The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, 18 U.S.C. § 983 et seq. ("CAFRA") "was enacted, in part, to curb what Congress perceived as abuses of the existing civil forfeiture system" because "prior to CAFRA, . . . there was no general-purpose statutory requirement that the government commence a civil forfeiture action-either administrative or judicial-within any specific period of time following the seizure of property." In re Funds on Deposit, 919 F. Supp. 2d 169, 172 (D. Mass. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Consistent with the legislative purpose, 18 U.S.C. § 983, titled "General rules for civil forfeiture proceedings," sets deadlines for commencement of administrative and judicial forfeiture proceedings.
This language presupposes that a nonjudicial forfeiture is pending before a proper seized asset claim can be filed. See also In re Funds on Deposit , 919 F.Supp.2d 169, 172–77 (D. Mass. 2012) ; Chaim v. United States , 692 F.Supp.2d 461, 465–66 (D.N.J. 2010) ; United States v. 1866.75 Board Feet of Dipteryx Panamensis , 587 F.Supp.2d 740, 751 (E.D. Va. 2008). A contrary interpretation would render the emphasized statutory text “mere surplusage, a result we try to avoid,” Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl , ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 1124, 1132, 191 L.Ed.2d 97 (2015) ; see also, e.g. , Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth. , 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2015) (“We assume ... that every word in a statute has meaning and avoid interpreting one part of a statute in a manner that renders another part superfluous.”). Given that property must be seized in a nonjudicial forfeiture proceeding before a seized asset claim triggers the Government's ninety-day period to respond, for the Langbords' argument to succeed, they would have to show that the Mint's retention of the coins initiated a nonjudicial forfeiture.
This language presupposes that a nonjudicial forfeiture is pending before a proper seized asset claim can be filed. See also In re Funds on Deposit, 919 F.Supp.2d 169, 172-77 (D. Mass. 2012); Chaim v. United States, 692 F.Supp.2d 461, 465-66 (D.N.J. 2010); United States v. 1866.75 Board Feet of Dipteryx Panamensis, 587 F.Supp.2d 740, 751 (E.D. Va. 2008). A contrary interpretation would render the emphasized statutory text "mere surplusage, a result we try to avoid," Direct Mktg. Ass'n v. Brohl, — U.S. —, 135 S.Ct. 1124, 1132, 191 L.Ed.2d 97 (2015); see also, e.g., Disabled in Action of Pa. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 539 F.3d 199, 210 (3d Cir. 2015) ("We assume ... that every word in a statute has meaning and avoid interpreting one part of a statute in a manner that renders another part superfluous.").
As for Credit Suisse's argument that it is inequitable to apply a six percent rate, established in different era, in today's low-rate environment, "the remedy is a legislative amendment, not judicial fiat." In re Funds on Deposit , 919 F.Supp.2d 169, 177 (D. Mass. 2012). IV. CONCLUSION
See 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(1)(A)(i) ("[I]n any nonjudicial civilforfeiture proceeding . . . notice shall be sent . . . [within] 60 days after the date of seizure") (emphasis added); United States v. $78,700.00, 2014 WL 1342863, *4-5 (W. D. Tex. April 3, 2014); In re Funds on Deposit, 919 F. Supp. 2d 169, 173-78 (D. Mass. 2012); United States v. $147,900.00 in U.S. Currency, 2009 WL 903356, *4 (M.D. N.C. Mar. 31, 2009), vacated in part on other grounds, 450 Fed. Appx. 261 (4th Cir. 2011). While not raised by Santana in his motion to set aside the forfeiture complaint, the undersigned directed the Government to file a supplement to their response, addressing the applicable statute of limitations and the timeliness of the institution of this forfeiture action.