We are not without compassion for the respondent because of the distressing situation which engulfs him, but we cannot overlook the fact that his burdened circumstances and his conviction were the inevitable consequence of his own deeds. We recognize that while the respondent's conviction is conclusive evidence of his guilt ( In re Fumo, (1972), 52 Ill.2d 307, 309), it does not preclude consideration of other evidence for the purpose of determining the appropriate disciplinary action. ( In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill.2d 307, 310; In re Crane (1961), 23 Ill.2d 398, 401-402.)
In support of this argument, respondent asserts that he was not acting as an Illinois attorney at the time of the offense, that he was sentenced pursuant to a Florida statute which vacates the conviction following probation and that he was entitled to the money he received as salary. This court has consistently stated that conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is conclusive evidence of an attorney's guilt and a ground for disbarment ( In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill.2d 307, 309; In re Eaton (1958), 14 Ill.2d 338, 340; In re Carr (1941), 377 Ill. 140, 143), and that moral turpitude is shown when, as here, the crime involves fraud or fraudulent conduct ( In re Teitelbaum (1958), 13 Ill.2d 586, 588; In re Needham (1936), 364 Ill. 65, 70). However, since it is not the conviction itself which gives rise to discipline but the underlying conduct, it is essential that we consider all of the circumstances attendant the conviction.
Respondent engaged in serious misconduct leading to a criminal conviction for his participation in a scheme to defraud Union Oil. A crime in which fraud is an element involves moral turpitude. ( In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill.2d 307, 309; In re Eaton (1958), 14 Ill.2d 338, 340; In re Needham (1936), 364 Ill. 65, 70.) However, respondent profited very little from the transactions in question, receiving only about $8,500 in attorney fees, which may properly be considered as a mitigating factor.
Such misconduct manifests a serious breach of trust, and "tends to defeat the administration of justice and to bring the legal profession into disrepute." ( In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill.2d 307, 311.) For these reasons, there is no question that the offense of conversion is sufficient to justify disbarment. ( E.g.
Under Illinois law, that crime involves moral turpitude. In re Hutul, 54 Ill.2d 209, 214, 215, 296 N.E.2d 332 (1973); In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307, 309, 288 N.E.2d 9 (1972). We affirmed this conviction in United States v. Bornstein and Grossgold, 447 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1971), certiorari denied, 404 U.S. 851, 92 S.Ct. 88, 30 L.Ed.2d 91.
See, e.g., In re Metheany, 104 Ariz. 144, 449 P.2d 609 (1969); In re Higbie, 6 Cal.3d 562, 99 Cal.Rptr. 865, 493 P.2d 97 (1972); In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307, 288 N.E.2d 9 (1972); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lester, 437 S.W.2d 958 (Ky. 1968); In re Lurkins, 374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1964). The constitutionality of these procedures has not been seriously questioned.
See, e.g., In re Metheany, 104 Ariz. 144, 449 P.2d 609 (1969); In re Higbie, 6 Cal.3d 562, 99 Cal.Rptr. 865, 493 P.2d 97 (1972); In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307, 288 N.E.2d 9 (1972); Kentucky State Bar Ass'n v. Lester, 437 S.W.2d 958 (Ky. 1968); In re Lurkins, 374 S.W.2d 67 (Mo. 1964). The constitutionality of these procedures has not been seriously questioned.
( Cf. In re Feldman (1982), 89 Ill.2d 7 (disbarment warranted in conversion cases where intentional improper acts extended over a period of time); In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill.2d 307 (same principle involving fraudulent activity).) It is anomalous that the administration of justice should be obstructed for five years, while a perpetrator thereof is suspended for one. This is particularly unfortunate because, assuming Arambasich's character is as reprehensible as we are led to believe, respondent's failure to report his activities undoubtedly caused other members of the public to suffer the extortionist's demands.
Although these cases alone indicate that the disbarment of respondent is clearly warranted, there are numerous other cases to the same effect. (See, e.g., In re Fumo (1972), 52 Ill.2d 307; In re Snitoff (1972), 53 Ill.2d 50; In re Lingle (1963), 27 Ill.2d 459; In re Patlak (1938), 368 Ill. 547.) As this court stated in In re Stillo (1977), 68 Ill.2d 49, 54: "When a lawyer * * * converts a client's funds to his own personal use he commits an act involving moral turpitude, and, in the absence of mitigating circumstances, such conversion is a gross violation of the attorney's oath, calling for the attorney's disbarment." ( In re Royal (1963), 29 Ill.2d 458, 464; In re Ahern (1962), 26 Ill.2d 104, 110.)
In other jurisdictions the specific crime of mail fraud has been held to be a crime involving moral turpitude for which an attorney can be disbarred. In re Fumo, 52 Ill.2d 307, 288 N.E.2d 9, 11 (1972); Louisiana State Bar Ass'n v. Hennigan, 340 So.2d 264, 269 (La. 1976); Neibling v. Terry, 177 S.W.2d 502, 503 (Mo. 1944) (en banc); Ohio State Bar Ass'n v. Mackay, 46 Ohio St.2d 81, 346 N.E.2d 302, 303 (1976); In re Comyns, 132 Wn. 391, 232 P. 269, 270 (1925); In re West, 155 W. Va. 648, 186 S.E.2d 776, 778 (1972). In Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Reamer, 281 Md. 323, 379 A.2d 171, 173-74 (1977) the Maryland Court of Appeals held: