in Fresno. She had a history of chronic substance abuse and began using cocaine when she was 15 years old. She admitted that in September 2006, she relapsed into drug use even though she just completed an outpatient drug program. Appellant had an extensive criminal record of misdemeanors and felonies beginning in 1991, consisting of prostitution and narcotics offenses, and continuing to 2006 with an outstanding warrant for possession of narcotics and violating probation.
The whereabouts of F.Y.s father were initially unknown. He was subsequently found and waived his right to reunification services.
Appellant already had 12 children; five children tested positive for cocaine at birth, and six children were involved in dependency proceedings based on neglect, physical abuse, caretaker absence, and substance abuse issues. The court had terminated reunification services for four children, denied reunification services for two children, and terminated her parental rights for three children. Appellant admitted her older children were removed because of her drug problem. Appellant wanted to have her 12 children back and be a family, and claimed not to have used cocaine since November 2006.
Appellant admitted she knew about the aunts drug problem when she left F.Y. with her, but she thought the aunt was clean and sober and able to care for the child. Appellant told the social worker that she had been HIV positive since 2004, and had recently been weak and tired and had lost weight. However, she claimed everything was "under control" and she could now take care of F.Y. with a neighbors assistance.
The petition
In November 2006, a petition was filed in the Superior Court of Sacramento County which alleged F.Y. was a dependent child pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j), based on appellants leaving the child with an inappropriate care provider, appellants substance abuse problems which impaired her ability to care for F.Y. and her older children, and the removal of her older children from her custody. The court ordered the child detained and placed in foster care, with appellant to have weekly supervised visitation. The court also issued an order authorizing CPS to consent to the childs medical care; the order stated that HIV testing could be authorized by the parent or by the court if the parent did not consent. CPS reported that F.Y. was healthy and well-adjusted to foster care. After F.Y. was detained, however, CPS had "an extremely difficult time" contacting appellant to arrange for a visit. She scheduled then cancelled a visit for early December 2006.
All further statutory citations are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise indicated.
On February 21, 2007, a first amended petition was filed, which again alleged F.Y. was a dependent child pursuant to section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). On the same day, the court conducted the jurisdiction hearing, found the allegations true, ordered the child detained, and transferred the matter to Fresno County, appellants legal residence. The child remained in foster care and the court ordered reasonable supervised visitation for appellant.
Transfer to Fresno County
On March 15, 2007, the Superior Court of Fresno County accepted jurisdiction and set the disposition hearing. Appellant was in custody in the Fresno County jail but she was present at the hearing and stated that she was going to be released that day. She requested an inpatient drug treatment program and visitation with F.Y. The court ordered respondent, the Fresno County Department of Children and Family Services, to provide appellant with a substance abuse evaluation and an inpatient program. The court also ordered that appellant have reasonable supervised visits with F.Y.
The disposition hearing
In April 2007, respondent submitted the disposition report, which summarized the reasons for F.Y.s detention in Sacramento, and noted that appellant sent F.Y. to live with his aunt because appellant had been diagnosed "with an immune compromising disease since 2004" and she was unable to care for the child. Appellant had not participated in reunification services since F.Y. was detained in November 2006, and had only one visit with F.Y. while the case was still in Sacramento County.
After the March 2007 transfer to Fresno County, appellant did not have any visits with the child, she failed to contact respondent, and respondent could not locate her. Respondent subsequently determined appellant was in custody in state prison in Chowchilla. Respondent also determined that at the sentencing hearing in the criminal matter the court offered to place appellant in an inpatient substance abuse treatment program but she chose to serve prison time instead.
Respondent reported that in March 2007 F.Y. had a medical examination and was in good health. He was in foster care, developmentally on target, did not have any behavioral problems, and was very happy and healthy. F.Y. did not show any signs of distress from being separated from appellant, and it did not appear that appellant had a significant bond with F.Y.
Respondent recommended denial of reunification services to appellant with the permanent plan being adoption. Respondent believed the possibility of reunification was very poor based on appellants choice of serving prison time instead of participating in an inpatient program in the criminal matter, her continuing drug problem and her inability to complete reunification services within the statutory six-month timeframe.
On April 26, 2007, the court held the disposition hearing and appellant submitted the matter on respondents report. Appellant was still in prison and requested visits with F.Y. The court denied reunification services and set the section 366.26 hearing. The court ordered appellant to have reasonable supervised visits with F.Y. while she was incarcerated.
Appellants petition for modification
On November 1, 2007, appellant filed a section 388 petition and argued there were changed circumstances because she had been released from prison, she was living at a transitional living center, and she had been testing clean. Appellant argued she had a strong bond with F.Y. and wanted to reunify with him. On the same day, the court denied the petition and found appellants assertion of a strong bond with F.Y. was refuted by evidence of the poor quality and infrequency of her visits. The court acknowledged F.Y. displayed some affection toward appellant, but that was "something different than whether or not there is a sufficient prima facie case that granting reunification services at this time would be in [the childs] best interests." The court granted appellants motion for a contested section 366.26 hearing.
Respondents section 366.26 report
Appellant sought a contested section 366.26 hearing to argue that her parental rights should not be terminated because she had a strong bond with the child. Respondent filed several reports as to the nature and frequency of appellants visits with F.Y. since the childs detention in November 2006. Appellant had one visit with F.Y. while the case was still in Sacramento. After the case was transferred to Fresno County in March 2007, respondent had trouble finding appellant and finally located her in prison.
In June 2007, respondent transported F.Y. for a visit with appellant in prison. Appellant arrived in the visiting area over an hour late. The other inmates surrounded them and appellant handed off the child to the other women. Appellant had to be prompted to hold the child and, when she did, the child repeatedly cried and appellant requested termination of the 20-minute visit.
Appellant was released from prison in July or August 2007, and respondent had difficulty contacting her to arrange visits. However, appellant had six visits with F.Y. starting in September 2007, pursuant to the court order for one-hour monthly supervised visits.
"During these visits, [appellant] greeted the minor with hugs and kisses. [F.Y.] does not appear to react to [appellant] initially, but will smile at her. [F.Y. appears comfortable playing and interacting in [appellants] presence, but does not seek [appellant] out for affection unless [she] requests a hug or kiss. [F.Y.] will respond that he loves [her] after she tells him this first. [Appellant] refers to herself as `mom during visits, but minor does not refer to her as this. [Appellant] commonly takes pictures of the minor while playing in the room, will read [F.Y.] a book, and have him repeat his numbers and colors or play with him on the floor. [F.Y.] enjoys throwing a football back and forth with [appellant] and at times will play in the play house located in the visitation room. When visits end, [appellant] gives the minor hugs and kisses goodbye. [Appellant] tells [F.Y] she loves him and minor responds that he loves her, much like he repeats other statements made by [her] during the visits. [F.Y.] does not appear upset when leaving [her], but instead easily with the transporter."
Respondent reported that F.Y. appeared content to interact with appellant during these visits but only sought her out to give hugs and kisses when prompted. The social workers professional opinion was that appellant and F.Y. "share a friendly visitor relationship at most. While [F.Y.] appears content interacting with [appellant] during visits, he does not look to her for his ongoing care and support," and he had been out of his mothers care for over half of his life.
Respondent recommended termination of parental rights with adoption as the most appropriate plan. Respondent believed F.Y. was "generally adoptable" because he was one year old, physically and emotionally healthy, developmentally on target, and able to form positive attachments. The foster parents were committed to adoption, and F.Y. referred to the foster mother as "mom" and appeared to have a positive attachment to her. Respondent believed another adoptive home could be identified if F.Y. had not already been placed in an identified adoptive home.
The contested section 366.26 hearing
On May 6 and 8, 2008, the contested section 366.26 hearing was held. Traci Anderson Morales had been the social worker on the case since June 2007, and testified about the visitation reports. Morales supervised five visits between appellant and F.Y. and another social worker supervised three visits.
Morales testified F.Y. recognized appellant as a familiar face but not as his mother, and he did not have a bond with her. F.Y. called appellant his mother only when prompted to do so. F.Y. once looked at appellant and asked where his mother was, because he called his foster mother by that name. Morales testified there were one or two occasions when F.Y. opened his arms to appellant when he saw her.
Morales testified that appellant arrived on time for the visits, she dressed appropriately, she played with F.Y., and she was respectful toward the child. Appellant usually brought snacks and clothes to their visits, and F.Y. smiled when he received the gifts. Morales did not see F.Y. wear any of the clothes on subsequent visits but she did not know the reason. F.Y. played with appellant, he laughed and interacted with her appropriately, and he did not cry when he was with her. There were also times when appellant just watched F.Y. play without interacting with him. F.Y. never appeared upset or distressed when the visits ended, and he just had no reaction when appellant left. Morales testified she would have expected to see some type of reaction if appellant had a stronger relationship with F.Y. Appellant brought one of F.Y.s half-brothers to one of the visits, and Morales did not see any relationship between the children.
Morales testified appellant did not have a parental relationship with F.Y. "When the visits begin there is just on a few occasions there was a reaction to it. For the most part its blank. Hes comfortable during visits with [appellant], he interacts with her. When a visit ends there is no distress, he leaves willingly." F.Y. had a parental relationship with his foster parents, referred to the foster mother as "mom," and showed affection to the foster siblings. Morales testified F.Y. did not have a substantial positive attachment with appellant, he was not likely to miss his visits if they ended, and he would not suffer any detriment from the termination of appellants parental rights.
Appellant interrupted Moraless testimony and accused her of lying about the nature of her visits. Morales acknowledged appellant had some animosity toward her but those feelings did not affect Moraless opinions about the case. Morales testified appellant complained to respondent about her presence during the visits with F.Y., and she disagreed with Moraless views about the case.
Appellant testified at the hearing, and explained she was living in a substance abuse treatment facility when F.Y. was born. She had a drug problem at the time but the child did not test positive for drugs at birth. Appellant raised F.Y. for the first year of his life, she never used drugs while F.Y. lived with her, and she participated in voluntary services to retain custody of F.Y.
Appellant testified she left F.Y. with the aunt in Sacramento because she was "going through medical problems" and she needed help. She knew about the aunts prior drug problem but thought she had been clean and sober for three years.
Appellant explained she was sent to prison for violating probation in a 2004 drug case. After appellant was released from prison, she lived in a residential treatment facility. She was currently on parole, she attended Alcoholics Anonymous and Narcotics Anonymous meetings, and she had been clean and sober for nine months. Appellant testified she was complying with the terms of parole because she wanted her baby back, and she wanted to stay clean and sober for "me and [F.Y.]."
Appellant disputed Moraless opinions about the quality of her visits with F.Y. Appellant testified F.Y. recognized her during the contact visit in prison, but the child was confused and upset, and appellant ended the visit because F.Y. was tired. After appellant was released from prison, she repeatedly tried to arrange visits, but Morales never called her back. Appellant finally began regular visits in September 2007, and she always brought clothes, toys, or snacks to the visits. F.Y. was happy to see her and receive the gifts. However, F.Y. often was not dressed in clean and appropriate clothes for their visits, and appellant was upset that on subsequent visits he never wore the clothes she had given him as presents.
Appellant testified Moraless reports about their visits were false, and that F.Y. recognized appellant when he arrived for visits, he was always happy to see her, he always opened his arms to her, and called her "momma" and said he loved her without being prompted. Appellant felt there was still a bond between them and that F.Y. knew she was his mother. Appellant opposed adoption because F.Y. "needs his mother" and she could provide him with "[l]ove, care, a place to stay." Appellant admitted her parental rights for her older children had been terminated and she did not have custody of any of her children.
Richard Banuelos, a social worker, testified respondents first contact with F.Y. occurred in January 2006, when appellant left him with several strangers. Appellant accepted voluntary family maintenance services from January to September 2006, and Banuelos was her social worker. Appellant lived in an inpatient drug treatment program, then moved to a transitional facility, and then lived in an apartment with F.Y. while she continued in an intensive outpatient drug treatment program. Banuelos went to the apartment numerous times. The apartment was always neat and clean and he did not see any evidence of ongoing neglect.
Banuelos testified appellant completed the program in August 2006 and the program organizers held a "graduation" for appellant and other clients. Banuelos described appellant as an "inspiration" to the program because despite her prior negative history with her older children she was able to overcome her problems and complete the program. Banuelos observed a bond between appellant and F.Y. while he supervised the case. Banuelos conceded he did not know anything about appellant and F.Y. after September 2006, aside from the fact that F.Y. was taken into protective custody in Sacramento.
At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found the case was sad and unfortunate from appellants point of view, but it was compelled to review the matter based on the best interests of the child. The court found clear and convincing evidence was "sufficiently established" that it was likely that F.Y. would be adopted. The court noted appellant sought to establish that adoption would not be in the childs best interests because of the bond between parent and child, but it was appellants burden to establish that exception by a preponderance of the evidence. The court stated there was "a very high standard" to establish that exception, and that simply showing "frequent and loving contact" and a positive relationship was not sufficient. The court further stated, "It must be shown that there is such a positive parental child relationship that terminating that relationship would be detrimental to the minor. That has not been established in this case that there is detriment that would occur in any amount if that relationship were severed."
The court had no doubt that appellant deeply loved F.Y., but found evidence of such possible detriment was speculative, and more than mere speculation was required. The court found that appellants testimony failed to meet that burden, and even if there were occasions when F.Y. "referred to [appellant] as momma even unprompted there is no evidence in the record that detriment would occur to [F.Y.] let alone to the extent required by the law to find that the exception has been established." The court terminated parental rights and found adoption was in the best interests of the child.
On appeal, appellant contends the courts finding of adoptability is not supported by substantial evidence, and the court should have found that termination of appellants parental rights would be detrimental to the child because there was a strong bond between them.
DISCUSSION
I. Substantial evidence of adoptability.
Appellant contends the courts finding that F.Y. was adoptable is not supported by substantial evidence because there is no evidence that F.Y. was not HIV positive. Appellant cites to statements in the record that she was diagnosed as HIV positive in 2004 and F.Y. was born in 2005, and argues the court should have ordered an HIV test to make sure the child was adoptable.
In order to terminate parental rights, the juvenile court must find by clear and convincing evidence that it is likely the child will be adopted within a reasonable time. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Jerome D. (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 1200, 1204-1205.) On appeal, we review the juvenile courts order to determine whether the record contains substantial evidence from which a reasonable trier of fact could find clear and convincing evidence that the child was likely to be adopted. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1); In re Lukas B. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1145, 1154; In re Asia L. (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 498, 509-510.) We therefore "presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order." (In re Autumn H. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 567, 576; In re Josue G. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 725, 732.)
"The issue of adoptability requires the court to focus on the child, and whether the childs age, physical condition, and emotional state make it difficult to find a person willing to adopt. [Citations.] It is not necessary that the child already be placed in a preadoptive home, or that a proposed adoptive parent be waiting. [Citations.] However, there must be convincing evidence of the likelihood that adoption will take place within a reasonable time. [Citation.]" (In re Brian P. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 616, 624.)
"Usually, the fact that a prospective adoptive parent has expressed interest in adopting the minor is evidence that the minors age, physical condition, mental state, and other matters relating to the child are not likely to dissuade individuals from adopting the minor. In other words, a prospective adoptive parents willingness to adopt generally indicates the minor is likely to be adopted within a reasonable time either by the prospective adoptive parent or by some other family. [Citation.]" (In re Sarah M. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1642, 1649-1650, italics in original.) Alternatively, evidence of "approved families willing to adopt a child of [this] `age, physical condition, and emotional state" can be used to evaluate the likelihood of the childs adoption. (In re Jerome D., supra, 84 Cal.App.4th at p. 1205; In re Jennilee T. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 212, 224-225.)
In the instant case, the courts finding of adoptability is supported by substantial evidence, which showed that F.Y. was a happy and healthy child, developmentally on target, and had bonded with his foster family. Respondent reported F.Y. was adoptable, his current foster family was willing to adopt F.Y., and he referred to his foster mother as "mom."
Appellant concedes the existence of such evidence but asserts the courts finding of adoptability must be reversed because of the possibility that F.Y. is HIV positive, based on appellants statement to the social worker that she was diagnosed as HIV positive in 2004, and F.Y. was born in 2005. Appellant asserts that without knowledge of F.Y.s HIV status, "a certain amount of discomfort exists regarding the childs adoptability." Appellant argues the courts adoptability finding was premature and F.Y. will likely lose the prospective adoptive placement "if it is determined at a future date that he was born HIV positive."
