This court finds that, by Respondent's actions and omissions in this case he seriously violated several provisions of the Hawaii Code of Professional Responsibility, including at the very least the following three Disciplinary Rules: DR1-102(A)(4), which prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation; DR7-106(A), which prohibits an attorney from disregarding a ruling of a tribunal made in the course of a proceeding; and DR 1-102(A)(5), which prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice — in this case, the administration of the bankruptcy laws by the bankruptcy court. Cf. In re Corey, 55 Haw. 47, 50, 515 P.2d 400, 402 (1973) (attorney suspended for six months because of misrepresentation to mortgagee savings and loan association "by direct actions and also be way of acquiescence through silence"); In re French, 28 Haw. 47 (1924) (attorney disbarred because of misrepresentations to district magistrate in a collusive lawsuit which had been brought by the attorney against his client to deter the client's true creditor). Of course such unapproved disbursements after the filing of the petition for bankruptcy amounted to improper diminution of the bankrupt's assets where, as here, the disbursements were to be expended by the bankrupt and by Respondent rather than being preserved in trust for the bankrupt's creditors.

The misconduct must be shown by clear and convincing evidence before disciplinary action will be taken and any reasonable doubt will be resolved in favor of the accused. In re French, 28 Haw. 47, 65 (1924). Accord, Black v. State Bar of California, supra; In re Melnick, 383 Ill. 200, 48 N.E.2d 935 (1943).

It has been held in this jurisdiction that in disciplinary proceedings the charge against an attorney accused of unprofessional conduct must be sustained by clear and convincing proof. In re Davis, 15 Haw. 220; In re French, 28 Haw. 47; In re Bouslog-Sawyer, 41 Haw. 403. These cases were decided when the rule governing disciplinary proceedings contained no provision respecting the quantum of proof. The rule (rule 16) governing this proceeding was adopted in 1955.

In re Bevins, 26 Haw. 570 (1922) Three months. 47. In re French, 28 Haw. 47 (1924) X 48. In re Lyman, 30 Haw. 405 (1928) X

It is a duty they owe to themselves, the bar and the public, to see that a power which may be wielded for good or for evil is not entrusted to incompetent or dishonest hands". People v. Keegan, 18 Colo. 237, 239, adopted as a correct statement of the law in this jurisdiction in the case entitled In Re French, 28 Haw. 47, 61. To the same effect are 3 A. E. Ency. L. 302 and 6 C.J. 583, 584. In the present instance the charges are specifically set forth in the petition of the attorney general and the respondent's misconduct is disclosed in even greater detail in the transcript of the testimony which he gave before a jury in the trial of ex-Sheriff Desha and Achuck. Without qualification, the respondent has expressly admitted in this court in this proceeding for disbarment that all of the allegations of the petition are true and that the transcript correctly reports his testimony at the trial before the jury.

What the order of this court should be upon the foregoing facts found by us is not open to doubt. The principles applicable to such a case are set forth at some length in the opinion of this court in the case of George K. French, 28 Haw. 47, 60-65. Quoting again from some of the cases there followed:

In defining the term "material," as applied to perjury, much has been said by judicial and text-writers. The consensus of opinion, however, has nowhere been more accurately epitomized than in 30 Cyc., 1418, which received the approval of this court in Re French, 28 Haw. 47, 56. The text from Cyc. is as follows: "False testimony is deemed material not only when directly pertinent to the main issue, but also when it has a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove any material fact in the chain of evidence." It cannot be denied, of course, that the main issues in the sexual intercourse case were whether the defendant had sexual intercourse with the girl named in the indictment and whether she was under the age of sixteen years.