Appellant has waived review of this speculative contention. A parents failure to raise an issue in the juvenile court prevents the parent from presenting the issue to the appellate court. (In re Lorenzo C. (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1338-1339; In re Elijah V. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 576, 582.) "[A]ny other rule would permit a party to trifle with the courts. The party could deliberately stand by in silence and thereby permit the proceedings to reach a conclusion in which the party could acquiesce if favorable and avoid if unfavorable. [Citations]" (In re Lorenzo C., supra, 54 Cal.App.4th at p. 1339.) "[I]f the law does not require the juvenile court to act in a certain way, the parent bears the responsibility to care for his or her own interests by asking the court to exercise its discretion in a manner favorable to the parent. In such circumstances, the courts have not permitted the silent parent to argue that the juvenile court erred in not being psychic." (Ibid.)
Appellant never raised this issue during the lengthy dependency proceedings and has necessarily waived such a claim on appeal. Moreover, appellants insistence that the child might be HIV positive, or that he was never tested, is speculative based on the evidence before this court. First, we note that the only evidence of appellants HIV status was her own statement to the social worker and the aunts uncertain report about some type of immune problem. When appellant testified at the contested hearing, she only said that she sent F.Y. to live with the aunt because she was "going through medical problems," but did not clarify the issue. There is no medical evidence to confirm appellants claim of being HIV positive even though she had been involved in juvenile dependency proceedings, sent to prison, and attended both in- and outpatient drug treatment programs for years.
Next, while appellant insists there is no evidence that F.Y. was tested for HIV, we note the record also supports the opposite supposition—that given his mothers claimed medical history, he might have been tested and found negative, which is why the record is silent on that issue. The reports prepared in this case, for the proceedings in both Sacramento and Fresno Counties, contained the aunts statement that appellant left F.Y. with her because appellant was ill with an "Immune Compromising Disease" and could not care for the child. The reports also contained appellants statement to a social worker she had been HIV positive since 2004. The Sacramento County juvenile court issued a standard order authorizing CPS to consent to the childs medical care, which included the provision that HIV testing could be authorized by the parent, or by the court if the parent did not consent. Both the Sacramento and Fresno County reports stated F.Y. had gone through medical checkups and he was found to be healthy and developmentally on target and he did not have any behavioral problems. In the section 366.26 reports, filed in May 2008, respondent reported F.Y. was "generally adoptable" because he was one year old, physically and emotionally healthy, developmentally on target, and able to form positive attachments.
The entirety of the record shows that all the parties were well aware of appellants claimed HIV status during the entirety of this case, but appellant never raised this issue during the lengthy proceedings and the evidence was undisputed that F.Y. was in good health. We thus conclude the courts finding of adoptability is supported by substantial evidence, and appellants claims regarding F.Y.s purported HIV status are speculative and have been waived based on her failure to raise this issue below.
II. The beneficial relationship exception.
Appellant next contends that even if the courts finding of adoptability is supported by substantial evidence, the court abused its discretion by failing to find a beneficial relationship existed between appellant and F.Y. such that termination of her parental rights was detrimental to the child.
Once reunification services are ordered terminated, the focus shifts to the needs of the child for permanency and stability. (In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309.) If the child is likely to be adopted, then adoption is the norm. The court must order adoption and termination of parental rights unless one of the statutorily specified circumstances provides a compelling reason for finding termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child. (In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.)
One of the specified circumstances is the beneficial relationship exception, which exists where the parent maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship. (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) The parent has the burden to show that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child under the beneficial relationship exception. (In re S.B. (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 289, 297; In re Valerie A. (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 987, 997.)
Since contact between parent and child generally confers some benefit on a child, the parent must demonstrate more than pleasant visits or frequent and loving contact. (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 942, 953-954.) "Interaction between natural parent and child will always confer some incidental benefit to the child. . . . The exception applies only where the court finds regular visits and contact have continued or developed a significant, positive, emotional attachment from child to parent." (In re Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 575.) If severing the existing parental relationship would deprive the child of "a substantial, positive emotional attachment such that the child would be greatly harmed, the preference for adoption is overcome and the natural parents rights are not terminated." (Ibid.) In determining whether the beneficial relationship exception applies, the juvenile court takes into account variables such as the childs age, the portion of the childs life spent in the parents custody, the positive or negative effect of interaction between the parent and child, and the childs individualized needs. (In re Jasmine D. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1349-1350.)
In addition, section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) does not mandate that the court choose a permanent plan other than adoption if the court finds the existence of the beneficial relationship exception. Instead, the subdivision merely permits the court, in exceptional circumstances, to choose an option other than adoption. (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)
The juvenile courts ruling on the beneficial relationship exception is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1351.) "Because a section 366.26 hearing occurs only after the court has repeatedly found the parent unable to meet the childs needs, it is only in an extraordinary case that preservation of the parents rights will prevail over the Legislatures preference for adoptive placement." (Id. at p. 1350.)
The instant matter does not present us with such an extraordinary case. As to the first requirement of regular visitation and contact, F.Y. was detained in November 2006, and appellant only had a few visits with F.Y. during the four months the case was held in Sacramento County. At some point, appellant was taken into custody but she failed to notify respondent of her whereabouts and it took some time to locate her after the case was transferred to Fresno County in March 2007. Respondent finally learned she was in prison. While appellant had requested the juvenile court to order an inpatient drug treatment program, which would have allowed her to have visits with F.Y., she declined the opportunity to attend such a program when she appeared for sentencing in the unrelated criminal matter. The juvenile court provided for visitation while she was incarcerated, but appellant terminated the single prison visit after only 20 minutes, during most of which F.Y. was held by other inmates. As of September 2007, after she was released from prison, appellant utilized the court order for monthly supervised visits. By that time, however, the child had been in foster care for nearly a year.
As to the significance of the parent-child relationship, the juvenile court herein noted that appellant obviously felt love and affection for F.Y., but she failed to establish that the relationship between them was so strong that F.Y. would suffer detriment from termination of that relationship. F.Y. was nearly three years old and had only lived with appellant for the first year of his life. Thereafter, appellant left him with the aunt who had the cocaine problem, while appellant relapsed into cocaine use. After F.Y. was detained, appellant had only a few sporadic visits with the child. By the time she finally started to have regular visits with F.Y., reunification services were denied and the section 366.26 hearing had been set. In the meantime, F.Y. formed a close and loving bond with his foster mother, and the foster parents were committed to adoption.
Appellant argues there was evidence of her strong bond with F.Y. based on the testimony of Richard Banuelos, the social worker who supervised appellants participation in voluntary family maintenance services in 2006. Appellant asserts Banueloss testimony was more reliable and persuasive than the opinions offered by Traci Anderson Morales, the social worker involved in the instant case, because Banuelos spent more time with appellant and F.Y. than did Morales.
A review of Banueloss testimony refutes appellants assertions. Banuelos testified appellant successfully completed voluntary services and a drug treatment program, appellants success was hailed as an inspiration because of her prior history of dependency issues, and Banuelos observed a definite bond between appellant and F.Y. However, Banueloss testimony was based on his interaction with appellant between January and September 2006; he did not have any contact with her after that time. Banuelos was unaware that in September 2006, appellant left F.Y. with the aunt in Sacramento, even though she knew the aunt had a cocaine problem. Banuelos was also unaware that appellant returned to Fresno and relapsed into cocaine use even though she had just completed a drug treatment program, and that she failed to have regular visitation with F.Y. until nearly a year after the child was detained.
Appellant challenges Moraless testimony about the quality of her visits with F.Y., and accuses Morales of being reluctant to acknowledge that F.Y. knew appellant as his mother or that there was a loving relationship between them. Appellant asserts her own testimony was more reliable about her interactions with F.Y., that F.Y. enjoyed being with her and did not have to be prompted to call her "mom" and say that he loved her. At most, however, F.Y. recognized appellant as a friendly person and enjoyed being with her. A parents "frequent and loving contact" with a child is insufficient to show detriment if the relationship is terminated. (In re Beatrice M. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1411, 1418.) The relationship between the parent and child must be sufficiently significant that the child would suffer detriment from its termination. (In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468.) "In other words, for the exception to apply, the emotional attachment between the child and parent must be that of parent and child rather than one of being a friendly visitor or friendly nonparent relative . . . . [Citation.]" (Ibid.) "[A] child should not be deprived of an adoptive parent when the natural parent has maintained a relationship that may be beneficial to some degree but does not meet the childs need for a parent." (In re Jasmine D., supra, 78 Cal.App.4th at p. 1350.)
While appellant sought to show that she acted lovingly and appropriately with F.Y. during her most recent visits, she failed to present any evidence that F.Y.s relationship with her was so significant that termination would cause any detriment to the child. Accordingly, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion when it found the beneficial relationship exception did not exist. (See, e.g., In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at pp. 468-469.)
DISPOSITION
The order terminating parental rights is affirmed.